Martinez v. Rojo

• Decision Date: 19 May 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-00102-BU
• Parties: BARBARA MARTINEZ, individually and as next friend and guardian of D.B., Plaintiff, v. JOEL DEREK ROJO, individually, and the CITY OF BIG SPRING, TEXAS, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

BARBARA MARTINEZ, individuallyand as next friend and guardian of D.B., Plaintiff, v. JOEL DEREK ROJO, individually, andthe CITY OF BIG SPRING, TEXAS, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-00102-BU

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS ABILENE DIVISION

May 19, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Barbara Martinez ("Martinez"), individually and as next friend and guardian of D.B., brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against Joel Rojo ("Rojo"), in his individual capacity, and the City of Big Spring ("the City"). The City filed a motion for summary judgment.¹ See Dkt. No. 29. Martinez filed a response opposing the motion. See Dkt. No. 38. And the City filed a reply. See Dkt. No. 41.

For the following reasons, the City's motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

In early June 2015, Rojo was a detective with the Big Spring Police Department ("BSPD") when he sexually assaulted a twelve-year-old female ("D.B."), on three separate occasions.² Dkt. No. 1-3 at 4; Dkt. No. 30 at 8. Under the pretext of investigating juveniles for trespass and burglary, Rojo had D.B. remove her clothing and took photos of her exposed breasts on twooccasions in his office at the BSPD station, as well as taking fully nude photos while in his police vehicle at a secluded location. Dkt. No. 30 at 8; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 4; Dkt. No. 39 at 14.

Two months after these assaults, on August 20, 2015, BSPD Chief Chad Williams ("Chief Williams") and BSPD Administrative Lieutenant Brian Gordon ("Lieutenant Gordon") received a phone call from the Howard County Sheriff informing them of allegations of sexual misconduct made against Rojo by another minor female, identified as "C.A.K." Dkt. No. 30 at 16. The next day, Chief Williams placed Rojo on administrative leave when he reported for work, initiated an Internal Affairs ("IA") investigation, and referred the matter to the Texas Rangers for a criminal investigation.³ Id. at 9.

While these investigations were pending, Martinez, D.B.'s mother, discovered that her daughter had also been sexually assaulted by Rojo and reported this to the BSPD on October 9, 2015. Id.; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 5.

Ultimately, a grand jury indicted Rojo on multiple charges related to his sexual assaults of C.A.K. and D.B.⁴ Dkt. No. 30 at 9.

After Rojo's indictment, a third minor ("S.R.B.") accused Rojo of sexual assault which occurred in April 2015. Id. at 9, 14-15. Following a jury trial in 2017, Rojo was found guilty and sentenced to twenty years in prison.⁵ Id.

Martinez filed this lawsuit on June 5, 2017. See Dkt. No. 1-3. Her original complaint was filed in the 118th Judicial District of Howard County, Texas, and the City removed the case to federal court on June 30, 2017. Id.; Dkt. Nos. 1 and 3. The parties consented to the exercise ofjurisdiction by a United States magistrate judge in their proposed scheduling order filed on September 1, 2017. Dkt. No. 11.

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims." Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). The court "must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum." Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). Indeed, "before a federal court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court must establish the requisite standing to sue." Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990).

Martinez seeks to bring claims on behalf of herself and her minor daughter, D.B., under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Though not an issue raised by the parties, the Court must address, as a threshold matter, whether Martinez has standing to bring individual claims against the City and Rojo under § 1983.

In order to establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution with respect to her individual claims, Martinez must demonstrate that she has "suffered 'injury in fact,' that the injury is 'fairly traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). "The injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, n. 1.

Under § 1983, Martinez has standing in her individual capacity if she "clearly allege[s] an injury to [her] own personal constitutional rights." Hooker v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 3:09-CV-1289-D, 2010 WL 4025877, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2010) (quoting Trujillo v. Bd. of Cnty.Commis. of Santa Fe Cnty., 768 F.2d 1186, 1187 (10th Cir. 1985)). "It is well-established that parents lack standing to bring individual claims under § 1983 based solely upon deprivation of a child's constitutional rights." Crozier v. Westside Cmty. Sch. Dist., No. 8:18CV438, 2018 WL 5298744, at *2 (D. Neb. Oct. 25, 2018) (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has recognized that parental rights are a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (discussing "extensive precedent"). However, the case law governing parental liberty rights is narrow and primarily addresses parental rights with respect to child-rearing decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of minors. Id.

In contrast, Martinez alleges individual capacity pecuniary claims of lost income, past and future medical expenses, and expenses associated with moving herself and D.B. out of the state as a result of Rojo's sexual assault of her daughter. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 15-16. She further alleges non-pecuniary claims that "the sexual assault" by Rojo "interfered with the mother-daughter relationship" between Martinez and D.B., "causing pain and behavioral changes for D.B., and causing pain for Ms. Martinez." Id. at 15.

While such claims may be recoverable under a state law tort theory, they do not implicate a constitutional right and, therefore, are not cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of Martinez's own constitutional rights. See T.F.R. v. Morris Cnty. Prosecutor's Office, No. 2:16-5407, 2017 WL 4390098, at *4 (D. N.J. Oct. 3, 2017) (dismissing parents' individual claims under § 1983 for lack of standing where parents suffered loss of income and emotional injuries that stemmed from alleged constitutional violations during their son's arrest and prosecution).

With respect to Martinez's non-pecuniary claim that her "right to recover damages for obligations and harms caused are protected by the [Fourteenth Amendment], which protectsparental rights created by special bonds with their children," Martinez's passing reference to a Fourteenth Amendment interest fails to articulate the type of injury caselaw recognizes as a violation of a parent's own constitutional rights. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 17. Martinez does not claim that the actions of the City or Rojo deliberately undermined her right as a parent to make critical decisions about the care, custody, and control of her child.⁶ Rather, she claims that Rojo and the City caused her child harm, and as a result, Martinez was deprived of her constitutional rights.

Martinez's non-pecuniary claim is akin to emotional distress, which again is not a constitutionally protected interest cognizable under § 1983. See Burrow v. Postville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1208 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (holding that parents could not bring a § 1983 action against the school based on their own claims of emotional distress); Morgan v. City of New York, 166 F. Supp. 2d 817, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that a mother lacked standing to bring individual claims under § 1983 based on a deprivation of [her child's] constitutional rights). And, to the extent that Martinez's non-pecuniary claim can be characterized as a loss of filial consortium claim under state law, Texas law "does not authorize a parent to recover consortium damages for non-fatal injuries to a child, whether due to negligent or intentional conduct." Moreno v. McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 7:15-CV-162, 2016 WL 1258410, *8 (S.D. Tex. March 31, 2016) (citing Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 120 (Tex. 2003) ("We conclude that no compelling social policy impels us to recognize a parent's right to damages for the loss of filial consortium.")).

Ultimately, the Court concludes that Martinez lacks standing to bring individual claims under § 1983 in this action, which deprives the Court of the subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicateMartinez's claims on behalf of herself. The Court, however, maintains subject matter jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims Martinez brings in her representative capacity on behalf of her minor daughter as next friend and guardian. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(1)-(2). In that capacity, Martinez is hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff."

III. STATUS OF DISCOVERY

In a joint motion to amend the scheduling order filed on February 15, 2019 (Dkt. No. 27), Plaintiff and the City represented that they had "diligently proceeded in discovery" and had "cooperatively resolved all matters to date." Id. at 3. Plaintiff and the City further indicated that any additional discovery that might be needed related only to issues other than liability and that their discovery up to that point had been focused solely on the issue of liability. Id. Plaintiff and the City also affirmatively represented that they were not seeking to extend the dispositive motion deadline. Id. In that same joint motion, the parties sought a deadline for such additional discovery, if necessary, of sixty (60) days following the Court's ruling on the City's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 4.

The Court denied the request by Plaintiff and the City to keep the discovery deadline open until after the Court's ruling on the City's motion for summary judgment and...