Martinez v. Town of Prescott Valley

• Decision Date: 19 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. CV-18-08192-PCT-SMB,CV-18-08192-PCT-SMB
• Citation: 467 F.Supp.3d 786
• Parties: Tomas MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF PRESCOTT VALLEY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

467 F.Supp.3d 786

Tomas MARTINEZ, Plaintiff,

v.TOWN OF PRESCOTT VALLEY, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-18-08192-PCT-SMB

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

Signed June 19, 2020

Elizabeth Diane Tate, Elizabeth D. Tate Attorney at Law, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff.

Milton W. Hathaway, Jr., Murphy Schmitt Hathaway Wilson & Becke PLLC, Prescott, AZ, for Defendants.

ORDER

Susan M. Brnovich, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 28, "Mot."; Doc. 42, "Resp."; Doc. 43, "Reply"). Each side submitted a statement of facts with corresponding exhibits.¹ (Doc. 29, "DSOF"; Doc. 41,² "PSOF"). The parties stipulated that oral argument was unnecessary to resolve this motion. (Doc. 44.) Having considered the parties’ submissions and relevant law, the Court issues the following Order.

I. BACKGROUND

On a late Arizona Saturday night in August almost three years ago, Officer Shook of the Town of Prescott Valley Police Department went to twenty-one-year-old Tomas Martinez's home to check on him because his wife was concerned that he might be suicidal. (PSOF ¶ 1; DSOF ¶ 1.) Shortly after Officer Shook arrived, Mr. Martinez, who is of a large, stocky build, agreed to be transported to a Crisis Stabilization Unit ("CSU") for a mental health evaluation. (PSOF ¶¶ 2-4; DSOF ¶¶ 2-4.) Following Mr. Martinez's arrival at CSU, he became uncooperative and CSU staff called Officer Shook to request that he be relocated to Yavapai Regional Medical Center ("YRMC") for additional screening.³ (PSOF ¶ 5; DSOF ¶ 5.) After receiving the call, Officer Shook returned to the CSU to take Mr. Martinez to YRMC. (PSOF ¶ 6; DSOF ¶ 6.) Although Officer Shook explained to Mr. Martinez that he needed to wear handcuffs before being transported to YRMC for a Title 36 involuntary evaluation, he was escorted out of the CSU without handcuffs on because he refused to wear them. (PSOF ¶¶ 7-11; DSOF ¶¶ 9-12.) These facts are undisputed.

What happened outside the CSU is disputed in part. After escorting Mr. Martinez outside, Officer Shook explained to Sergeant McCamish, who had just arrived on scene, that Mr. Martinez was refusing to wear handcuffs. Officer Shook then heard Sergeant McCamish ask Mr. Martinez to wear handcuffs. (Doc. 28-2 at 2-3.) When Mr. Martinez refused again, Officer Shook heard Sergeant McCamish repeatedly order him to submit to wearing handcuffs. (Id. ) Sergeant McCamish's affidavit mirrors what Officer Shook heard. It states that Sergeant McCamish told Mr. Martinez three times that he had to wear handcuffs before being transported to YRMC for his and the other officers’ safety, but Martinez repeatedly refused. (PSOF ¶¶ 13-14; DSOF ¶¶ 13-14.) After these repeatedly refusals, Sergeant McCamish used a head redirection tactic to bring Mr. Martinez to the ground. (PSOF ¶ 15; DSOF ¶ 15.) Mr. Martinez's affidavit states that Sergeant McCamish never told him he had to be handcuffed. Instead, it states that Sergeant McCamish just told Mr. Martinez "You need to wear handcuffs" and slammed him to the ground, presumably without giving him the chance to comply. Mr. Martinez also disputes that he refused to be handcuffed and that he was involuntarily taken to YRMC. (PSOF ¶¶ 8, 14.)

After Mr. Martinez is on the ground, he does not dispute Defendants’ version of the facts. Specifically, that Officers Shook and Sease unsuccessfully assisted Sergeant McCamish in detaining him while another officer asked whether she should use her taser on him, to which McCamish advised not to. (PSOF ¶¶ 16-18; DSOF ¶ 16-18.) He also does not dispute that Officers Shook and Sease and Sergeant McCamish could not detain him because his arms were underneath him. (PSOF ¶ 19; DSOF ¶ 19.) Or that, in an effort to cause him to release his arms from under his body, Sergeant McCamish applied several pressure point maneuvers, consistent with department policy, which eventually proved successful in obtaining his compliance. (PSOF ¶ 19, 21-23; DSOF ¶¶ 19-22.)

A year later, Mr. Martinez sued Sergeant McCamish, Officer Sease, Officer Shook, and the Town of Prescott Valley ("Town") under various legal theories for compensatory damages and injunctive and declaratory relief based on this incident. (See Doc. 1, "Compl." ¶¶ 1, 32-66.) His claims against all Defendants include (1) excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) civil assault and battery, and (3) negligence and gross negligence, (id. ¶¶ 32-51, 57-61), while his claims solely against the Town include (4) negligent training and (5) negligent hiring and retention. (Id. ¶¶ 52-56, 62-66.) Defendants move for summary judgment on each claim.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is any factual issue that might affect the outcome of the case under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). The Court need only consider the cited materials, but it may also consider any other materials in the record. Id. 56(c)(3). Summary judgment may also be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Initially, the movant bears the burden of demonstrating the basis for the motion and "identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. If the movant fails to carry its initial burden, the nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos. , 210 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000). If the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1103. The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, but it "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmovant's bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). However, in the summary judgment context, the Court believes the nonmovant's evidence, id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Ellison v. Robertson , 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) ; Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ("facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts" (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). If "the evidence yields conflicting inferences [regarding material facts], summary judgment is improper, and the action must proceed to trial." O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc. , 311 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriately granted in their favor on each claim. Mr. Martinez disagrees, in part. He does not oppose summary judgment on his Fourteenth Amendment claims⁴ or his negligence and assault and battery claims against Sergeant McCamish, Officer Shook and Officer Sease. (See Resp. at 8 ("Martinez does not request that the Court permit him to proceed to trial on his negligence claims. Instead, [he] seeks to pursue his assault and battery and negligent hiring actions against the Town based [on] its Officers intending to cause him harmful contact.")). In other words, he requests that, in addition to his Fourth Amendment claim against each Defendant, the "Court permit [him] to try his claims of assault and battery and negligent hiring of Sergeant McCamish against the Town." (Id. ) Because summary judgment is appropriate on each claim, none will proceed to trial. Cf. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

A. Excessive Force Under the Fourth Amendment

Mr. Martinez's Fourth Amendment excessive force claims are brought against Sergeant McCamish, Officer Shook, Officer Sease, and the Town under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides in relevant part that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[T]o establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right." Hafer v. Melo , 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) ); see also Crumpton...