Martinez v. Ryan

• Citation: 182 L.Ed.2d 272,132 S.Ct. 1309,566 U.S. 1
• Decision Date: 20 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–1001.,10–1001.
• Parties: Luis Mariano MARTINEZ, Petitioner v. Charles L. RYAN, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

566 U.S. 1
132 S.Ct. 1309
182 L.Ed.2d 272

Luis Mariano MARTINEZ, Petitioner
v.
Charles L. RYAN, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections.

No. 10–1001.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Oct. 4, 2011.
Decided March 20, 2012.

Robert D. Bartels, Tempe, AZ, for Petitioner.

Kent E. Cattani, Phoenix, AZ, for Respondent.

Jeffrey B. Wall, for United States as amicus curiae.

Robert Bartels, Counsel of Record, Sandra Day, Tempe, AZ, for Petitioner.

Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General, David R. Cole, Solicitor General, Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Division, Michael T. O'Toole, Assistant Attorney General (Counsel of Record), Phoenix, AZ, for Respondent.

Robert Bartels, Counsel of Record, Sandra Day, Tempe, AZ, for Petitioner.

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

566 U.S. 4

The State of Arizona does not permit a convicted person alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel to raise that claim on direct review. Instead, the prisoner must bring the claim in state collateral proceedings. In the instant case,

566 U.S. 5

however, petitioner's postconviction counsel did not raise the ineffective-assistance claim in the first collateral proceeding, and, indeed, filed a statement that, after reviewing the case, she found no meritorious claims helpful to petitioner. On federal habeas review, and with new counsel, petitioner sought to argue he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and in the first phase of his state collateral proceeding. Because the state collateral proceeding was the first place to challenge his conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance, petitioner maintained he had a constitutional right to an effective attorney in the collateral proceeding. While petitioner frames the question in this case as a constitutional one, a more narrow, but still dispositive, formulation is whether a federal habeas court may excuse a procedural default of an ineffective-assistance claim when the claim was not properly presented in state court due to an attorney's errors in an initial-review collateral proceeding.

I

A jury convicted petitioner, Luis Mariano Martinez, of two counts of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of 15. The prosecution introduced a videotaped forensic interview with the victim, Martinez's 11–year–old stepdaughter. It also put in evidence the victim's nightgown, with traces of Martinez's DNA. As part of his defense, Martinez introduced evidence of the victim's recantations, including testimony from the victim's grandmother and mother and a second videotaped interview in which the victim denied any abuse. The victim also denied any abuse when she testified at trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a–39a. To explain the inconsistencies, a prosecution expert testified that recantations of child-abuse accusations are caused often by reluctance on the part of the victim's mother to lend support to the child's claims. Pet. for Cert. 3. After considering the conflicting evidence, the jury convicted Martinez. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment

566 U.S. 6

with no possibility of parole for 35 years. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a.

132 S.Ct. 1314

The State appointed a new attorney to represent Martinez in his direct appeal. Ibid.; Pet. for Cert. 4. She made numerous arguments on Martinez's behalf, including a claim that the evidence was insufficient and that newly discovered evidence warranted a new trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. Arizona law, however, did not permit her to argue on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective. State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002). Arizona instead requires claims of ineffective assistance at trial to be reserved for state collateral proceedings.

While Martinez's direct appeal was pending, the attorney began a state collateral proceeding by filing a "Notice of Post–Conviction Relief." Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 733–734 (C.A.9 2010) ; Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.4(a) (2011). Despite initiating this proceeding, counsel made no claim trial counsel was ineffective and later filed a statement asserting she could find no colorable claims at all. 623 F.3d, at 734. Cf. State v. Smith, 184 Ariz. 456, 459, 910 P.2d 1, 4 (1996).

The state trial court hearing the collateral proceeding gave Martinez 45 days to file a pro se petition in support of postconviction relief and to raise any claims he believed his counsel overlooked. 623 F.3d, at 734; see Smith, supra, at 459, 910 P.2d, at 4. Martinez did not respond. He later alleged that he was unaware of the ongoing collateral proceedings and that counsel failed to advise him of the need to file a pro se petition to preserve his rights. The state trial court dismissed the action for postconviction relief, in effect affirming counsel's determination that Martinez had no meritorious claims. 623 F.3d, at 734. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Martinez's conviction, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Id., at 733.

About a year and a half later, Martinez, now represented by new counsel, filed a second notice of postconviction relief

566 U.S. 7

in the Arizona trial court. Id., at 734. Martinez claimed his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to challenge the prosecution's evidence. He argued, for example, that his trial counsel should have objected to the expert testimony explaining the victim's recantations or should have called an expert witness in rebuttal. Martinez also faulted trial counsel for not pursuing an exculpatory explanation for the DNA on the nightgown. App. to Brief in Opposition B–6 to B–12. Martinez's petition was dismissed, in part in reliance on an Arizona Rule barring relief on a claim that could have been raised in a previous collateral proceeding. Id., at B–27; see Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(a)(3). Martinez, the theory went, should have asserted the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his first notice for postconviction relief. The Arizona Court of Appeals agreed. It denied Martinez relief because he failed to raise his claims in the first collateral proceeding. 623 F.3d, at 734. The Arizona Supreme Court declined to review Martinez's appeal.

Martinez then sought relief in United States District Court for the District of Arizona, where he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, again raising the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. Martinez acknowledged the state courts denied his claims by relying on a well-established state procedural rule, which, under the doctrine of procedural default, would prohibit a federal court from reaching the merits of the claims. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84–85, 90–91, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). He could overcome this hurdle to federal review, Martinez argued, because he had cause for the default: His first postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing to raise any claims in the first

132 S.Ct. 1315

notice of postconviction relief and in failing to notify Martinez of her actions. See id., at 84–85, 97 S.Ct. 2497.

On the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, the District Court denied the petition, ruling that Arizona's preclusion rule was an adequate and independent state-law ground to bar federal review. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a. Martinez

566 U.S. 8

had not shown cause to excuse the procedural default, the District Court reasoned, because under Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753–754, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), an attorney's errors in a postconviction proceeding do not qualify as cause for a default. See id., at 754–755, 111 S.Ct. 2546.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals relied on general statements in Coleman that, absent a right to counsel in a collateral proceeding, an attorney's errors in the proceeding do not establish cause for a procedural default. Expanding on the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals, citing Coleman, noted the general rule that there is no constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings. 623 F.3d, at 736. The Court of Appeals recognized that Coleman reserved ruling on whether there is "an exception" to this rule in those cases "where ‘state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction.’ " 623 F.3d, at 736 (quoting Coleman, supra, at 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546). It concluded, nevertheless, that the controlling cases established no basis for the exception. Certiorari was granted. 563 U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2960, 180 L.Ed.2d 244 (2011).

II

Coleman v. Thompson , supra, left open, and the Court of Appeals in this case addressed, a question of constitutional law: whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. These proceedings can be called, for purposes of this opinion, "initial-review collateral proceedings." Coleman had suggested, though without...