Mary J. Pond v. Adelia C. Pond's Estate
| Decision Date | 26 November 1906 |
| Citation | 65 A. 97,79 Vt. 352 |
| Parties | MARY J. POND v. ADELIA C. POND'S ESTATE |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
January Term, 1906.
APPEAL from the decision of commissioners allowing the claim of Mary J. Pond presented against the estate of Adelia Pond; L Alison Webster, executor. The record does not show the pleadings. Trial by jury at the June Term, 1905, Addison County, Watson, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the claimant. The defendant appealed. The defendant called one Bion Wilson as a witness, and offered to show by him "That at about the time when his service on the farm ended, said Adelia C. Pond in the presence of the plaintiff Mary J. Pond, offered and proposed to the witness to make a contract with him whereby he should work for her during the remainder of her lifetime, and have his home with her, and that upon her decease he should have her entire property and estate, which she, the said Adelia C. then represented to be two thousand dollars; that the plaintiff participated in the conversation and heard what was said by the parties, but said nothing about having any claim against Mrs. Pond or the estate; that this conversation occurred at a time when more than four of the six years for which the plaintiff now claims pay for services had elapsed."
Reversed and remanded.
Davis & Russell for the defendant.
Present: ROWELL, C. J., TYLER, MUNSON, HASELTON, POWERS, and MILES, JJ.
This is an appeal from the allowance by the commissioners on the estate of Adelia C. Pond of Mary J Pond's claim for services covering the last six years of the testatrix' lifetime. The claimant is the daughter of Everett B. Pond and step-daughter of the testatrix. By the terms of Everett B. Pond's will, the use of the home farm was given to the testatrix during her lifetime and then to the claimant during her lifetime. It was further provided in the will that the claimant was to have a home on the farm as long as she desired, and be supported out of the income thereof, provided she continued to live there and rendered reasonable assistance about the household affairs. The claimant continued to reside with the testatrix on the farm and receive her support therefrom for some years after her father's death, but finally concluded to go away and take care of herself. Whereupon it was agreed between the testatrix and the claimant that the latter should remain at the farm and receive from the former for her services, in addition to her support, a fixed sum per week. Afterwards, and about a year and a half before the death of the testatrix, she made a contract with one Hubbard whereby he was to come to and make his home on the farm, carry it on, and in case he survived the testatrix, he was to receive the whole of her estate,--then and now consisting entirely of personal property. This proposed arrangement was fully discussed in the presence of the claimant, who knew all about its terms before it was consummated. While the negotiations for this contract were going on, the testatrix, in the presence and hearing of the claimant, told Hubbard that her estate was estimated at two thousand dollars, enumerated the items of which it consisted, and asserted that it was free from debts. To this last statement, the claimant made no dissent, nor did she ever disclose to Hubbard the existence of her claim for services until after the death of the testatrix; on the contrary she allowed the testatrix' statement to go unchallenged and urged Hubbard to enter into the arrangement. Relying upon these representations of the testatrix and believing them to be true, Hubbard did enter into this arrangement with the testatrix, and on his part fully carried out and performed the same according to its terms; and shortly before her death, the testatrix made her will giving Hubbard the use of all her property with remainder to his children, which was satisfactory to him. The executor defends under the general issue and a notice setting forth the facts herein recited, and relies mainly upon his claim that, in the circumstances, the claimant is estopped by her conduct from asserting her claim against the estate.
Under the terms of her father's will, the claimant had a right to remain at home and be there supported out of the avails of the farm,--rendering such service as the will specified. But she was under no obligation to remain there; the option was hers, and she could stay or go as she pleased. So when the time came that she decided to go, the way was open to her to make such arrangement with her step-mother to forego that decision and remain on the place as they might agree upon. And such arrangement, when made, was founded upon a valid consideration and binding, for she had thereby agreed to do and did in fact do, something which she was not before legally bound to do. So she has a valid claim which she may assert, unless she is estopped from setting it up against the estate by her conduct during the negotiations between the testatrix and Hubbard. It is claimed that it was her duty, when, in her presence, the testatrix informed Hubbard that there were no debts, to speak out and assert her claim, and not having done so, she will not now be allowed to, to the prejudice of Hubbard, who, being ignorant of the facts and relying upon their being as stated, has acted to his prejudice. That the conduct of the claimant on the occasion referred to amounted to an admission, and was evidence against the claimant tending to show that the testatrix was not then owing her, was fully recognized by the trial court and the estate was given the proper benefit thereof. But an estoppel is something more. An admission is a mere piece of evidence. An estoppel is the...
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