Mary Jo C v. N.Y. State

• Decision Date: 05 May 2011
• Docket Number: 09 CV 5635 (SJF)(ARL)
• Parties: MARY JO C, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK STATE AND LOCAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM and CENTRAL ISLIP PUBLIC LIBRARY, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

MARY JO C, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK STATE AND LOCAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM and CENTRAL ISLIP PUBLIC LIBRARY, Defendants.

09 CV 5635 (SJF)(ARL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: May 5, 2011

OPINION AND ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, J.

On December 23, 2009, plaintiff Mary Jo C. ("plaintiff) commenced this action pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and New York Executive Law § 296 ("state law") against defendants New York State and Local Retirement System ("the State defendant") and the Central Islip Public Library ("the Library") (collectively, "defendants"), alleging: (1) that the State defendant denied her a reasonable accommodation for her mental disability in violation of Title II of the ADA by failing to waive the requirements for applying for disability retirement benefits under Section 605 of the New York State Retirement and Social Security Law ("NYRSSL"); and (2) that the Library denied her a reasonable accommodation for her mental disability in violation of both Title II of the ADA and state law by failing (a) to file an application for disability retirement benefits on her behalf as permitted by Section 605(a)(2) of the NYRSSL and (b) to reclassify the termination of her employment as a leave of absence. The State defendant moves pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, respectively; and the Library moves pursuant toRule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Procedure to dismiss the complaint against it for failure to state a claim. For the reasons discussed herein, defendants' motions are granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations¹

Plaintiff is a fifty-eight (58) year old woman who has suffered from an unidentified mental illness since adolescence. (Complaint [Compl], ¶¶1, 12). Between 1986 and November 2006, plaintiff intermittently worked as a librarian for various libraries on Long Island, including the Library. (Compl, ¶ 13). In 1988, plaintiff became a member of the State defendant. (Compl, ¶ 14). Plaintiff alleges that in or about November 12, 2006, the Library terminated her employment "as a result of behaviors that were symptomatic of her mental illness." (Compl, ¶¶ 16-17). According to plaintiff, "[a]s a result of behviors manifested by [her] that were symptomatic of her mental illness, libraries in Suffolk County communicated among themselves and agreed that [she] should not be hired as a librarian. In vernacular, [plaintiff] has been blackballed from working in the public library system in Suffolk County." (Compl, ¶ 40).

Plaintiff alleges that she would have been eligible for disability retirement benefits from the State defendant under Section 605 of the NYRSSL as a result of her mental illness if she had made a timely application for such benefits, i.e., within three (3) months from her last day of work. (Compl, ¶18, 19). According to plaintiff, her mental illness prevented her from"recogniz[ing] that state law required her to file her retirement benefits application within three (3) months of her last day of employment." (Compl., ¶ 20). Nonetheless, plaintiff alleges that during the intervening three (3) month period, her brother "attempted to take steps to assist [her] in obtaining benefits to which she was entitled," including speaking to the State defendant's disability retirement director, Theresa Shumway ("Shumway"). (Compl., ¶¶21, 22). According to plaintiff, Shumway informed her brother that the Library could file an application for disability retirement benefits on her behalf. (Compl., ¶23).

Plaintiff alleges that on or about February 11, 2007, her brother requested that the Library file for retirement benefits on her behalf. (Compl., ¶ 25). According to plaintiff, the Library denied her brother's request on or about February 12, 2007. (Compl., ¶ 26).

Plaintiff alleges that on or about February 13, 2007, her brother requested that the Library reclassify her termination as an unpaid leave of absence, but the Library also denied that request. (Compl, ¶¶27,29).

Plaintiff alleges that she applied for disability retirement benefits in November 2007, when her clinical condition had improved. (Compl, ¶ 30). According to plaintiff, the State defendant denied her application based upon her failure to comply with the three (3) month filing deadline prescribed by Section 605(b)(2) of the NYRSSL. (Compl, ¶ 31).

Plaintiff alleges that on or about July 23, 2008, she "requested an accommodation under the [ADA] from [the State defendant] in the form of a waiver of the filing deadline." (Compl, ¶ 32). According to plaintiff, the State defendant "never formally responded" to that request. (Compl, ¶33). Meanwhile, plaintiff appealed the State defendant's denial of her application for disability retirement benefits, which was affirmed by the hearing officer. (Compl, ¶35, 37).

B. Procedural History

On December 23, 2009, plaintiff commenced this action against defendants alleging: (1) that by failing to waive the requirements for filing of disability retirement benefits under Section 605 of the NYRSSL, the State defendant denied her a reasonable accommodation for her mental disability in violation of Title II of the ADA (first cause of action), (Compl., ¶44); and (2) that by failing (a) to file a disability retirement application on her behalf as permitted by Section 605(a)(2) of the NYRSSL and (b) to reclassify her termination as a leave of absence, the Library denied her a reasonable accommodation for her mental disability in violation of both Title II of the ADA and state law (second through fifth causes of action), (Compl., ¶¶ 46-52). Plaintiff seeks: (a) judgment declaring that defendants violated Title II of the ADA and that the Library also violated state law; (b) (i) an injunction directing the State defendant to waive the three (3) month filing period under Section 605(b)(2) of the NYRSSL or, (ii) in the alternative, compensatory damages against the Library; and (c) attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205. (Compl., "Wherefore" Clause).

The State defendant moves pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, respectively; and the Library moves pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Procedure to dismiss the complaint against it for failure to state a claim.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Rule 12(b)(1)²

1. Standard of Review

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, seeExxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services. Inc.. 545 U.S. 546, 552, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005); Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic. 582 F.3d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 2009), and may not preside over cases absent subject matter jurisdiction. See Exxon Mobil. 545 U.S. at 552, 125 S.Ct. 2611 (holding that federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis); County of Nassau. NY. v. Hotels.com. LP. 577 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that federal courts lack power to disregard the limits on their jurisdiction imposed by the Constitution or Congress). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. See Oscar Gruss & Son. Inc. v. Hollander. 337 F.3d 186, 193 (2d Cir. 2003); Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier. 211 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 2000); seealso Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki. 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1202 (Mar. 1,2011) ("[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press. * * * Objections to subject matter jurisdiction * * * may be raised at any time."); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment. Cent. Region. 130 S.Ct. 584, 596,175 L.Ed.2d428 (2009) ("[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction, * * * refers to a tribunal's power to hear a case, a matter that can never be forfeited or waived." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Arbaugh v.Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006); Durant. Nichols-Houston, Hodgson & Cortese-Costa. P.C. v. Dupont. 565 F.3d 56, 62-3 (2d Cir. 2009). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Hamm v. U.S.. 483 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 2007); Makarova v. United States. 201 F.3d 110,113 (2d Cir. 2000).

2. Standing

The State defendant contends that plaintiff lacks constitutional standing to assert her ADA claim against it.

"Standing is a federal jurisdictional question 'determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.'" Carver v. City of New York. 621 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Warth v. Seldin. 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197,45 L.Ed.2d 343 [1975]). Constitutional standing determines '"whether the plaintiff has made out a "case or controversy" between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Article III, ' and is therefore 'entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.'" Amnesty Intern. USA v. Clapper._F.3d_, 2011 WL 941524, at * 9 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 2011) (quoting Warth. 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197). "[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim and form of relief sought." Cacchillo v. Insmed. Inc.._F.3d_, 2011 WL 1005427, at * 2 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2011) (quoting Baur v. Veneman. 352 F.3d 625, 642 n. 15 (2d Cir. 2003)). To meet the constitutional requirement of standing, a plaintiff must allege (1) an injury-in-fact, i.e., "an invasion of a legally...