Martinez v. United States
| Decision Date | 06 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-40042,19-40042 |
| Parties | CARLOS A. MARTINEZ, Plaintiff - Appellant v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
Before SOUTHWICK, GRAVES, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
*
Carlos Martinez sued the United States for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for injuries resulting from an automobile collision allegedly caused by United States Customs and Border Protection Agent Fabian Rocha. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States. We AFFIRM.
This case arises out of an automobile collision that occurred on January 26, 2016 in Brownsville, Texas. While in pursuit of a suspected drug smuggler, United States Customs and Border Protection Agent Fabian Rocha turned right onto Old Military Road when his vehicle struck Carlos Martinez's vehicle, which was stopped at a stop sign near the intersection of Highway 281 and Old Military Road. Martinez sued the United States for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for injuries resulting from that collision, alleging that Agent Rocha was negligent.
The Government moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or alternatively, for summary judgment, asserting as a defense the Texas Emergency Vehicle Privilege, a statutory privilege set forth in §§ 546.001-.005 of the Texas Transportation Code. The United States argued that the asserted privilege precluded liability for Martinez's FTCA claim of negligence unless the facts of the case demonstrate that Agent Rocha acted with reckless disregard at the time of the accident.
The district court granted summary judgment for the Government, finding that Agent Rocha's "activation of the vehicle's emergency lights and application of brakes do not support a finding of reckless disregard as to Agent Rocha's actions." Because it concluded that Martinez failed to raise material issues of fact to infer that Agent Rocha acted with reckless disregard, the district court held Agent Rocha's actions were privileged under the Texas Transportation Code. Martinez appealed.
Martinez and the United States agree that the Texas Transportation Code privilege applies to Agent Rocha's conduct and shields the United States from FTCA liability unless Agent Rocha acted with "reckless disregard for thesafety of others."1 Tex. Transp. Code § 546.005. Further, it is undisputed that Agent Rocha, a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agent, was operating an authorized emergency vehicle in pursuit of a suspected drug smuggler at the time of the collision. Thus, as it was before the district court, the sole issue on appeal is whether Martinez presented evidence that Agent Rocha acted with reckless disregard.
On appeal, Martinez challenges the district court's ruling that Agent Rocha's conduct was not reckless as a matter of law. Specifically, Martinez contends there remains a factual dispute as to whether Agent Rocha failed to slow down and look before turning his vehicle at the intersection, which he asserts is material to the reckless disregard determination.
We review a summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing DeVoss v. Sw. Airlines Co., 903 F.3d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 2018)). "Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).In reviewing summary judgment, we "construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012).
"The FTCA is a waiver of sovereign immunity that allows a plaintiff to bring a civil action for damages against the Government." Villafranca v. United States, 587 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674). Under the FTCA, district courts have jurisdiction over claims against the United States for damages "caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). "On those claims, the United States is liable 'in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.'" Mendez v. Poitevent, 823 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674). In the instant case, Texas law governs liability because the collision occurred in Texas.
Pursuant to the Texas Transportation Code, authorized emergency vehicle operators are entitled to various privileges when acting in emergency situations. See City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tex. 1998) (citing Tex. Transp. Code § 546.001-.005). The conditions that give rise to these privileges include, inter alia, "responding to an emergency call" and "pursuing an actual or suspected violator of the law." See Tex. Transp. Code §§ 546.002(b)(1)-(2). In these enumerated emergency situations, authorized emergency vehicle operators are permitted to:
Id. § 546.001. In sum, in designated emergency situations, the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle is entitled to privileges, which include the authority to operate the vehicle in certain otherwise-illegal ways.
These privileges are not unqualified, however, and do not relieve the driver of an emergency vehicle from "the duty to operate the vehicle with appropriate regard for the safety of all persons," or "the consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others." Id. § 546.005; see also Hernandez v. United States, No. 1:17-CV-00087, 2018 WL 4103015, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 2, 2018) ().
The Texas Supreme Court held that this limiting provision "imposes a duty to drive with [appropriate]2 regard for others by avoiding negligent behavior, but it only imposes liability for reckless conduct." Martin, 971 S.W.2d at 431 (). Accordingly, operators of emergency vehicles are not subject to liability for mere negligence. See id. Rather, the Texas Transportation Code only imposes liability for "reckless" conduct, which requires a plaintiff to show that the emergency vehicle operator "committed an act that the operator knew or should have known posed a high degree of risk of serious injury." Id. at 430. This "requires a showing of more than a momentary judgment lapse" or "mere failure of judgment." Id.
The underlying policy for providing limitations to liability in this narrow context is the need "to balance the safety of the public with the need for prompt responses to police, fire, and medical emergencies." Martin, 971 S.W.2d at 429. "The reckless disregard test . . . is better suited to the legislative goal of encouraging emergency personnel to act swiftly and resolutely while at the same time protecting the public's safety to the extent practicable." Id. at 430.
Martinez has not shown that a genuine dispute of fact exists with respect to whether Agent Rocha acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. Shortly before the collision, Agent Rocha was notified that nearby agents observed subjects loading bales of marijuana into a white Chevy Suburban and that the driver of the vehicle was fleeing the scene. While in pursuit of the Chevy on Highway 281, Agent Rocha witnessed the suspect crash into a ditch and flee the vehicle near the intersection of Highway 281 and Old Military Road. This prompted Agent Rocha's instant decision to turn right onto Old Military Road in an attempt to apprehend the suspect. Shortly after turning, Agent Rocha's vehicle struck Martinez's vehicle, which was stopped on Old Military Road near the intersection of Highway 281.
We conclude that Agent Rocha's conduct does not give rise to a finding of reckless disregard. Instead, some of Agent Rocha's actions evince his concern for the safety of others during the emergency pursuit. First, it is uncontroverted that Agent Rocha was responding to an emergency call with his emergency lights activated. Although he did not activate his sirens, Agent Rocha's conduct in this regard was in accordance with Texas law. See Tex. Transp. Code § 546.003 () (emphasis added); see also Hernandez, 2018 WL 4103015, at *5 ().
Additionally, Agent Rocha slowed down prior to turning his vehicle onto Old Military Road. The video recording establishes that, while traveling in the proper direction of traffic on Highway 281, Agent Rocha applied his brakes as he reached the intersection and prior to turning right onto Old Military Road. Thus, Martinez's contention on appeal that a genuine issue of fact remains as to whether Agent Rocha slowed down prior to turning is belied by the video evidence. Collectively, this evidence is generally sufficient to demonstrate that Agent Rocha did not act with reckless disregard for the safety of the public. See Estrada v....
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