Martinez v. Spencer
| Decision Date | 14 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 00CV11765RGS.,CIV.A. 00CV11765RGS. |
| Citation | 195 F.Supp.2d 284 |
| Parties | Edward MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. Luis SPENCER, Superintendent, Old Colony Correctional Center, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Edward Martinez, Bridgewater, MA, Pro se.
Thomas Dee, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau, Boston, MA, Respondent.
On January 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Bowler's Report and Recommendation. Despite petitioner's argument that trial counsel's failure to impeach Melissa Gaulin, and his failure to seek to exclude inadmissible evidence that bolstered her testimony, constituted ineffective assistance, I agree with Magistrate Judge Bowler's careful analysis, and her conclusion that counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Petitioner's principal argument regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct is even less compelling, see Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 73, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000), while the remaining arguments, for the most part, involve rulings of state law which are non-reviewable by a federal habeas court. Accordingly, the court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. The motion to dismiss the Petition is ALLOWED.
Respondent Luis Spencer ("respondent"), Superintendent of Old Colony Correctional Center ("OCCC") in Bridgewater, Massachusetts, seeks dismissal of the remaining three claims1 in the above styled petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pro se by petitioner Edward Martinez ("petitioner"), an inmate at OCCC. Respondent submits that the relevant state court's determinations were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ("section 2254"). Respondent also argues that certain claims involve solely issues of state law or are in procedural default. As to the two additional claims contained in petitioner's supporting memorandum, respondent maintains they involve issues of state law which petitioner failed to exhaust. (Docket Entry ## 27 & 32).
Even if an evidentiary hearing is not barred under section 2254(e)(2) of the AEDPA,2 petitioner has no right to an evidentiary hearing under the pre-AEDPA standard, assuming, arguendo, its applicability after the AEDPA's enactment. See Edwards v. Murphy, 96 F.Supp.2d 31, 49-50 (D.Mass.2000) (); see also Fryar v. Bissonnette, 113 F.Supp.2d 175, 179-180 (D.Mass.2000) (); Marshall v. Hendricks, 103 F.Supp.2d 749, 770 (D.N.J.2000) (same). The content of the record, consisting of state court records, including the probable cause hearing, the trial and the state courts' factual findings, are not in dispute.
On September 28, 1994, a grand jury sitting in Middlesex County indicted petitioner on one count of first degree murder and one count of possession of an unlicensed firearm. On February 13, 1996, a jury convicted petitioner of both charges.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the SJC. After consolidating prior proceedings, the SJC conducted a review of the entire record under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278, section 33E ("section 33E") and upheld the conviction.3
In the present petition, petitioner attacks his 1996 conviction on the following three grounds: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to his failure to impeach Melissa Gaulin ("Gaulin") and his failure to move for the exclusion of inadmissible evidence (a prior consistent statement) which bolstered Gaulin's credibility; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to trial counsel's failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct during cross examination of petitioner and closing argument; and (3) prosecutorial misconduct on various grounds. (Docket Entry #20). The memorandum in support of the petition contains the following additional grounds: (5)4 cumulative prejudice resulting from the prosecutorial misconduct during cross examination of petitioner; and (6) the trial judge's improper admission of the prior consistent statements made by Jaquay Abreu to the police. (Docket Entry # 18, pp. 18-19 & 22-24).
Consistent with pre-AEDPA law, the AEDPA affords "a presumption of correctness to any `determination of a factual issue made by a State court.'" Bryson v. Ward, 187 F.3d 1193, 1211 (10th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1058, 120 S.Ct. 1566, 146 L.Ed.2d 469 (2000). "For this purpose, factual issues are defined as basic, primary, or historical facts: facts in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators." Coombs v. State of Maine, 202 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.2000); accord Sanna v. Dipaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2001). With respect to the factual findings of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("the SJC"), such deference is particularly appropriate where, as here, the SJC "gave the trial record the type of scrutiny mandated by [section 33E]." Avellar v. DuBois, 30 F.Supp.2d 76, 79 (D.Mass.1998).
In an exhaustive and detailed recital, the SJC, viewing the record in the Commonwealth's favor, found the following facts, which petitioner fails to rebut:
(a) The events leading up to the murder ... [Petitioner], was convicted of the premeditated murder of Freddys Abreu. [Petitioner] and the victim lived in the same apartment building. [Petitioner] shared an apartment with his father, his girlfriend, Melissa Gaulin, and Gaulin's baby.5 The victim shared an apartment with his wife, Jaquay Abreu, and their daughter. The two couples were friendly with one another and visited one another's apartments. Jaquay Abreu, the victim's wife, testified that she also spoke with [petitioner] on the telephone.
The victim sold crack cocaine and, shortly after moving into the apartment building, asked [petitioner] to join him in selling drugs. [Petitioner] and the victim sold crack cocaine out of the apartment building for approximately two or three months before the murder.
Sometime before the murder, the victim purchased a silver handgun. Because the victim's wife objected to having a handgun in their home, the victim asked [petitioner] to keep the gun for him. The victim also gave [petitioner] approximately $1,000 worth of cocaine to hold. One day later, the victim asked [petitioner] to return the gun and the cocaine. [Petitioner] refused to do so. An argument ensued. Two days later, [petitioner]'s girl friend, Gaulin, reported to the police that the victim had been looking for [petitioner] and had threatened to kill [Gaulin]. Afraid, Gaulin went to stay with [petitioner]'s sister. (b) The murder. The next day, the victim, who apparently was friendly with [petitioner]'s father, went to [petitioner]'s apartment with a frozen dinner for [petitioner]'s father. At approximately 10 p.m., the victim left the apartment building in his car and drove to [petitioner]'s sister's apartment. [Petitioner] came out to the victim's car along with Jacob Sanchez, [petitioner]'s nephew. There was a brief argument, after which the victim drove away.
According to the testimony of Gaulin, Jacob Sanchez told [petitioner] to "get the gun." Gaulin saw [petitioner] take the silver gun from a bag in his sister's apartment and put it back. She then went upstairs. [Petitioner] and Sanchez left.6
At approximately 10:20 p.m., the victim returned to his apartment building. His wife heard his car pull up and looked out the window. She saw three men, dressed in dark clothing and hooded sweatshirts, approach her husband's car. She recognized one of the men as [petitioner] by his voice. The victim's wife saw [petitioner] pull out a gun and fire it twice at the victim. She recognized the gun as the silver gun the victim had given [petitioner] several days earlier.
That night, [petitioner] returned to his sister's apartment alone. Gaulin noticed that he was shaking and sweating. He told her, "I did it," or "[w]e did it," and stated that he "didn't want to kill him." [Petitioner] also told Gaulin that he had gotten rid of the gun.
(c) [Petitioner]'s arrest. The night of the murder, the victim's wife told the police that she had witnessed [petitioner] murder her husband. The police began a search of the area. The next morning, the police learned that [petitioner] was at his sister's apartment. When the police found him, [petitioner] agreed to speak with them at the police station.
[Petitioner] initially denied knowing the victim. Later in the interview, however, [petitioner] admitted to selling crack cocaine for the victim. [Petitioner] also told the police that he had severed his relationship with the victim several days earlier because the victim was not paying him enough. [Petitioner] said that he knew the police were looking for him and that he had run to another floor in the apartment building to hide earlier that day. When the police asked why [petitioner] thought the police were looking for him, [petitioner] terminated the interview.
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 431 Mass. 168, 726 N.E.2d 913, 919-920 (2000). At trial, Jaquay...
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Rivera v. Thompson
...of cumulative error where the individual errors have not been "actually determined to be constitutional error." Martinez v. Spencer, 195 F. Supp. 2d 284, 311 (D. Mass. 2001). Neither "the cumulative effect of counsel's actions deemed deficient" nor the "combined or individual effect of the ......
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...following Miranda warnings that are inconsistent with defendant’s trial testimony does not violate due process. Martinez v. Spencer , 195 F. Supp. 2d 284, 305 (D. Mass. 2002) (citing Anderson v. Charles , 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980) ( Doyle does not apply to cross-examination which merely inqu......