Martorelli v. Dep't of Transp.

• Decision Date: 28 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 19307.,19307.
• Citation: Martorelli v. Dep't of Transp., 316 Conn. 538, 114 A.3d 912 (Conn. 2015)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Steve MARTORELLI v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.

316 Conn. 538

114 A.3d 912

Steve MARTORELLI

v.DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.

No. 19307.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 15, 2015.

Decided April 28, 2015.

Michael Feldman, with whom was Steve Martorelli, self-represented, for the appellant(plaintiff).

Gregory T. D'Auria, solicitor general, with whom were Charles H. Walsh, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, and Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, for the appellee(defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

Opinion

ROGERS, C.J.

The primary issue that we must resolve in this appeal is what livery service permit applicants must demonstrate in order to establish that “public convenience and necessity will be improved” by the proposed service pursuant to General Statutes § 13b–103 (a).¹The plaintiff, Steve Martorelli, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal and affirming the decision of the defendant, the Department of Transportation(department), denying his application for a livery service permit.On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly affirmed the department's finding that the plaintiff failed to fully satisfy the statutory requirements for obtaining a permit because the department improperly interpreted the “public convenience and necessity” provision of § 13b–103 (a).We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court in part.

The record sets forth the following undisputed facts and procedural history relevant to our resolution of this appeal.On April 5, 2011, the plaintiff submitted an application to the department for authority to operate two motor vehicles in a new intrastate livery service located in Meriden.In the plaintiff's application, he declared that he would be the sole proprietor of the livery service, and would offer livery services by van and a “super stretch” limousine, both of which had a capacity of ten passengers.The plaintiff also submitted a fiscal analysis balance sheet demonstrating his financial assets, liabilities and capital.

After receiving the plaintiff's application, the department issued notice for a public hearing on the plaintiff's application, which it held on June 28, 2012.A representative of a local limousine service, A Premier Limousine Services, Inc.(Premier), attended the hearing and was granted intervenorparty status pursuant to General Statutes § 4–177a.²The plaintiff called eight witnesses to testify on his behalf and testified himself as to his financial ability and suitability, his ability to manage a livery service, and his proposed plan to offer lower rates than existing livery services.The plaintiff testified specifically that his services would be less expensive than existing livery services in Meriden and would attract local businesses as customers seeking to transport employees or clients.The department took administrative notice of the plaintiff's proposed rates and Premier's rates.

Following the hearing, the department concluded that the plaintiff did not satisfy his burden of proving the statutory requirement that his livery service would improve present or future public convenience and necessity.The department considered general statutory factors for granting permit applications, including “the suitability of the applicant ... the financial responsibility of the applicant, the ability of the applicant efficiently and properly to perform the service for which authority is requested and the fitness, willingness and ability of the applicant to conform to the provisions of the statutes and the requirements and regulations of the department thereunder, in accordance with ... § 13b–103.”The department then determined that the plaintiff had sufficient assets to cover his start-up costs and was a suitable applicant based upon his business experience in other business ventures and his clean criminal record.The department found, however, that while the plaintiff“spent a good deal of time attempting to prove the public need for his livery service by pointing out problems he found with [Premier] ... such [problems] ... are minor in nature and do nothing to prove a need for the [plaintiff's] service.”The department concluded that, “[w]hile it is certainly clear that the [plaintiff] is well liked, the testimony of [his] witnesses falls short [of] proving need and necessity.Few of the witnesses had any real need for a livery service; in fact, taxicab service could have taken care of most of their needs and been far less expensive.Most of these individuals had not called other livery services and had little experience with getting livery service in the [local] area and therefore their lack of experience shed little light onto the livery situation.”The department thereafter denied the plaintiff's application based upon his failure to demonstrate that his service would improve public convenience and necessity as required by § 13b–103 (a)(1).

The plaintiff appealed from the department's decision to the trial court, claiming that the department improperly concluded that he failed to establish that public convenience and necessity would be improved by his proposed livery service.He further claimed that § 13b–103 (a)(4), which allows persons who have already held an intrastate livery permit for at least one year to obtain up to two additional vehicle authorizations without a hearing and without written notice of the pendency of the application, violates the equal protection clause of the United States and Connecticut constitutions, the interstate commerce clause of the United States constitution, and the due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions.The trial court concluded that § 13b–103 was constitutional and that the department properly determined that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that public convenience and necessity would be improved by his livery service, and, accordingly, the court affirmed the department's decision and dismissed the plaintiff's appeal.This appeal followed.³

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly: (1) affirmed the department's denial of the plaintiff's livery permit application; (2) found that § 13b–103 (a)(4) did not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions; (3) found that § 13b–103 (a) did not violate the interstate commerce clause of the United States constitution; and (4) found that § 13b–103 (a) was not constitutionally void for vagueness in violation of the due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions.We agree with the plaintiff's first claim but affirm the trial court's judgment on the remaining claims.

I

The plaintiff contends that the evidence he presented of his ability to offer rates lower than those of existing livery service providers satisfied the public convenience and necessity requirement of § 13b–103 (a)(1), and that the department's conclusion to the contrary was “unreasonable and arbitrary....”He also contends that the phrase “public convenience and necessity” is undefined and that the department never explained what facts or evidence would be sufficient to meet this standard.Finally, the plaintiff claims that the department improperly relied on the fact that the plaintiff presented no witnesses who were refused service by existing livery service providers as the sole factor for finding that he failed to satisfy the public convenience and necessity requirement, and that this requirement to show specific, individualized need is wholly inconsistent with Briggs Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission,148 Conn. 678, 682, 174 A.2d 529(1961), wherein this court interpreted public convenience and necessity to mean a “benefit to the public generally, and ... upon the whole public instead of a small part of it....”

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review.“Judicial review of [an administrative agency's] action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act [General Statutes§ 4–166 et seq. ] ... and the scope of that review is very restricted.”(Internal quotation marks omitted.)Palomba–Bourke v. Commissioner of Social Services,312 Conn. 196, 202, 92 A.3d 932(2014)“Ordinarily, this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute's purposes....Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.”(Internal quotation marks omitted.)Id., at 203, 92 A.3d 932.“[A]n agency's interpretation of a statute is accorded deference when the agency's interpretation has been formally articulated and applied for an extended period of time, and that interpretation is reasonable.”(Internal quotation marks omitted.)Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commission,284 Conn. 149, 164, 931 A.2d 890(2007).

The department has not formally articulated its interpretation of the phrase “public convenience and necessity” in § 13b–103 (a)(1) and, in fact, department hearing officers have utilized different standards in prior decisions.⁴Accordingly, the department's interpretation of § 13b–103 is not entitled to special deference.SeeLongley v. State Employees Retirement Commission,supra, 284 Conn. at 166, 931 A.2d 890(agency interpretation accorded deference when it is “both time-tested and reasonable”).We therefore apply a de novo standard of review.Id.“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature....In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually...