Martinez v. Palmer
| Decision Date | 21 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:10-cv-00748-MMD-VPC |
| Parties | PEDRO ROSALES MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. COLBY PALMER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights based on allegations of failure to disclose material exculpatory and impeachment evidence in his criminal trial as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint ("FAC") with leave of court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this Court's earlier dismissal order. Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2014).
There are essentially three groups of defendants named in the FAC who have filed motions seeking dismissal, a more definite statement, or to strike Plaintiff's response: (1) the State of Nevada, Aaron Hurley, K.M. Lorenzo, Jennifer Reichelt, Mark Smith, and Mark Woods ("State Defendants"); (2) Washoe County and the Washoe County District Attorney's Office ("County Defendants"); and (3) the City of Reno, the Reno Police Department, Colby Palmer, and Rick Ayala ("City Defendants"). State Defendants filed a Motion to Quash Service of Process and Motion to Dismiss (dkt. no. 104)1 and a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Quash Service of Process and Motion to Dismiss (dkt. no. 106). County Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint ("County Defendants' Motion") (dkt. no. 71), and a Motion to Strike Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (dkt. no. 98). City Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (dkt. no. 77). Additionally, Defendant Heidi Poe filed a Renewed Motion for More Definite Statement (dkt. no. 61).
Plaintiff has filed a motion for extension of time (dkt. no. 76) to respond to County Defendants' Motion (dkt. no. 71) and an Application for Entry of Default (dkt. no. 110).
The following background facts are taken from Plaintiff's FAC. (Dkt. no. 57.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was charged with, and convicted of, offenses related to drug transactions in his criminal case ("Criminal Case"). Defendants Colby Palmer, Mark Ayala, and John Doe officers with the Reno Police Department orchestrated Plaintiff's arrest by offering a convicted felon — Gaudalupe Cortez, who had been arrested for trafficking in controlled substances — probation in exchange for becoming a confidential informant and delivering someone else who could be charged with drug offenses at least equal to the charges that Cortez faced. (Id. at 9-10.) As part of the deal, Cortez solicited Plaintiff, his "friend of several years," to act as a "middleman" in connection with several drug transactions that led to Plaintiff's arrest and charge. (Id.)
Plaintiff asserted an entrapment defense in his Criminal Case. (Id. at 12.) The Court granted his counsel's motion to disclose the name and criminal history of the confidential informant (Cortez), but the prosecution only disclosed limited information about Cortez's criminal history (consisting of one conviction for drug trafficking) and withheld information about Cortez's various aliases and extensive criminal history under at least eight different aliases. (Id. at 1, 10-11.) Plaintiff, his counsel, and the prosecutor all referenced Cortez by his alias of Jorge Algarin at trial. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges, based upon information and belief, that Defendants knew "at that time that Cortez had a much lengthier criminal history under several aliases." (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff's counsel subpoenaed Cortez to testify at trial, but Cortez failed to appear. (Id. at 14.) The prosecutor used Cortez's disappearance against Plaintiff at trial and called witnesses from the Department of Parole and Probation (who are named defendants in this case) to offer testimony about Cortez's positive character. (Id. at 13-14.) As a result, Plaintiff was convicted of four out of five counts, including two counts of Trafficking in a Controlled Substance, one count of Unlawful Giving Away of a Controlled Substance and one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff was sentenced to 10 to 25 years for one count of Trafficking in a Controlled Substance, 24 to 48 months for the second count, and 12 to 36 months for one count of Unlawful Giving Away of a Controlled Substance, all to be served concurrently. (Id. at 15-16.)
While in custody, Plaintiff "continued to request Cortez's criminal record and evidence proving that Cortez and Jorge Algarin were in fact the same person." (Id. at 16.) In February 2006, in connection with his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Plaintiff obtained information from the Washoe County Sheriff's Office verifying that Cortez and Joe Algarin-Martinez were the same person. (Id. at 17.) On July 2, 2008, through Plaintiff's efforts, the Department of Parole and Probation disclosed a Supplemental Presentence Investigation Report that detailed Cortez's extensive criminal history. (Id.)
On December 2, 2008, "the state habeas court vacated [Plaintiff's] original convictions on the grounds of cumulative error." (Id. at 18.) To avoid a possible retrial, Plaintiff pled guilty to one of the original counts — Unlawful Giving Away of a Controlled Substance in violation of NRS § 453.321 — and was sentenced to time served. (Id. at 18-19.) Plaintiff was in custody for more than four years. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants either had or should have had possession of the suppressed evidence of Cortez's criminal history and were "deliberately indifferent [to] or recklessly disregarded their constitutional obligation[s] to disclose that evidence." (Dkt. no. 57 at 20.) Plaintiff alleges that the actions of the Reno Police Department and its officers, the Department of Parole and Probation, and the prosecuting attorneys violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
On December 1, 2010, Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in this Court. (Dkt. no. 1.) The Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims as untimely, finding that the applicable two-year statute of limitations period begins to run on a § 1983 claim when a plaintiff knew or had reason to know that his claims had accrued. (Dkt. no. 33.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, clarifying that the limitations period did not begin to run until the underlying conviction was invalidated. Rosales-Martinez, 753 F.3d at 895-96. The Ninth Circuit further directed this Court to give Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his claims against the City of Reno and Washoe County to properly assert municipal liability. Id. at 897. The Ninth Circuit also rejected Palmer's argument that the complaint failed to allege that he acted with deliberate indifference or reckless disregard. Id.
After remand, the Court gave Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint. (Dkt. no. 56.) In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts three counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: count I alleges violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); count II asserts violations of Plaintiff's rights due to the failure to disclose impeachment evidence under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); and count III alleges violations of Plaintiff's civil rights. Defendants have separately moved to dismiss these claims.
A court may dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint must provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 678-79. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Second, a district court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678. Where the complaint fails to "permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not 'shown' — 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration omitted). When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations concerning "all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. at 562 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
Mindful of the fact that "[t]he Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe...
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