Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sutherland

• Decision Date: 18 September 1936
• Citation: 125 Fla. 282,169 So. 679
• Parties: MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. et al. v. SUTHERLAND.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

169 So. 679

125 Fla. 282

MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. et al. v. SUTHERLAND.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

September 18, 1936

Error to Circuit Court, Duval County; Bayard B. Shields, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Frances L Sutherland, as executrix of the estate of Samuel Hamilton also known as Sam Hamilton, deceased, for the death of Samuel Hamilton, opposed by the Southern Pine Chemical Company employer, and the Maryland Casualty Company, a corporation carrier. From judgment and order of the circuit court affirming an award of the Industrial Commission for the claimant, the carrier and employer appeal.

Affirmed.

COUNSEL

Harry T. Gray and Marks, Marks, Holt, Gray & Yates, all of Jacksonville, for appellants.

P. L. Gaskins and George Couper Gibbs, both of Jacksonville, for appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case is before us on appeal from the judgment and order of the circuit court of Duval county, affirming an award of the Florida Industrial Commission.

The facts involved in this case are relatively simple and are not controverted. Sam Hamilton, while employed by the Southern Pine Chemical Company, sustained injuries on October 3, 1935, arising from and in the course of his employment, which resulted in his death on October 6, 1935. The deceased adult employee, at the time of his injury and death, left surviving him no widow, child, or other person dependent upon him for support. Frances L. Sutherland was, on October 11, 1935, duly appointed and qualified as executrix of the estate of Sam Hamilton, deceased.

The executrix filed a petition against the Southern Pine Chemical Company, employer, and the Maryland Casualty Company, called 'carrier' by the statute before the Florida Industrial Commission, in which she sought an award to compensation under chapter 17481, Acts of 1935.

The carrier and the employer filed their answer in which they admitted practically every allegation of fact contained in the petition; but denied the right of petitioner to compensation other than medical benefits and funeral expenses.

Hearing was had on December 3, 1935, in Jacksonville, Fla., before Hon. Wendell C. Heaton, chairman of the Florida Industrial Commission. The only evidence offered at the hearing related to the fee to be allowed petitioner's attorneys, from the award she might recover.

The Florida Industrial Commission made the following award in the case:

'Award for the Petitioner is hereby granted, and it is the order of the Florida Industrial Commission the following obligations be discharged by the Carrier in behalf of the Employer because of the death of Samuel Hamilton:

'Medical expenses, $465.50 payable for the following services as per order of the Commission, November 15th, 1935, as per Section 13(c):

"Hospital, $104.50.

"Nurses, $36.00.

"Blood donor, $75.00.

"Dr. Harris, $250.00.

'Funeral expenses $150.00 as per Section 16(a).

'Compensation of $10.53 per week for 350 weeks in the form of a lump sum settled payable to the Executrix of the Estate of Samuel Hamilton, computed at four per centum (4%) per annum, true discount compounded annually to-wit: Thirty-two Hundred thirty-seven dollars and Ninety-four Cents ($3237.94).

'The Florida Industrial Commission approves the payment of attorney's fees from the award to Attorneys George Couper Gibbs and Perse L. Gaskins in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) for legal services to the claimant.'

An appeal was taken under the statute by the employer and the carrier to the circuit court in and for Duval county, Fla. It was stipulated in writing by counsel for both parties that the appellate proceedings in the circuit should be heard as an appeal and not tried de novo; and that in the event the Workmen's Compensation Act gave either party the right to have a jury trial, it would be waived.

After having read the record and heard the argument of counsel, the circuit court entered its judgment and order; which, after reciting the facts leading up to the appeal, contained the following:

'The allowances for medical and funeral expenses and the approval of attorney's fees are not questioned by Appellants. They attack the compensation order and award claiming that the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act should not be construed to warrant the award to the Executrix, as such, of the amount of $3237.94, or any other amount, as a general asset of the estate of the deceased employee, such award being designated by the Appellants as a 'death benefit.' This contention is the basis of the appeal and presents the sole question to be decided: Does the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act provide for death benefits other than funeral and medical expenses when the employee dies leaving no widow or dependents surviving him?

'The part of the award attacked was evidently based on subparagraph (b) of section 16 of the Act, which provides that 'the total amount of compensation payable under this Section on account of the death of an employee shall not exceed 50 per centum if no dependents, 55 per centum if one dependent and 60 per centum if more than one dependent of the average weekly wage of such employee; and shall not extend beyond a period of 350 weeks from the time of the injury.'

'This Court is of the opinion that the intent of the Legislature, as shown by the Act in question, was to provde for the payment, under the Workmen's Compensation Act and within the limits fixed in the Act, in cases where the deceased employee left no widow or dependents, of compensation to his estate analogous to the damages provided for in such case by the Florida Death by Wrongful Act Statute, chapter 3439, Acts of 1883. The construction contended for by Appellants cannot be reached without violating the meaning of the words and ignoring the plain language of the Compensation Act.

'For the above reason it appears to the Court that said Award and Compensation Order made by the Florida Industrial Commission on December 21, 1935, is in accordance with law; and it is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that said Award and Compensation Order be, and the same is hereby affirmed; and that the payment of attorney's fees from said award to Honorable George Couper Gibbs and Perse L. Gaskins, Esquire, in the amount of $250.00 for legal services to the claimant be, and the same is hereby, approved.'

From this judgment and order of the circuit court, the carrier and the employer took an appeal, under the statute, to the Supreme Court.

The question presented is whether, under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act, the personal representative of a deceased employee has the right to recover 'compensation' on behalf of the decedent's estate, when the deceased employee died as the result of an injury received in the course of his employment, and left surviving him no person dependent upon him for support.

The death benefits under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act, chapter 17481, Acts of 1935, which are questioned in this appeal, are found in section 16(b) of that act, as follows:

'The total amount of compensation payable under this Section on account of the death of an employee shall not exceed 50 per centum if no dependents, 55 per centum if one dependent, and 60 per centum if more than one dependent of the average weekly wage of such employee; and shall not extend beyond a period of 350 weeks from the time of the injury. Such compensation shall be subject to the limits provided in Section 12(b) that is, not over $18.00 per week or less than $4.00 per week unless deceased employee's average weekly wages were less than $4.00 in which event the compensation shall be equal to the full amount of the average weekly wage.'

This section, section 16(b) of chapter 17481, Acts of 1935, awarding death benefits, is peculiar, in that it provides for compensation in case the deceased employee left 'no dependents,' which goes a step farther than any statute yet enacted on the subject under workmen's compensation laws. In thirty states compensation is payable only to dependents and certain designated beneficiaries, upon the death of the employee. It is provided by the laws of nine states, Alaska, the District of Columbia, and by the Longshorement's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-950) that if the deceased employee left no dependents, specified payments shall be made into public funds. In Kentucky, if the deceased employee left no dependents, $100 is payable to his personal representative. In North Carolina and South Carolina, if the deceased employee left no dependents, part of the compensation is paid into a public fund and part is paid to the personal representative for distribution as specified. In Oklahoma, no provision is made for death benefit, the remedy in tort for wrongful death still being retained. See Jones Digest of Workmen's Compensation Laws (14th Ed.); 2 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (2d Ed.) §§ 365, 366.

There has been found no precedent for us to follow in the law of workmen's compensation, where the deceased employee left no dependents and the entire amount of compensation is to be paid to the estate of the deceased employee.

The legislative history of an act is important only when there is doubt as to what is meant by the language employed in the act. Where the language used, considered in its ordinary and grammatical sense, clearly expresses the legislative intent, rules of construction and interpretation are unnecessary. See State v. Beardsley, 84 Fla. 109, 94 So. 660; State v. Burr, 79 Fla. 290, 84 So. 61; Osborne v. Simpson, 94 Fla. 793, 114 So. 543.

The intention and meaning of the Legislature must be primarily determined from the language of the statute...