Martiszus v. Washington County
| Decision Date | 21 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 03-750-MO. |
| Citation | 325 F.Supp.2d 1160 |
| Parties | Edward MARTISZUS, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Oregon; Deputy Candilora, personally, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Leonard R. Berman, Beaverton, OR, for Plaintiff.
Elmer Manuel Dickens, Jr., Washington County Counsel, Hillsboro, OR, for Defendants.
In this civil-rights lawsuit, plaintiff Edward Martiszus claims that a Washington County Deputy Toby Candilora drew his gun on plaintiff and detained him simply because he was repairing his Volkswagen Beetle on the side of the road. Consequently plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim for unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In response, Candilora asserts the defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiff also seeks to impose liability on the county. Both sides have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, the court denies plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in full and also denies defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim.
The parties dispute much of the underlying events in this case. Their stories are discussed in some detail below.
On August 19, 2002, at about 2:00 a.m., defendant Toby Candilora, a Washington County deputy, was on patrol in a rural part of the county. He saw a Volkswagen Beetle sitting idle on the side of a road. The car's lights were not on, but its driver-side door was open. Although Deputy Candilora stated in a narrative report that plaintiff's car did not appear to be disabled, he stated in the same report that the reason he contacted plaintiff was to "check his welfare and determine if he needed assistance." An internal report written by county officials similarly stated that the reason Candilora originally stopped was "to assist the [plaintiff] with a possible broken down car."
As he approached the car, Deputy Candilora saw a leg hanging out of the open door, causing Candilora to turn his car around and park behind the idle Beetle. Candilora never turned on his car's sirens. Because of heavy radio traffic, Candilora was unable to reach police dispatch.
Deputy Candilora exited his car and approached the Beetle. He saw a man standing at the rear of the Beetle. The man turned out to be Edward Martiszus, a registered nurse and the plaintiff in this lawsuit. He testified at his deposition that at the time Candilora's car pulled in he was bending over working on his Beetle.
Plaintiff further testified as follows: As Deputy Candilora approached, he asked, "What's up?" or "What are you doing?" Plaintiff answered, "I'm working on my car," and continued to do so. Candilora then asked plaintiff whether he had his driver's license, to which plaintiff responded: After plaintiff's refusal to produce a driver's license, Candilora became angry. Plaintiff testified to what happened next:
[T]he next thing I heard was "Drop it," as I was working on my car, on my feeler gauge. I said, "Drop what?" And I looked over my head and I looked right down the barrel of a pistol pointed at my face.
Thus, according to plaintiff's version of events, he was knelt over working on his car when Candilora pulled and pointed the gun. Next, after Candilora told plaintiff to "drop it," plaintiff, while still bending over the Beetle, dropped what he was holding: a screwdriver in one hand and a metal-bladed tool (, a "feeler gauge") in the other hand. Then, pursuant to Candilora's orders, plaintiff stood up and faced the deputy. The two stood about three or four feet from each other. After a couple seconds facing each other, Candilora holstered his gun.
Candilora again asked plaintiff to produce identification, but plaintiff responded: Candilora responded, something like: The two then continued a little longer, with Candilora asking for a driver's license and plaintiff refusing to produce it. (At his deposition, plaintiff explained he did not want to produce his driver's license because he felt that it was his constitutional right not to produce the license given he was merely repairing his car.) At some point, Candilora stated, "Shut your mouth, shut your f* *ing mouth." (During the encounter, Candilora used the word "f* *k" multiple times.)
Candilora next ordered plaintiff to turn and put his hands behind his back. Plaintiff complied and Candilora handcuffed him; shortly thereafter, Candilora placed plaintiff in the back of the patrol car where he ultimately sat for about ten minutes. While in the patrol car, Candilora regained his cool and plaintiff finally produced his driver's license. When Candilora confirmed plaintiff owned the Beetle and that there were no outstanding warrants for him, Candilora released the handcuffs and allowed him to resume repairing the car.
Candilora testified that although he did not know exactly what type of crime might be afoot, he felt he had "reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was occurring." He testified that when he saw plaintiff bent over with his leg draped from the car, several thoughts entered his mind: Candilora further opined that plaintiff was required to produce a driver's license because there was reasonable suspicion of a crime.
Deputy Candilora's version of what happened differs slightly from plaintiff's version in other respects as well. For instance, Candilora said he told plaintiff to "drop the weapons" and said this while his hand was on the gun. Candilora, however, disputes that he even actually drew the gun and pointed it at plaintiff. In addition, according to Candilora, upon approaching the Beetle, he called out, "Hi, Washington County Sheriff's Office." In response, plaintiff allegedly did not turn around, continued to lean over the Beetle's engine compartment, and stated "F* *k you, leave me the f* *k alone." Candilora's version also alleges that each time he asked for identification, plaintiff cursed in response. (Candilora, however, admits that he used curse words because his adrenaline ran high during the encounter.) Plaintiff, however, denies ever cursing. Candilora further takes the position that plaintiff never said he was repairing his car until he had been placed in the patrol car.
The next day, plaintiff called the county to complain about the encounter. In response, the county initiated an internal investigation. Investigative officials "exonerated" Candilora from the allegation he had used "excessive force" by drawing his weapon. (Under the investigative unit's definitions, "exonerated" means the complained-about action was "lawful and proper.") The county, however, found that Candilora violated county policy by using profanity during the encounter with plaintiff.
Washington County Sheriff Rob Gordon also reprimanded Candilora for telling plaintiff to "shut his f* * *ing mouth." Candilora conceded he should have acted in a more "composed" fashion. Sheriff Gordon also wrote a letter directly to plaintiff explaining the county's internal findings:
Based on these events, plaintiff asserts several claims. He brings constitutional claims under Section 1983 based on the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.1 Plaintiff additionally brings various state law claims: wrongful imprisonment negligent hiring, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Defendants moved for summary judgment against all of plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff, in turn, moved for partial summary judgment on "liability" as to his Fourth Amendment claim against Candilora. Plaintiff further seeks summary judgment as to his claim for municipal liability against the county.
Summary judgment is only proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the movant initially shows that no genuine issue exists for trial, the non-movant cannot then rest on the pleadings but must respond with evidence setting "forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The non-movant's evidence must create more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Evaluating whether a genuine issue of material fact exists requires the court to view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
In addition to seeking to hold Candilora individually liable for the alleged constitutional violations, plaintiff also seeks to impose municipal liability on the county. As briefly outlined below, the court finds that summary judgment is appropriate against plaintiff's federal claims insofar as those claims seek to hold the county liable.
In order to hold a local governmental entity liable for money damages under Section 1983, the plaintiff must establish a governmental custom or policy which caused the alleged constitutional violation. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Thus the local entity "may not be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of...
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