Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp.
Decision Date | 26 February 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 11–1175.,11–1175. |
Citation | 568 U.S. 371,185 L.Ed.2d 242,133 S.Ct. 1166 |
Parties | Olivea MARX, Petitioner v. GENERAL REVENUE CORPORATION. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Allison M. Zieve, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Eric J. Feigin, for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Petitioner.
Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
David M. Larson, Englewood, CO, Allison M. Zieve, Counsel of Record, Scott Michelman, Scott L. Nelson, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Eric D. Reicin, Deputy General Counsel, Sallie Mae, Inc., Reston, VA, Kevin T. Dreyer, Associate General Counsel, Sallie Mae, Inc., Cincinnati, OH, Lisa S. Blatt, Counsel of Record, Robert J. Katerberg, Anthony J. Franze, Dirk C. Phillips, R. Reeves Anderson, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, DC, Adam L. Plotkin, Steven J. Wienczkowski, Denver, CO, for Respondent.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) gives district courts discretion to award costs to prevailing defendants "[u]nless a federal statute ... provides otherwise." The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 91 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), provides that "[o]n a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs." This case presents the question whether § 1692k(a) (3)"provides otherwise" than Rule 54(d)(1). We conclude that § 1692k (a)(3) does not "provid[e] otherwise," and thus a district court may award costs to prevailing defendants in FDCPA cases without finding that the plaintiff brought the case in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.
Petitioner Olivea Marx defaulted on a student loan guaranteed by EdFund, a division of the California Student Aid Commission. In September 2008, EdFund hired respondent General Revenue Corporation (GRC) to collect the debt. One month later, Marx filed an FDCPA enforcement action against GRC.1 Marx alleged that GRC had violated the FDCPA by harassing her with phone calls several times a day and falsely threatening to garnish up to 50% of her wages and to take the money she owed directly from her bank account. Shortly after the complaint was filed, GRC made an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 to pay Marx $1,500, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs, to settle any claims she had against it. Marx did not respond to the offer. She subsequently amended her complaint to add a claim that GRC unlawfully sent a fax to her workplace that requested information about her employment status.
Following a 1–day bench trial, the District Court found that Marx had failed to prove any violation of the FDCPA. As the prevailing party, GRC submitted a bill of costs seeking $7,779.16 in witness fees, witness travel expenses, and deposition transcript fees. The court disallowed several items of costs and, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), ordered Marx to pay GRC $4,543.03. Marx filed a motion to vacate the award of costs, arguing that the court lacked authority to award costs under Rules 54(d)(1) and 68(d) because 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) sets forth the exclusive basis for awarding costs in FDCPA cases.2 Section 1692k (a)(3) provides, in relevant part: "On a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs." Marx argued that because the court had not found that she brought the case in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, GRC was not entitled to costs. The District Court rejected Marx's argument, concluding that § 1692k(a)(3) does not displace a court's discretion to award costs under Rule 54(d)(1) and that costs should also be awarded under Rule 68(d).
The Tenth Circuit affirmed but agreed only with part of the District Court's reasoning. In particular, the court disagreed that costs were allowed under Rule 68(d). 668 F.3d 1174, 1182 (2011). It explained that " Rule 68 applies only where the district court enters judgment in favor of a plaintiff" for less than the amount of the settlement offer and not where the plaintiff loses outright. Ibid. (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352, 101 S.Ct. 1146, 67 L.Ed.2d 287 (1981) ). Because the District Court had not entered judgment in favor of Marx, the court concluded that costs were not allowed under Rule 68(d). 668 F.3d, at 1182. Nevertheless, the court found that costs were allowed under Rule 54(d)(1), which grants district courts discretion to award costs to prevailing parties unless a federal statute or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide otherwise. Id., at 1178, 1182. After describing the "venerable" presumption that prevailing parties are entitled to costs, id., at 1179, the court concluded that nothing in the text, history, or purpose of § 1692k(a)(3) indicated that it was meant to displace Rule 54(d)(1), id., at 1178–1182. Judge Lucero dissented, arguing that "[t]he only sensible reading of [ § 1692k(a)(3) ] is that the district court may only award costs to a defendant" upon finding that the action was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment and that to read it otherwise rendered the phrase "and costs" superfluous. Id., at 1187 (emphasis in original).
We granted certiorari, 566 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2688, 183 L.Ed.2d 44 (2012), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits regarding whether a prevailing defendant in an FDCPA case may be awarded costs where the lawsuit was not brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment. Compare 668 F.3d, at 1182 (case below), with Rouse v. Law Offices of Rory Clark, 603 F.3d 699, 701 (C.A.9 2010). We now affirm the judgment of the Tenth Circuit.
As in all statutory construction cases, we " 'assum[e] that the ordinary meaning of [the statutory] language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.' " Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2156, 176 L.Ed.2d 998 (2010) (quoting Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) (alteration in original)). In this case, we must construe both Rule 54(d)(1) and § 1692k(a)(3) and assess the relationship between them.
Rule 54(d)(1) is straightforward. It provides, in relevant part: "Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party."
As the Tenth Circuit correctly recognized, Rule 54(d)(1) codifies a venerable presumption that prevailing parties are entitled to costs.3 Notwithstanding this presumption, the word " should" makes clear that the decision whether to award costs ultimately lies within the sound discretion of the district court. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.,
566 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1997, 2001, 182 L.Ed.2d 903 (2012) (). Rule 54(d)(1) also makes clear, however, that this discretion can be displaced by a federal statute or a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that "provides otherwise."
A statute "provides otherwise" than Rule 54(d)(1) if it is "contrary" to the Rule. See 10 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 54.101[1][c], p. 54–159 (3d ed. 2012) (hereinafter 10 Moore's). Because the Rule grants district courts discretion to award costs, a statute is contrary to the Rule if it limits that discretion. A statute may limit a court's discretion in several ways, and it need not expressly state that it is displacing Rule 54(d)(1) to do so. For instance, a statute providing that "plaintiffs shall not be liable for costs" is contrary to Rule 54(d)(1) because it precludes a court from awarding costs to prevailing defendants. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 18(d)(1) (). Similarly, a statute providing that plaintiffs may recover costs only under certain conditions is contrary to Rule 54(d) because it precludes a court from awarding costs to prevailing plaintiffs when those conditions have not been satisfied. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1928 ().
Importantly, not all statutes that provide for costs are contrary to Rule 54(d)(1). A statute providing that "the court may award costs to the prevailing party," for example, is not contrary to the Rule because it does not limit a court's discretion. See 10 Moore's § 54.101[1][c], at 54–159 () .
Marx and the United States as amicus curiae suggest that any statute that specifically provides for costs displaces Rule 54(d)(1), regardless of whether it is contrary to the Rule. Brief for Petitioner 17; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11–12 (hereinafter Brief for United States). The United States relies on the original 1937 version of Rule 54(d)(1), which provided, " 'Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.' " Id., at 12 (quoting Rule). Though the Rules Committee updated the language of Rule 54(d)(1) in 2007, the change was "stylistic only." Advisory Committee's Notes, 28 U.S.C.App., p. 734 (2006 ed., Supp. V). Accordingly, the United States asserts that any "express provision" for costs should displace Rule 54(d)(1).
We are not persuaded, however, that the...
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