The Superior Court of Pennsylvania succinctly recited the relevant facts and procedural history of this matter as follows:
On June 22, 2005, a jury convicted [Martz] on one count of indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7), and one count of corruption of minors, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1), in connection with his sexual assault of an eleven-year-old girl. On February 22, 2006, the trial court sentenced [Martz] to one year to four years in prison for indecent assault, and one year to four years in prison for corruption of minors, the sentences to run consecutively. Thus, [Martz's] aggregate sentence was two years to eight years in prison. Additionally, the trial court found [Martz] to be a sexually violent predator for Pennsylvania's Megan's Law III purposes. [42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9791-99].
On August 10, 2006, the trial court filed an amended sentencing order indicating [Martz's] sentences were to run concurrently, resulting in a reduced aggregate sentence of one year to four years in prison. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed [Martz's] conviction but held the trial court erred when it filed its amended sentencing order reducing [Martz's] sentence. Commonwealth v. Martz, 926 A.2d 514 (Pa. Super.2007). Therefore, on June 25, 2007, upon remand, the trial court reinstated [Martz's] original sentence in which [Martz] was to serve his sentences consecutively, thus resulting in an aggregate of two years to eight years in prison. However, after the trial court reinstated [Martz's] original sentence, for unknown reasons, the Montour County Clerk of Courts failed to transmit the June 25, 2007 sentencing order to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (the DOC).
On January 18, 2008, [Martz] filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. However, during the pendency of his petition, unaware [Martz's] sentences were to run consecutively, the DOC released [Martz] from custody on January 21, 2010, at the end of his maximum four-year "concurrent" sentence. That is, [Martz] was not placed on parole; but rather, he was released from prison after he "maxed out" his August 10, 2006 sentence, which imposed concurrent sentences, as opposed to his reinstated June 25, 2007 sentence, which imposed consecutive sentences.
Believing [Martz] was no longer eligible for relief since he was not "currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole for the crime," 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i), the Commonwealth moved to dismiss [Martz's] PCRA petition. On June 22, 2010, the PCRA court granted the Commonwealth's motion, thereby dismissing [Martz's] PCRA petition without reaching the merits thereof. On July 12, 2010, [Martz] filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
Subsequently, on August 11, 2011, the Commonwealth discovered the Clerk of Courts had failed to send the June 25, 2007 re-sentencing order to the DOC, and therefore, [Martz] had been mistakenly released from prison before the completionof his sentence. As a result, the Commonwealth applied for a bench warrant, and, on August 12, 2011, [Martz] was detained. On September 1, 2011, following a hearing, the trial court recommitted [Martz] to serve the remainder of his sentence under the terms of the June 25, 2007 re-sentencing order. However, the trial court gave [Martz] credit for "time served" from January 21, 2010, when he was mistakenly released from prison due to an apparent clerical error, until September 1, 2011, when he was recommitted to serve the remainder of his sentence. The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal . . . arguing in its timely-filed court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence on September 1, 2011, when it gave [Martz's] credit for "time served" while he was at liberty. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, in responding to the Commonwealth's issue, the trial court explained, in relevant part, the following:
In reviewing a series of cases, the [Pennsylvania] Commonwealth Court said that "[t]hese cases indicate that a prisoner has the right to serve a sentence continuously rather than in installments, but a continuous sentence may be interrupted by some fault of the prisoner.... The principle is applicable where prison authorities erroneously release a prisoner from prison and then deny the prisoner credit for the time spent outside of prison." Forbes v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 931 A.2d 88, 93 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007)[, affirmed, 596 Pa. 492, 946 A.2d 103 (2008) (per curiam ) ] (citations omitted). In this case, the prisoner was erroneously released due to no fault of his own, but due to a systemic clerical error. He had a right to serve his sentence continuously. Practically speaking, he is back in prison with almost two and one-half years left to serve on his maximum sentence, one of which will satisfy his minimum sentence.
Trial Court's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion filed 10/20/11 at 2-3.
On appeal, the Commonwealth's sole contention [was] that the trial court erred in giving [Martz] credit for "time served" from January 21, 2010, when he was mistakenly released from prison due to a clerical error, until August 12, 2011, when [Martz] was detained.
Com. v. Martz, 2012 PA Super 87, 42 A.3d 1142, 1143-45 (2012). The Superior Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting Martz credit for the time he was erroneously at liberty from January 21, 2010 to August 12, 2011, and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. (Id. at 1151). Martz's petition for allowance of appeal was denied. Com.v. Martz, 618 Pa. 685; 57 A.3d 69 (Table). Martz was subsequently resentenced on December 20, 2012, in accordance with the superior court's directive. (Doc. 19-2, p. 21).
On October 15, 2013, Martz filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1), which was stayed on May 5, 2014, to allow him to pursue his PCRA petition, which had been resurrected. (Doc. 19-2, p. 2). On November 25, 2013, an order issued scheduling Martz's PCRA hearing for January 13, 2014. (Id.) The hearing was continued on January 23, 2014, pending the filing of an amended PCRA petition (Id. at 4-5), which was filed on or about January 31, 2014. (Doc. 41-10, p. 2). The Commonwealth responded by filing an answer and supplemental answer to the amended PCRA petition. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 3, 2014. (Doc. 41-9, pp. 1-131). Relief was denied at the conclusion of the hearing. (Doc. 41-9, pp. 126-31; Doc. 41-8, p. 2). Martz appealed and, on March 31, 2015, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's denial of relief. (Doc. 41-2, pp. 2-8).
Thereafter, Martz returned to federal court seeking review of the following issues:
Ground One: [Martz's] right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated.
Ground Two: [Martz's] Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process were violated when Trial Counsel failed to seek a cautionary jury instruction.
Ground Three: The evidence presented by the Commonwealth was not sufficient to prove Petitioner guilty of Indecent Assault and Corruption of Minors beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ground Four: Prosecutorial misconduct violated Petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Constitution of the United States.
Ground Five: [Martz] was denied effective assistance of counsel under the SixthAmendment of the United States [Constitution] when counsel stipulated to a grossly inaccurate and highly prejudicial sexual offender's assessment report that had a direct impact on [Martz's] sentence.
Ground Six: [Martz's] right to serve his sentence continuously and in a timely manner was denied after he was erroneously released from prison, then taken back into custody while being denied credit for time he was erroneously at liberty.
Ground Seven: [Martz] is entitled to credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment that was a result of another charge which [Martz] was arrested after the commission of the offense for which he was sentenced because that time has not been credited against another sentence.
(Doc. 1, pp. 5-19).
By limiting habeas relief to state conduct which violates "the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," § 2254 places a high threshold on the courts. Typically, habeas relief will only be granted to state prisoners in those instances where the conduct of state proceedings resulted in a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice" or was completely inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure. See, e.g., Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994). Thus, claimed violations of state law, standing alone, will not entitle a petitioner to § 2254 habeas relief, absent a...
