Martuzas v. Reynolds, Civil Action No. 96-CV-1083 (RSP/DRH).

• Decision Date: 28 October 1997
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 96-CV-1083 (RSP/DRH).
• Citation: 983 F.Supp. 87
• Parties: Richard MARTUZAS, Petitioner, v. Edward REYNOLDS, Superintendent, Mohawk Correctional Facility, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

983 F.Supp. 87

Richard MARTUZAS, Petitioner, v. Edward REYNOLDS, Superintendent, Mohawk Correctional Facility, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 96-CV-1083 (RSP/DRH).

United States District Court, N.D.New York.

October 28, 1997.

Richard Martuzas, Marcy, NY, pro se.

Dennis C. Vacco, New York State Attorney General, Albany, NY (Keith E. Kammerer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

ORDER

POOLER, District Judge.

The above matter comes to me following a Report-Recommendation by Magistrate Judge David R. Homer, duly filed on the 4th day of April, 1997. Following ten days from the service thereof, the Clerk has sent me the entire file, including any and all objections filed by the parties herein.

Petitioner Richard Martuzas, an inmate in the New York State Corrections system, filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. Dkt. No. 1. Martuzas is serving a sentence of five to fifteen years following his plea of guilty to a New York State charge of criminal sale of a controlled substance. Id. ¶ 5. Martuzas claims that (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to make an early motion for recusal and the attorney represented other defendants arrested in the same police investigation; (2) the judge should have recused himself; and (3) the judge should have permitted Martuzas to withdraw his plea. Id. ¶ 12.

The magistrate judge recommended that I deny Martuzas's application for a writ of habeas corpus. First, the magistrate judge found that the trial court judge's failure to recuse himself failed to rise to the level of a constitutional violation because Martuzas produced no evidence of actual bias, or violation of his due process rights. Report-Recommendation ("Rpt-Rec") at 5. Next, the magistrate judge found that Martuzas failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) counsel's failure to make a motion for the judge to recuse himself at an earlier time was not unreasonable and did not change the outcome and (2) counsel's representation of other defendants indicted separately and tried separately did not present a conflict of interest. Finally, the magistrate judge found that petitioner failed to allege a due process violation relative to the court's denial of his motion to withdraw the plea of guilty because the plea was knowing and voluntary. Id. at 10-12.

On April 15, 1997, Martuzas filed objections to the report-recommendation. The objections substantially re-state the arguments Martuzas has already stated in support of his claims. After careful review of all of the papers herein, including the Magistrate Judge's Report-Recommendation, and the objections submitted thereto, I approve the magistrate judge's report-recommendation.

It is well established that "a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process." Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). When a criminal defendant pleads guilty on the advice of counsel, he may not later collaterally attack the conviction based on a deprivation of constitutional rights which occurred prior to the plea. Id. at 266-67, 93 S.Ct. at 1607-08. The defendant "may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within [established] standards." Id. at 267, 93 S.Ct. at 1608. Thus, instead of examining the merits of the claims preceding the guilty plea, the court must determine only whether the defendant pleaded guilty intelligently and voluntarily with the advice of competent counsel. United States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 497-98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1445, 134 L.Ed.2d 565 (1996).

In the present case, Martuzas claims that his plea was not intelligent and voluntary because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. As the magistrate judge noted, where a petitioner contends that a guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show that (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). The first requirement is based on an objective standard of attorney competence. Id. at 58, 106 S.Ct. at 370. "The second, or `prejudice,' requirement ... focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process." Id. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370 (citations omitted).

Here, the magistrate judge found both that (1) Martuzas's counsel acted reasonably in not making a motion for recusal at an earlier time and in securing for Martuzas the plea bargain which Martuzas accepted; and (2) even if counsel had acted differently, there was no evidence that those actions would have resulted in a more favorable outcome for Martuzas. Martuzas objects to the magistrate judge's finding that counsel acted reasonably but does not object to the finding that by not pleading guilty and going to trial Martuzas would not have fared better than he did pursuant to his plea of guilty. I find no error in the magistrate judge's conclusion that Martuzas fails to show prejudice. Because Martuzas fails to show prejudice, I do not consider his objections to the magistrate judge's finding that his counsel acted reasonably. See Mitchell v. Scully, 746 F.2d 951, 954 (2d Cir.1984) (where petitioner fails to demonstrate sufficient prejudice, court need not examine question of whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance). Consequently, I conclude that ineffective assistance of counsel did not render Martuzas's plea less than knowing and voluntary.

Martuzas also claims that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did not understand that the plea would result in a five to fifteen year sentence. The magistrate judge correctly concluded that because the trial court judge informed Martuzas of the minimum and maximum possible sentences that could result from his plea and then sentenced Martuzas within that range, the plea was knowing and voluntary. I find that the plea was knowing and voluntary and constituted a waiver of all prior non-jurisdictional constitutional defects. Consequently, Martuzas had no constitutional right to withdraw his plea and may not now challenge alleged constitutional infirmities in the proceedings which occurred prior to the plea.

As noted in the report-recommendation, in the absence of evidence of actual bias in the proceedings, petitioner fails to raise a constitutional claim relative to the judge's denial of the motion for recusal following the plea.

For the reasons stated herein, I approved the magistrate judge's report-recommendation and deny petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION¹

HOMER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Richard Martuzas, petitioner pro se and an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, pleaded guilty to the criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree in Jefferson County Court. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of five to fifteen years imprisonment. Petitioner, having exhausted all available state remedies, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on three grounds: (1) the trial judge incorrectly denied petitioner's motion for recusal; (2) petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) the trial judge erred in denying petitioner's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons which follow, it is recommended that the petition be denied.

I. Background

In November, 1993, a Jefferson County grand jury returned Indictment No. 523-93 (the first indictment), charging petitioner in two counts each with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The first indictment alleged that petitioner sold cocaine to an undercover police informant on October 6 and 7, 1993. RA 3-4.²

Prior to petitioner's arraignment on the first indictment, petitioner was again arrested and charged in Indictment No. 561-93 (the second indictment) with one count each of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fourth degrees. Petitioner was arraigned separately on each indictment and entered pleas of not guilty to all charges. PB 2.³

A trial on the first indictment commenced on May 16, 1994, before Jefferson County Court Judge, Lee Clary. On May 16, petitioner made oral motions for substitution of counsel and for the recusal of Judge Clary from the proceedings. Petitioner based the motions, respectively, on his attorney's failure to make an earlier motion for recusal and on the fact that petitioner had filed a formal complaint against Judge Clary in 1975 when Judge Clary, as a practicing attorney, represented petitioner on an appeals. Both motions were denied. RA 36-44.

Jury selection commenced. RA 45. Before jury selection was completed, petitioner pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree to satisfy the first indictment. RA 49-50. On July 19, 1994, petitioner appeared before Judge Clary for sentencing. At that time petitioner's counsel was formally substituted. His new attorney moved to vacate petitioner's May 16, 1994 guilty plea and renewed petitioner's motion for recusal. Petitioner also moved to vacate his guilty plea. RA 73-83. The court again denied both motions and sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate term of five to fifteen years imprisonment on the first indictment. RA 105-06.⁴ The Appellate Division affirmed. People v. Martuzas, 224 A.D.2d 928, 637 N.Y.S.2d...