Maryland Com'n on Human Relations v. Mass Transit Admin.

• Decision Date: 02 September 1982
• Docket Number: No. 126,126
• Citation: 449 A.2d 385,294 Md. 225
• Parties: , 38 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1505, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,228 MARYLAND COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS et al. v. MASS TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 225

294 Md. 225

449 A.2d 385, 38 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1505,

30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,228

MARYLAND COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS et al. v. MASS TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION.

No. 126.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 2, 1982.

Risselle Rosenthal Fleisher, Gen. Counsel, Baltimore (Philip L. Marcus, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants-cross appellees.

Joseph S. Kaufman, Baltimore (D. Christopher Ohly and Melnicove, Kaufman, Weiner & Smouse, P. A., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee-cross appellant.

Argued before SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and J. DUDLEY DIGGES, Retired, Specially Assigned, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

The laws of this State prohibiting discrimination in employment provide, inter alia, that it shall be unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire an individual "because of such individual's ... physical or mental handicap unrelated in nature and extent so as to reasonably preclude the performance of the employment...." Maryland Code (1957 1979 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, § 16(a)(1). The phrase "physical or mental handicap" is defined as "any physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness...." Art. 49B, § 15(g). We issued a writ of certiorari in this case to determine the extent, if any, that obesity may be a "physical or mental handicap" within the meaning of the statutory language. Despite the importance of this issue, we shall not be able to address it because of the employer's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Jacquelin Wilson applied for the position of bus driver with the Mass Transit Administration (MTA), and she was given a medical examination by the MTA's physician. The examining physician's report stated that Ms. Wilson was "40 lbs. overweight," although no cause for this condition was set forth in the report. Ms. Wilson's employment application was rejected by the MTA because she was overweight. During the same period of time (1979-1980), the applications of Dorothea Goodman and Betty R. Wright for employment as bus drivers were also rejected by the MTA for the same reason. ¹

The three women whose employment applications were rejected filed complaints with the Maryland Commission on Human Relations, alleging unlawful employment discrimination by the MTA. ² An investigation of the complaints by the Commission's staff pursuant to Art. 49B, § 10, resulted in staff findings of probable cause to believe that the MTA had engaged in discrimination based on physical handicaps in violation of Art. 49B, § 16(a)(1). After the MTA refused to concur with the findings and refused to execute proposed conciliation agreements, the Commission's staff decided that the matter would be set for a public hearing before a Commission hearing examiner.

Before any hearing was held, the MTA commenced the present action by filing in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City a bill for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Commission. The bill recited the basic facts concerning the complaints which had been filed with the Commission, as well as the general allegation that numerous other similar complaints had been filed. The bill set forth the MTA's belief "that it is necessary for the protection of the public safety that the MTA require applicants for the position of bus driver to meet certain weight requirements because of the lack of agility associated with overweight or obesity which agility is necessary for the safe operation of MTA buses." The MTA asserted "that overweight or obesity is not a physical handicap within the meaning of the definition found in Article 49B" and "that the Commission has neither the power, authority nor jurisdiction to consider obesity as a physical handicap." The MTA requested a declaratory judgment determining whether overweight or obesity is a physical handicap within the meaning of the statute, as well as an injunction preserving the status quo pending the judicial determination.

The Commission filed a demurrer and an answer, asking that the bill of complaint be dismissed for failure of the MTA to exhaust its statutory administrative remedies. The Commission denied that it had taken a position on the question of whether obesity was a physical handicap within the meaning of the statute, and asserted that the issue should be determined after a public hearing by a hearing examiner.

In a written opinion, the Circuit Court held that the MTA need not exhaust administrative remedies because "the issue here is purely one of statutory interpretation." The Commission's demurrer was overruled, and the Commission was enjoined "from processing any complaints based on alleged discrimination because of obesity, pending further Order of this Court."

Subsequently, the MTA filed a motion for summary judgment. The Commission opposed the motion on the grounds that the MTA had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that obesity is not, as a matter of law, excluded from the definition of "physical handicap" in Art. 49B, § 15(g). Attached to the Commission's opposition was an affidavit by Dr. Neil Solomon, an expert in the "treatment of conditions commonly called 'overweight' and 'obesity,' " which stated: "Although it is not common, both overweight and obesity can ... be caused by illness, bodily injury or birth defect." Cases of obesity caused by illness, severe trauma and genetic deficiency were described.

The Circuit Court granted the motion for summary judgment, holding that no factual dispute existed. The court entered a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Commission "is without jurisdiction to process complaints filed with it claiming obesity as a physical handicap under the definition contained in Article 49B, § 15(g), unless, as a threshold matter, the [Commission] affirmatively ascertains that the obesity condition complained of 'is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness.' If there is no affirmative finding of causation, the [Commission] has no jurisdiction to further process the claim...." The court enjoined the Commission "from further processing each precipitating complaint against MTA based on alleged discrimination because of obesity until it is determined as a threshold matter that each complaint which is to be further processed is founded on 'bodily injury, birth defect or illness' ...."

The Commission took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing (1) that the bill should have been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and (2) that the Commission should not be required "to determine at the threshold that a Complainant's obesity or overweight 'is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness' before it can process such a complaint" (Commission's brief, p. 2). The MTA took a cross-appeal, arguing that "obesity is not a physical handicap within the meaning of Art. 49B, § 15(g) ... even if it is caused by bodily injury, birth defect, or illness." (MTA's brief, p. 10). This Court issued a writ of certiorari prior to oral argument in the intermediate appellate court.

Under Art. 49B, §§ 10 and 11, if after investigation, the Commission's staff finds probable cause to believe that a discriminatory act or acts have been committed, and if no agreement is reached for the elimination of the alleged discriminatory acts, a case is to be set for a hearing before a hearing examiner. At the hearing, the Commission's general counsel is to present the case in support of the complaint, and the respondent may submit testimony, examine and cross-examine witnesses and "be fully heard." Art. 49B, § 11(b). After the hearing, the hearing examiner is to render a decision; if the examiner finds that the respondent has engaged in unlawful discrimination, he is to enter an appropriate order. Art. 49B, § 11(e). Furthermore, "any party affected by the [hearing] examiner's decision" may take an appeal to an "appellate panel of commissioners" in accordance with the procedural rules of the Commission. Art. 49B, § 3(d). Finally, as we held in Soley v. St. Comm'n On Human Rel., 277 Md. 521, 525-526, 356 A.2d 254 (1976), under Art. 49B, § 12, together with the Administrative Procedure Act, Code (1957, 1978 Repl.Vol.), Art. 41, § 255, either the Commission, the respondent, or a party aggrieved by the Commission's decision may file an action for judicial review.

The above-described administrative and judicial review remedies were not exhausted in the present case. Because of this action for a declaratory judgment and an injunction, the complaints of Jacquelin Wilson, Dorothea Goodman and Betty R. Wright have not yet been heard by a hearing examiner.

This Court has firmly adhered to the rule that statutorily prescribed administrative and judicial review remedies must ordinarily be pursued and exhausted. As recently summarized by Judge Digges for the Court in Prince George's Co. v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 283-284, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083, 101 S.Ct. 869, 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981):

"An examination of the decisions of this Court over the last four or five decades will supply ample support for the statement that there are few legal tenets which have received greater acceptance into the jurisprudential law of this State than the one announcing:

[A] claimant ordinarily must seek to redress the wrong of which he complains by using the statutory procedure the legislature has established for that kind of case, if it is adequate and available, and that if he is unsuccessful and wishes aid from the courts, he must take judicial appeals in the manner the legislature has specified rather than by seeking to invoke the ordinary general jurisdiction of the courts .... [Consequently, we] have consistently held that where a special form of remedy is provided, the litigant must adopt that form and must not bypass the administrative body or official, by pursuing other remedies. [ Agrarian, Inc. v. Zoning Inspector, 262 Md. 329, 332, 277 A.2d...