Martl v. United States, 14-391L

• Decision Date: 13 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 14-391L,14-391L
• Parties: NADA MARTL, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

NADA MARTL, Plaintiff,
v.
THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 14-391L

United States Court of Federal Claims

Filed: May 13, 2014

ORIGINAL
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

In her complaint, filed pro se, plaintiff Nada Marti alleges that the United States took her property in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In particular, she alleges that while she was outside of the United States receiving medical treatment, the United States District Court of the District of Hawaii improperly ordered and supervised the sale of real property that she owned in the state of Hawaii. She therefore seeks damages of $8 million, an amount that she asserts reflects the fair market value of the property. As explained below, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's claims and therefore must dismiss plaintiff's complaint.

I. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction in the United States Court of Federal Claims

Whether the court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case is a threshold matter. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). The parties or the court on its own initiative may challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

The ability of the United States Court of Federal Claims to entertain suits against the United States is limited. "The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). The waiver of immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395

Page 2

U.S. 1, 4 (1969). The Tucker Act, the principal statute governing the jurisdiction of this court, waives sovereign immunity for claims against the United States, not sounding in tort, that are founded upon the United States Constitution, a federal statute or regulation, or an express or implied contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). However, the Tucker Act is merely a jurisdictional statute and "does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Instead, the substantive right must appear in another source of law, such as a "money-mandating constitutional provision, statute or regulation that has been violated, or an express or implied contract with the United States." Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).

When considering whether to dismiss a complaint for lack of jurisdiction, a court assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true and construes those allegations in plaintiff's favor. Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995). A pro se plaintiff's complaint, "'however inartfully pleaded,' must be held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers' . . . ." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 n.7 (1980) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). However, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from meeting basic jurisdictional requirements. See Henke, 60 F.3d at 799 ("The fact that [the plaintiff] acted pro se in...