Martinez v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 April 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-00528-P
• Parties: German Lopez MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. TYSON FOODS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

533 F.Supp.3d 386

German Lopez MARTINEZ, Plaintiff,

v.TYSON FOODS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-00528-P

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division.

Signed April 7, 2021

Ricardo J. Prieto, Melinda Arbuckle, Shellist Lazarz Slobin LLP, Houston, TX, Armando Aguirre Ortiz, Pro Hac Vice, Fitapelli & Schaffer LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

A. Lisa A. Schreter, Pro Hac Vice, Littler Mendelson PC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Mark T. Pittman, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Before the Court is Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) ("Motion"). ECF No. 20. Having considered the Motion, Plaintiff's Response (ECF No. 25), Defendant's Reply (ECF No. 31), docket entries, and applicable law, the Court finds that the Motion should be and is hereby GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This is an overtime compensation dispute arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Plaintiff German Lopez Martinez ("Martinez") was employed by Defendant Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc. ("Tyson") from approximately 1988 to January 2020 in Fort Worth, Texas. ECF No. 9, Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 10, 23. During his employment with Tyson, he worked at times as a pepperoni slice supervisor, and at all times relevant to his lawsuit as a production supervisor. Id. at ¶ 9. Martinez initiated this action by filing a Complaint in this Court on May 22, 2020, and later a First Amended Complaint ("Amended Complaint") on June 23, 2020. See Orig. Compl., ECF No. 1; see also Am. Compl. In his Amended Complaint, Martinez alleges Tyson violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 – 219, and the Portal-to-Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251 – 262, for failure to pay Martinez all due and owing overtime wages. Am. Compl. at ¶ 1. Martinez is a resident of Texas, and Tyson was incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Arkansas. Id. at ¶ 8, 13–14; Mt. at 13.

Martinez filed an Expedited Motion for Conditional Certification and Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) asking the Court to conditionally certify this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and approve notice to be sent to "[a]ll production supervisors employed by Tyson during the last three years who were paid with a salary and who did not receive overtime pay ...." ECF No. 28. During the motion's pendency, the Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the Lusardi approach to conditional certifications of FLSA actions and formally adopted a new approach. See Swales v. KLLM Transp. Servs., L.L.C. , 985 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2021). In light of Swales , the Court entered an order on January 13, 2021, denying without prejudice Martinez's motion for conditional certification and ordering him to file an amended motion for conditional certification addressing the Swales approach. ECF No. 41. The Court then granted parties’ Joint Motion for Extension of Time requiring parties to submit a joint proposed scheduling order for discovery and briefing on the certification issue no later than seven days after the Court issues its ruling on Tyson's Partial Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2). ECF No. 44.

Tyson filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) on September 21, 2020 (ECF No. 20), Martinez filed his Response to this Motion on October 13, 2020, (ECF No. 25), and Tyson filed its Reply on October 27, 2020 (ECF No. 31). This Motion is now ripe for review.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)

"When a nonresident defendant presents a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that in personam jurisdiction exists." Stuart v. Spademan , 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985) ; D.J. Invs., Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg Inc. , 754 F.2d 542, 545–46 (5th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff need not, however, establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence; prima facie evidence of personal jurisdiction is sufficient. Wyatt v. Kaplan , 686 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1982). The court may resolve a jurisdictional issue by reviewing pleadings, affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, exhibits, any part of the record, and any combination thereof. Stuart , 772 F.2d at 1192. Allegations in the plaintiff's complaint are taken as true except to the extent that they are contradicted by defendant's affidavits. Wyatt , 686 F.2d at 282–83 n.13 (citing Black v. Acme Markets, Inc. , 564 F.2d 681, 683 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977) ). Any genuine, material conflicts between the facts established by the parties’ affidavits and other evidence are resolved in favor of plaintiff for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case exists. Bullion v. Gillespie , 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990).

B. Personal Jurisdiction

In a federal question case, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause fixes the limits of the Court's personal jurisdiction. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). To "exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied." Omni Cap. Intern., Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd. , 484 U.S. 97, 104, 108 S.Ct. 404, 98 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987). "[S]ervice of process in a federal action is covered generally by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. Rule 4 makes service of process effective over a defendant either "when authorized by a federal statute" or where the defendant "is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located." FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). The FLSA—unlike some federal statutes—does not authorize nationwide service of process. Therefore, under Rule 4, service can only be effective to the extent a Texas state court of general jurisdiction could exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. Since the Texas long-arm statute has been interpreted as extending to the limits of due process,¹ the only inquiry is whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant would be consistent with due process. Id.

ANALYSIS

Tyson argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it with respect to the FLSA claims of out-of-state putative collective members and, as such, that the Court should dismiss any claims asserted on behalf of out-of-state putative opt-in plaintiffs for conduct that did not occur in Texas. Mt. at 1. In contrast, Martinez argues that the Court need only have personal jurisdiction over Martinez on behalf of the collective members and that deciding this issue prior to conditional certification is premature. Resp. at 5–6, 10.

A. The Court must decide the 12(b)(2) Motion prior to conditional certification.

As an initial matter, Martinez argues that the Court may not rule on this 12(b)(2) Motion prior to conditional certification. Resp. at 10. The Court disagrees.

In Martinez's Response, he argues that any Bristol-Meyers defense is premature at the motion to dismiss stage and cites Cruson v. Jackson National Life Insurance Company to support this proposition. Id. Martinez's reliance on Cruson is misplaced because, in that case, the Court analyzed whether a personal jurisdiction defense had been brought too late instead of whether it was premature, which is the issue in this case. Cruson v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. , 954 F.3d 240, 246–47 (5th Cir. 2020). The issue in Cruson was whether the personal jurisdiction defense was available under Rule 12(g)(2) when the defendant filed its Rule 12 Motions. Id. at 250. Further, the Court finds that it must decide this issue now because "[c]ourts should only authorize notice to individuals who might be in the collective," and prolonging this determination would "only sow confusion." Greinstein v. Fieldcore Servs. Sols., LLC , No. 2:18-CV-208-Z, 2020 WL 6821005, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2020) (Kacsmaryk, J.).

B. The Court does not have personal jurisdiction over potential out-of-state opt-in plaintiffs’ claims because Bristol-Myers Squibb applies.

There are two types of personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779–80, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017). General jurisdiction over a corporation exists where the company is incorporated and where it maintains its principal place of business. Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 137, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014). Martinez does not assert that general jurisdiction will apply, nor would it apply. Resp. at 5.

Specific jurisdiction exists over suits that arise out of a defendant's contact with the forum. Daimler , 571 U.S. at 127, 134 S.Ct. 746. The Fifth Circuit articulated a three-step analysis for specific jurisdiction:

(1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, i.e. , whether it purposely directed its activities toward the forum state or purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there; (2) whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.

Libersat v. Sundance Energy, Inc. , 978 F.3d 315, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2020). Tyson concedes this Court has personal jurisdiction over Tyson for purposes of the claims brought by Martinez individually. Reply at n.1 (citing Answer at ¶ 21). The question is whether the Court has jurisdiction over out-of-state putative opt-in plaintiffs. It does not.

1. BMS applies to FLSA cases.

Defendant asks the Court to adopt the Supreme Court's holding in Bristol-Myers Squibb (" BMS ") and apply that holding to this FLSA collective action. Mt. at 7. Alternatively, Martinez urges the Court to follow the Swamy line of cases and refuse application of BMS to FLSA collective actions. Resp. at 11. The...