Martino v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

Decision Date19 October 2018
Docket Number1:17-CV-01071 EAW
Citation339 F.Supp.3d 118
Parties Julia Ann MARTINO, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of New York

Jeanne Elizabeth Murray, Kenneth R. Hiller, Law Offices of Kenneth Hiller, PPLC, Amherst, NY, for Plaintiff.

Blakely Pryor, Dennis J. Canning, Office of the General Counsel Social Security Administration, Kansas City, MO, Fergus John Kaiser, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Represented by counsel. Plaintiff Julia Ann Martino ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner," or "Defendant") denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). (Dkt. 1). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. 10; Dkt. 15), and Plaintiff's reply (Dkt. 16). For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 15) is granted and Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. 10) is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff protectively filed her application for DIB on February 13, 2014. (Dkt. 7 at 68, 182-88).2 In her application, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning June 22, 2012, due to: posttraumatic stress disorder

; severe anxiety/depression; inability to drive; fear of bad weather, driving, and mistreatment; difficulty interacting with others; inability to function; decreased memory; repetitive nightmares; difficulty sleeping; and high blood pressure and cholesterol. (Id. at 182, 192). Plaintiff's applications were initially denied on May 7, 2014. (Id. at 68-80, 86-96). At Plaintiff's request, a video hearing was held before administrative law judge ("ALJ") Jack D. McCarthy on May 19, 2016. (Id. at 164-65, 33-67). The ALJ presided over the hearing from Kansas City, Kansas, and Plaintiff appeared and testified in Buffalo, New York. (Id. ). On June 22, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 14-28). Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review on July 23, 2016 (id. at 166); her request was denied on August 25, 2017, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision (id. 4-9). This action followed.

LEGAL STANDARD
I. District Court Review

"In reviewing a final decision of the [Social Security Administration ("SSA") ], this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). It is not the Court's function to "determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence). However, "[t]he deferential standard of review for substantial evidence does not apply to the Commissioner's conclusions of law." Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984) ).

II. Disability Determination

An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Bowen v. City of New York , 476 U.S. 467, 470-71, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is "severe" within the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of "not disabled." If the claimant does have at least one severe impairment, the ALJ continues to step three.

At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the "Listings"). Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement (id. § 404.1509), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments. See id. § 404.1520(e).

The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits the claimant to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).

DISCUSSION
I. The ALJ's Decision

In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Initially, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2018. (Dkt. 7 at 19). At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful work activity since June 22, 2012, the alleged onset date. (Id. ).

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of major depressive disorder

, recurrent, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). (Id. ). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments of high blood pressure, chronic pain syndrome, irritable bowel syndrome, and hypertension were non-severe. (Id. at 19-20).

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. (Id. at 20). The ALJ particularly considered the criteria of Listings 12.04 and 12.06 in reaching his conclusion. (Id. at 20-21).

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform full range of work at all exertional levels as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 96-4, with the additional nonexertional limitations that Plaintiff:

is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple and detailed instructions that can be learned in 6 months or less, but not complex instructions; she can have occasional interaction with the public, co-workers, and supervisors; and she should avoid jobs that pose a risk of violence.

(Id. at 21). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Id. at 26).

At step five, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") to conclude that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including the representative occupations of merchandise marker, routing clerk, and photocopy machine operator. (Id. at 26-27). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act. (Id. at 27-28).

II. The Commissioner's Determination is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free from Legal Error

Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse the determination of the Commissioner, or in the alternative, to remand this matter to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings, arguing that the RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because (1) in assessing Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ failed to adopt the more restrictive findings of Thomas H. England, Ph.D., as to Plaintiff's limitations, and (2) the ALJ mischaracterized the medical opinions of Richard G. Bennett, M.D., and Bonnie Collins, a licensed clinical social worker. (Dkt. 10-1 at 15-25). The Court has considered each of these arguments and, for the reasons discussed below, finds them to be without merit.

A. Assessment of Plaintiff's RFC

In deciding a disability claim, an ALJ is tasked with "weigh[ing] all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole." Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App'x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013). An ALJ's conclusion need not "perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his decision." Id. However, an ALJ is not a medical professional, and "is not qualified to assess a claimant's RFC on the basis of bare medical findings." Ortiz v. Colvin, 298 F.Supp.3d 581, 586 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (quotation omitted). "[A]s a result[,] an ALJ's determination of RFC without a medical advisor's assessment is not supported by substantial evidence." Dennis...

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