Maryland and Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.
Citation | 254 Md. 162,254 A.2d 162 |
Decision Date | 06 June 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 87,87 |
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Parties | The MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA ELDERSHIP OF the CHURCHES OF GOD et al. v. The CHURCH OF GOD AT SHARPSBURG, INC., et al. |
Charles O. Fisher, Westminster (Walsh & Fischer, Westminster, and James H. Booser and McNees, Wallace & Nurick, Harrisburg, Pa., on the brief), for appellants.
Omer T. Kaylor, Jr., Hagerstown (Kaylor & Spence, Hagerstown, on the brief), for appellees.
Before HAMMOND, C. J., and MARBURY, BARNES, FINAN and SINGLEY, JJ.
After we filed our opinion in this case on May 9, 1968 (see 249 Md. 650, 241 A.2d 691) the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. (See No. 357, October Term of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1968.) On January 27, 1969, the Supreme Court filed its opinion in Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church (Hull), 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658, and by a per curiam opinion, foled February 24, 1969 (see 393 U.S. 528, 89 S.Ct. 850, 21 L.Ed.2d 750) vacated the judgment and remanded the case to us 'for further consideration in light of' Hull. After the mandate from the Supreme Court was received by us we set the case for reargument and requested additional briefs from counsel for the parties. These briefs were duly filed and the case was regargued in due course.
We have carefully reviewed the opinion and decision in Hull and we have concluded that there is nothing in our original opinion which is contrary to the decision in the Hull case. Indeed, we believe that we anticipated the decision in Hull in our original opinion in the present case, and that our original opinion properly applied the constitutional principles subsequently enunciated by the Supreme Court.
The principal holding in Hull was to reaffirm as now applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment applying the First Amendment to them, the holding in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872), that the doctrine of an implied trust of church property in favor of those who adhered to the faith of the founders of the particular church, with its attendant required examination into, and determination of, religious doctrine and theological determinations by the Civil Courts was inconsistent with the principles underlying the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States forbidding the establishment of religion or the denial of its free exercise.
In our original opinion, we relied upon, in part, the decision of our predecessors in Shaeffer v. Klee, 100 Md. 264, 59 A. 850 (1905), which we indicated was in accord with the holding in Watson v. Jones, supra. In fact, Judge Page, for the Court, in the Shaeffer case cited Watson '. Jones with approval. (100 Md. at 271, 59 A. at 852.) The implied trust doctrine has not been part of the law of Maryland since the Constitution of 1776, and our original opinion made this clear.
After the Supreme Court in Hull rejected as contrary to the First Amendment, the application of the implied trust doctrine by a State, it then enunciated the proper basis for determination in the State courts of disputes in regard to church property as follows:
(Emphasis supplied.) (393 U.S. at 449, 89 S.Ct. at 606, 21 L.Ed.2d at 665)
The Supreme Court further emphasizes that the State courts must not determine what is proper religious doctrine but must dispose of church property cases upon 'neutral principles of law' when it stated:
'Hence, States, religious organizations and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve acclesiastical questions.' (393 U.S. at 449, 89 S.Ct. at 606, 21 L.Ed.2d at 665)
As we have indicated, we were required by the existing Maryland law as well as by the command of Hull, to decide the present case upon 'neutral principles of law' developed for use in all property disputes and this we believe we have done.
First, we inquired into the provisions of the State statutory law in regard to the holding of property by religious corporations applicable to all religious corporations without regard to the doctrine or ecclesiastical practices of any particular religious sect or denomination. We stated:
(249 Md. at 656, 241 A.2d at 695-696)
We also pointed out that there are special statutory provisions in regard to the government of four religious denominations, the Protestant Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian Church in the United States, of America (now known as the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America), the Methodist Church and the Roman Catholic Church. These code provisions were adopted at the request or with the acquiescence of the denominations affected but as we observed in the original opinion 'these provisions are not involved in the present case.' (249 Md. at 674, 241 A.2d at 705) We did make various references to these code provisions to illustrate various differences in church polity in regard to the holding of property by local churches and suggested that this was one possible method by which a parent body in a hierarchical denomination might maintain control of local church property. (249 Md. at 663, 241 A.2d at 699) We did not intend, however, to express any opinion in regard to the validity of any of these special provisions in the light of the requirements of the First Amendment, or otherwise, inasmuch as none of these provisions was involved in the present case, as we observed above.
The Maryland Religious Corporation Law is a general law for All religious corporations and has no reference whatever to doctrine. It, therefore, meets the requirement of a 'neutral principle of law.'
Secondly, we considered the express language of the deeds by which the properties in question were conveyed to local church corporations. We stated:
'Nor do the deeds for the properties of the local churches provide for their reverting to the Md. & Va. Eldership if the congregation withdraws from that Eldership. The deed to the Sharpsburg church recites in the habendum clause that it is held by the trustees and their successors 'in trust for the use of the congregation of the Church of God at Sharpsburg, Maryland,' and-
'* * * in the event the congregation of the Church of God at Sharpsburg, Maryland, ceases to function as a church organization, then all right, title and interest in the hereinabove described property shall immediately vest in the Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God in North America, a body corporate, its successors or assigns.' (Emphasis supplied.)
'One of the Indian Springs deeds has a provision that if the church should became extinct or cease to be the property reverts to the Md. & Va. Eldership; the other Indian Springs...
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