Marx v. Schnuck Markets, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-2375-JWL.,93-2375-JWL.
• Citation: 869 F. Supp. 895
• Parties: Gerald MARX, Plaintiff, v. SCHNUCK MARKETS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

869 F. Supp. 895

Gerald MARX, Plaintiff, v. SCHNUCK MARKETS, INC., Defendant.

No. 93-2375-JWL.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

November 21, 1994.

Stephen J. Dennis, Kenneth R. Battis, Dennis & Battis, P.A., Fairway, KS, for plaintiff Garald Marx.

Nancy M. Landis, Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, Overland Park, KS, Dennis G. Collins, Lisa K. Boyer, Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, P.C., St. Louis, MO, for defendant Schnuck Markets, Inc.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LUNGSTRUM, District Judge.

I. Introduction

This matter is currently before the court on plaintiff's motion to reconsider the court's order of summary judgment entered September 30, 1994 (Doc. # 91). In our order, the court granted defendant summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of discriminatory demotion and discharge under the ADEA and plaintiff's claims of retaliatory demotion and discharge under the FLSA, 863 F.Supp. 1489. Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the court's decision on the grounds that the court erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas criteria to plaintiff's claims and that the court failed to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Plaintiff also asks the court to consider additional evidence not before the court when it rendered its decision. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion to reconsider is denied.

II. Legal Standard

The standard applied on a motion for reconsideration in this court has been accurately summarized as follows:

Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is committed to the court's discretion. Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1395 (10th Cir.1988). In exercising that discretion, courts in general have recognized three major grounds justifying reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Estate of Pidcock v. Sunnyland America, Inc., 726 F.Supp. 1322, 1333 (S.D.Ga.1989); see Major v. Benton, 647 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir.1981).

Parker v. Board of Public Utilities of Kansas City, KS, No. 93-2262-GTV, slip op. at 3, 1994 WL 542130 (D.Kan. September 14, 1994); see also Anderson v. United Auto Workers, 738 F.Supp. 441, 442 (D.Kan.1990) (motion to reconsider appropriate when the court has obviously misapprehended a party's position, the facts, or the applicable law, or when a party introduces new evidence that could not have been obtained through the exercise of due diligence).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff's primary argument for reconsideration is that this court erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas shifting burdens test to plaintiff's claims because that test is not applicable in a case of after-acquired evidence. The court finds this argument by plaintiff to be totally without merit for the simple reason that the court did not base its original decision on the after-acquired evidence doctrine. The after-acquired evidence doctrine allows employers to escape liability or diminish damages in Title VII claims by introducing evidence of an employee's wrongdoing that the employer discovered after its initial employment decision. See generally Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.1988). In the present case, the evidence which the defendant relied on in demoting plaintiff was defendant's belief that plaintiff was not truthful in connection with an investigation undertaken by defendant following its receipt of a complaint from an employee at the Schnucks store where plaintiff was manager regarding an alleged encounter she had with plaintiff. This evidence was discovered prior to plaintiff's demotion and was the stated reason for his demotion. Similarly, the defendant presented evidence that it terminated plaintiff due to the fact that plaintiff misrepresented his marital status on his employment application for the purpose of gaining employment at Schnuck, that plaintiff continued to misrepresent his marital status following his employment, and that defendant therefore terminated him consistent with its policy of terminating persons found to have deliberately falsified their employment applications. Again, this evidence was discovered prior to plaintiff's termination and was in fact the stated reason for his termination.

The court's decision granting summary judgment in no way relied on the after-acquired evidence doctrine. Rather, it was based on plaintiff's failure to produce any evidence, beyond his showing of a prima facie case, that age was a determining factor in defendant's decision to demote and subsequently discharge plaintiff or that the immediate cause or motivating factor of defendant's adverse employment action was in retaliation for plaintiff's assertion of statutory rights.

Plaintiff next argues that the court inappropriately applied the shifting burden analysis described in McDonnell Douglas to plaintiff's FLSA retaliation claim. Plaintiff cites no authority for this contention. This court believes that the shifting burden analysis described in McDonnell Douglas does apply to plaintiff's FLSA retaliation claims for the reasons set forth in the original order.

Plaintiff next argues that the court improperly applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis based on the Supreme Court's holding in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). In that case, a correctional officer alleged that St. Mary's Honor Center had demoted and subsequently discharged him on the basis of race. At trial, St. Mary's introduced evidence of two purported legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The district court, acting as trier of fact in a bench trial, found that the reasons St. Mary's gave were not the real reasons for Mr. Hick's discharge. However, it nonetheless held that Mr. Hicks had failed to carry his ultimate burden of proving that his race was the determining factor in the decision to first demote and then to dismiss him. Id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2748. The Court of Appeals set this determination aside on the grounds that once Mr. Hicks had proved all of the reasons given by St. Mary's for its actions to be pretextual, Mr. Hicks was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trier of fact's rejection of an employer's asserted reasons for its actions does not entitle a plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

Plaintiff in our case contends that, based upon language contained in St. Mary's, this court misapplied the McDonnell Douglas analysis in issuing summary judgment. Plaintiff relies on language wherein the Supreme Court stated that although a factfinder's disbelief of an employer's proffered reason for a termination would not mandate judgment as a matter of law for plaintiff, it "may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." Id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. Plaintiff argues that due to this court's finding that the plaintiff had...