Martinez v. Wilkie, 17-1551
| Decision Date | 21 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | 17-1551 |
| Parties | Andre Martinez, Appellant, v. Robert L. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Appellee. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals For Veterans Claims |
Argued March 28, 2019
On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' Appeals
Christopher F. Attig, of Little Rock, Arkansas, for the appellant.
Ashley D. Varga, with whom Jessica K. Grunberg; James M. Byrne General Counsel; Mary Ann Flynn, Chief Counsel; and Edward V Cassidy, Jr., Deputy Chief Counsel, were on the brief, all of Washington, D.C., for the appellee.
Before MEREDITH, TOTH, and FALVEY, Judges.
In this appeal, which is timely and over which the Court has jurisdiction, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a), 7266(a), we are asked to decide whether the Secretary's failure to automatically provide a claimant with a copy of a VA medical examination report violates either the duty to assist provision of 38 U.S.C. § 5103A or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S Constitution.[1] The appellant challenges a January 27, 2017, Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) decision that denied disability compensation for sleep apnea. [2] The Board's denial was based in part on a 2016 VA medical examination. Although VA informed Mr. Martinez that this examination was in VA's possession and that it supported a denial of benefits, he did not request a copy before the Board denied his claim. We hold that neither section 5103A nor constitutional due process, as applied to Mr. Martinez, required the Secretary to have automatically provided the veteranwith a copy of a VA medical examination prior to rendering an adverse decision on his claim. Therefore, we will affirm the Board's January 27, 2017, decision.
The appellant served honorably in the U.S. Army from January 1969 to December 1970 and from September 1981 to April 1988. In May 2005, he filed his current claim for sleep apnea. Record (R.) at 3380. We address here only the most salient aspects of his lengthy claim history.
In January 2016, VA obtained a VA medical examination report that addressed whether the veteran's sleep apnea is related to his service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder. R. at 499-506. The 2016 examiner concluded that the veteran's sleep apnea was less likely than not caused or aggravated by PTSD. R. at 505. The examiner noted that the medical literature shows that PTSD does not cause sleep apnea. Id. Regarding aggravation, the examiner observed that, if a mental condition leads to overeating, it may be possible for that condition to worsen sleep apnea because increased fatty tissue reduces airway capacity. Id. But, the examiner explained that, in Mr. Martinez's case, PTSD did not aggravate sleep apnea because the veteran's "body mass index is not at a level that might produce airway restriction." Id.
In May 2016, relying on this examination, the regional office (RO) issued a Supplemental Statement of the Case (SSOC) that again denied compensation for sleep apnea. R. at 237-46. The RO discussed the 2016 examination in detail and explained that the examiner found it less likely than not that sleep apnea is related to a service-connected mental condition in part because "there is no accepted clinical reasoning or research to suggest PTSD causes obstructive sleep apnea." R. at 245. Because the record showed no evidence connecting sleep apnea to service or a service-connected disability, the RO denied compensation. R. at 246. The SSOC was sent to both Mr. Martinez and his then counsel. See R. at 235, 914-17.
After the 2016 SSOC issued, Mr. Martinez's claim returned to the Board and resumed its place on the Board's docket. R. at 162. The Board then notified the veteran that he had 90 days to submit additional argument and evidence. Id. In response, Mr. Martinez, through former counsel, informed the Board that he planned to submit a written brief and might also submit additional evidence for the Board's consideration. R. at 146. He later requested that the Board delay deciding his appeal for 30 more days so that he could "submit a written brief and any additional evidence." R. at 132. As promised, Mr. Martinez submitted a timely written brief in which he argued that sleep apnea should be secondarily service-connected to PTSD because medical treatise evidence attached to the brief definitively showed a causal relationship between the two conditions. R. at 39. At no point did the veteran ask VA to provide him a copy of the 2016 VA examination.
On January 27, 2017, the Board denied compensation for sleep apnea. R. at 6. The Board explained that it found the 2016 VA examination highly probative and that the veteran's medical treatise evidence did not support his claim. R. at 12-16. The veteran now appeals the Board's decision.
The appellant challenges the Board's decision to deny him disability compensation for sleep apnea, basing his primary argument on his reading of certain provisions in title 38 of the U.S. Code. Appellant's Brief (Br.) at 9-18; Reply Br. at 3-11. Secondarily, he invokes the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for remand of the Board's decision. Appellant's Br. at 19-29; Reply Br. at 11-15. Ultimately, his arguments are not persuasive and, additionally, he fails to demonstrate prejudicial error. We begin by addressing the questions of statutory interpretation and then turn to the appellant's due process argument.
Mr. Martinez's chief argument is rooted in 38 U.S.C. § 5103A, which states that the Secretary "shall make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claimant's claim." 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1) (2016). The veteran argues that this requires the Secretary to automatically "give a copy of a VA medical opinion" to a claimant whenever the Secretary intends to rely on the opinion to deny a claim. Appellant's Br. at 10. According to Mr. Martinez, the plain language of section 5103A supports his interpretation because the word "obtaining" is commonly defined as "getting or acquiring something." Appellant's Br. at 11. He contends that his reading of the statute is consistent with the overall statutory and regulatory scheme, Reply Br. at 6, and comports both with Congress's clear intention for the Secretary to assist a veteran and the "theme of mutual help" that is "woven throughout [section] 5103A." Appellant's Br. at 13.
The Secretary disputes these contentions. He argues that, under the circumstances of this case and viewed in the context of the overall statutory scheme, the language of section 5103A plainly and unambiguously does not require VA to ensure that a claimant receives a copy of a claims file document like a medical examination report absent a written request. Secretary's Br. at 14-20. In the alternative, he asserts that the language of the statute is ambiguous and that the Court should defer to the Secretary's reasonable statutory interpretation. Secretary's Br. at 20-24.
We thus are called upon to consider the language of section 5103A. The Court reviews statutory construction questions de novo. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1). We first address whether the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). In making this determination, we look to "the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Id. at 341. "[I]f the statutory language is unambiguous and 'the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, '" then the Court's statutory inquiry comes to an end. Id. at 340 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
Several canons of statutory construction guide our review of the statute's plain language. First, it is a "fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). "Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context." Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). Thus, in assessing the language of a statute, courts review the overall statutory scheme "'so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.'" Roper v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 173, 178 (2006) (quoting Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 46:06 (6th ed. 2000)), aff'd, 240 Fed.Appx. 422 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Related canons caution against a construction that would nullify or impliedly repeal other statutory requirements. Under "the so-called surplusage canon [we presume] that each word Congress uses is there for a reason," Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S.Ct. 1652, 1659 (2017), and we are "obliged to give effect, if possible to every word Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). Thus, "one section of a law should not be interpreted so as to render another section meaningless." Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 201 F.3d 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Similarly, "[w]hen two statutes complement each other, it would show disregard for the congressional design to hold that Congress nonetheless intended one federal statute to preclude operation of the other." POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 115 (2014). "In the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable." Morton v. Mancari, ...
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