Martinez v. State

• Decision Date: 01 February 2000
• Citation: 24 S.W.3d 10
• Parties: (Mo.App. E.D. 2000) . Urban Martinez, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Defendant/Respondent. Case Number: ED76224 Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District Handdown Date: 0
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

24 S.W.3d 10 (Mo.App. E.D. 2000)

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.

Urban Martinez, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Defendant/Respondent.

Case Number: ED76224

Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District

Handdown Date: 02/01/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Hon. Kenneth M. Romines

Counsel for Appellant: Gino F. Battisti

Counsel for Respondent: Andrew F. Wasserman

Opinion Summary: Urban Martinez (Appellant) appeals from the judgment denying his petition to expunge records of his arrest, which was filed pursuant to Section 610.122 RSMo Cum. Supp. 1998, following a jury acquittal of the charge of forcible rape for which he was arrested. The trial court determined that Appellant was barred from seeking relief under the statute because it provides that one of the conditions a petitioner must establish to obtain an order of expungement is that that no charges "will be pursued" as a result of the arrest, and criminal charges were pursued in Appellant's case.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Division Three holds: (1) The provision in Section 610.122 that no charges "will be pursued" as a result of the arrest refers plainly and unambiguously to the future tense only, and it is undisputed that at the time of the action to expunge no future charges would be pursued against Appellant as a result of the arrest, since such charges would violate the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. To the extent that the provision that no charges "will be pursued" could be viewed as ambiguous, thus possibly referring both to charges that will be pursued or have been pursued, resort to applicable rules of statutory construction compels the conclusion that the legislature did not intend the provision to automatically bar individuals who have been tried and acquitted from seeking expungement of their records of arrest. (2) Criminal acquittal does not per se conclusively establish that the arrest was based on false information or that there was no probable cause at the time of the action to expunge to believe that Appellant actually committed the charged offense; these are disputed elements that the petitioner still must affirmatively establish in the action to expunge. Accordingly, the cause is remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

Opinion Author: Richard B. Teitelman, Presiding Judge

Opinion Vote: REVERSED AND REMANDED. Ahrens and Mooney, JJ., concur.

Opinion:

Urban Martinez (Appellant) appeals from the judgment denying his petition to expunge arrest records following the jury acquittal of the charge for which he was arrested. The issue is whether the provision of Missouri's expungement¹ statute requiring that no charges "will be pursued" as a result of the arrest automatically bars relief to one who has been tried and acquitted. Finding that it does not, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant was arrested in June of 1997 and subsequently indicted on one count of forcible rape. The case went to trial in May of 1998. The jury found Appellant not guilty of the offense.

Thereafter, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 610.122² and 610.123 RSMo Cum. Supp. 1998³, Appellant filed his Petition to Expunge Arrest Records in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. In accordance with Section 610.123(4), Appellant named as Defendants numerous courts, prosecutorial, and law enforcement agencies, as well as the State of Missouri. Of the named Defendants, only the office of St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney (hereinafter, "Prosecutor") contested the petition, although several others, including the St. Louis County Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("F.B.I.") filed responses indicating that they would neither consent to nor oppose the petition.

In January of 1999, the Prosecutor filed a motion to dismiss Appellant's expungement action. It asserted three grounds for dismissal: (1) that despite Appellant's acquittal his arrest was not based on false information, as required by Section 610.122; (2) that despite the acquittal there was "probable cause" to believe Appellant had committed the charged offense, which meant that he did not satisfy the requirement of Section 610.122(1); and (3) that criminal charges had already been pursued in the matter, thereby making it impossible as a matter of law for Appellant to meet the requirement of Section 610.122(2) that "no charge will be pursued as a result of the arrest."

Shortly after the Prosecutor's motion to dismiss was filed, appellant filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellant's motion argued there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding any of the six required statutory elements for expungement under Section 610.122, thus entitling him to judgment as a matter of law. The Prosecutor filed a timely response to appellant's summary judgment motion.

On April 12, 1999, the court heard arguments on Prosecutor's motion to dismiss and on Appellant's motion for summary judgment. The record conclusively established that Appellant had no prior or subsequent misdemeanor or felony convictions, that there were no other pending civil actions relating to the arrest, and that Appellant had not received a suspended imposition of sentence. After the hearing, the court entered the following order and judgment, which stated in pertinent part:

The Court, having taken Judicial Notice of the file, finds that no material issues of fact exist which would defeat summary judgement.

The file reflects, and the Court finds, that plaintiff was indicted by the Grand Jury of St. Louis County for forcible rape on 4 September 1997.

The file reflects, and the Court finds that on 29 May 1998, plaintiff was found, after Jury Trial, not guilty.

Plaintiff seeks expungement pursuant to Sec. 610.122 RSMo.

The record reflects that the arrest was based on false information and that no probable cause exists at this time to believe that plaintiff committed the offense of forcible rape.

The plaintiff has no prior or subsequent convictions.

The plaintiff did not receive a suspended imposition of sentence; no civil action is pending.

The record reflects that charges were pursued.

The Court finds that Sec. 610.122 RSMo is inapplicable, but that Sec. 610.105 RSMo is applicable and the records are closed with exception of the application of Sec. 610.120 RSMo.

The Court does not believe it has the power to equitably expunge the arrest; if the power existed the record is clear that these circumstances are exceptional and that the disclosure, even in the limited terms of Sec. 610.120, works on [sic] unfair hardship, the Court would equitably expunge the record.

It is the Judgment and order of the court that Plaintiff's arrest is closed within the provisions of Sec. 610.105 RSMo.

When taken in context it is clear from the above judgment that the trial court, although finding against the State on the first two grounds asserted in its motion to dismiss, found in favor of the State on its third asserted ground: namely, that Section 610.122(2) made the expungement statute inapplicable to Appellant and barred him from relief because "charges were pursued" in the criminal case. It is from that judgment that Appellant now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although styled a "motion to dismiss," the Prosecutor's motion was in substance more akin to a motion for summary judgment. In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we view the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). Because the propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law, and the criteria on appeal for determining its propriety are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court, our review is essentially de novo. Id.

Additionally, the trial court's judgment is based upon statutory interpretation. Construction of a statute is purely a question of law. Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 908 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Mo. banc 1995). The decision appealed from is therefore within this Court's province of independent de novo review, and no deference is given to the trial court's determination of law. Barry Service Agency Company v. Manning, 891 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995).

DISCUSSION

I. No Charges "Will Be Pursued"

The threshold issue concerns the interpretation of the language in Section 610.122⁴ which requires a finding that no charges "will be pursued" as a result of the arrest. In his sole point on appeal Appellant contends the trial court erred in holding that once criminal charges were pursued following arrest Section 610.122 was no longer an available remedy. Appellant argues that the requirement that no charges "will be pursued" as a result of the arrest speaks unambiguously in the future tense only, and hence that where charges have already been fully pursued at the time of an action to expunge, the statutory requirement has been met since no further charges will be pursued.⁵ The Prosecutor disagrees, arguing that Section 610.122(2) was intended to include both future and past prosecutions, and accordingly should be interpreted to read "no charges will be or have been pursued as a result of the arrest."

A. Prior Case Law Concerning Section 610.122

At the outset, we must address the fact that we have touched upon this issue once before, in the only previously reported case concerning Section 610.122, P.B.S. v. Prosecuting Attorney's Office of St. Louis County, 998 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999). Even though neither party has briefed it, we must consider whether our holding in P.B.S. is dispositive. We conclude that it is not. In P.B.S., the petitioner who sought expungement of his arrest records had pled guilty to the offense and then received a suspended imposition of sentence. P.B.S., 998 S.W.2d...