Maryland Mortg. & Inv. Co. v. State

Decision Date24 February 1975
Docket NumberNo. 532,532
Citation332 A.2d 675,25 Md.App. 8
PartiesMARYLAND MORTGAGE AND INVESTMENT COMPANY v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Eugene Hettleman, Baltimore, for appellant.

Benjamin L. Brown, City Sol. and Richard M. Hartman, Chief Asst. Sol., Baltimore, amicus curiae for Mayor and City Council.

Gilbert Rosenthal, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Milton B Allen, State's Atty., for Baltimore City, Barry Norwitz and C. Keith Meiser, Asst. State's Attys., for Baltimore City, on the brief for appellee.

Argued before THOMPSON, GILBERT and MOORE, JJ.

GILBERT, Judge.

This appeal is the sequel to R.S. Constr. Co. v. City of Baltimore, 269 Md. 704, 309 A.2d 629 (1973). In that case R.S. Construction Company had sued the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The company sought to have the Upton Urban Renewal Ordinance, No. 794, of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, declared unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the equal protection clause of the 'federal and state constitutions.' The trial judge (Ross, J.) ruled that R.S. Construction Company had fallen short of producing the degree of proof necessary to overcome the presumption of the constitutionality of the Ordinance. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that bare evidence of the existence of a difference in the treatment of two allegedly similar situations, devoid of details of surrounding circumstances, fails to meet the heavy onus cast upon those claiming a denial of equal protection of the laws.

Approximately one month prior to the Court's opinion in R. S. Constr. Co., supra, the appellant, owner of 704 West Lafayette Avenue, was served with a Baltimore City Departments of Fire, Health and Housing and Community Development 'Violation Notice'. The notice listed eighty-one separate alleged violations. Apparently, after the opinion of the Court of Appeals had been handed down, the appellant determined to succeed where R.S. Construction Company had failed. Appellant purposely charted a collision course with the City in order that appellant could challenge the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 794.

The Ordinance condemned 'for urban renewal purposes' numerous properties located within the geographical confines of what it defined as the Upton area, and it set certain standards to be 'applied to all residential uses within the project area other than those structures' the City had determined to acquire through condemnation.

The specific provision of the ordinance that appellant attacks is designated as § 7(a)(3). It requires that within the Upton area:

'All lead base paint shall be removed from interior surfaces of dwellings before repainting. Good repair shall include keeping properly painted all interior surfaces which are painted in normal practice.'

Appellant, under penalty of 'a fine not exceeding One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) and . . . each day's violation shall constitute a separate offense', was directed to (1) 'Remove all loose or deteriorated paint and repaint,' and (2) to remove all 'loose or defective paper on walls or ceilings and . . . refinish.' When appellant declined to correct the defects noted in the 'violation notice', a summons was issued out of the Housing Part of the District Court for District 1, and the matter was set for trial before Judge Hudent. The judge disagreed with the appellant's contention that it was denied the equal protection of the laws, and he adjudged appellant guilty. Obviously cognizant that appellant was seeking to challenge a law rather than flout it, the court suspended the imposed fine. Appellant entered an appeal to the Criminal Court of Baltimore where issue was joined before Judge Shirley B. Jones, without the intervention of a jury.

The evidence presented to Judge Jones established that the appellant's property at 704 West Lafayette Avenue is within the Upton area. All of the open charges 1 against appellant, with one exception 2, not applicable to this opinion, would not have been placed had the property not been located within the Upton urban renewal project. The subject property is similar in exterior appearance to other properties not situate within Upton's boundaries. The appellant's expert witness, the president of R. S. Construction Company, testified that, absent the requirement of § 7(a)(3) of Ordinance 794, there were, in his opinion, no factors necessitating repainting and repapering, and that in other areas of the City one was required only to remove defective paint or paper. Once having done so, it was not mandated that repainting and repapering be accomplished.

The testimony produced on behalf of the State was elicited from Mr. Michael Calvert, Chief Planner for the Department of Housing and Community Development. Mr. Calvert, after testifying to the basic 'theory behind the (Upton) community renewal plan', said that the properties in the Upton area were 'considerably worse, measurably worse' than those areas against which he had been asked to compare Upton.

Judge Jones held that Ordinance No. 794 is constitutional as it applies to 704 West Lafayette Avenue, that appellant had not been denied equal protection of the laws, and that appellant was guilty of violating the housing code. The judge imposed the same sanction as that meted to appellant in the District Court.

Because we considered the resolution of the case to be in the public interest and of great importance, not only to the appellant, but to the State and the City of Baltimore as well, we granted certiorari. 3 Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 12-305.

Appellant seeks to have us reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court by holding that the Upton Ordinance invidiously discriminates against the appellant, thus denying it equal protection of the laws. We not only decline to do so, but we expressly hold that the Upton Ordinance is a constitutional application of the police power of the City of Baltimore. 4

In Queen Anne's County v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967) the Court stated 'A person who contends that there has been a denial of the equal protection of the laws has the burden of showing that his situation is the same as another situation, and that the State or its instrumentalities, has treated the two situations differently in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner.'

See also R. S. Constr. Co. v. City of Baltimore, supra. While the appellant, in the trial court, presented evidence in order to establish that it was treated differently than persons owning property without the boundaries of the Upton area, it did not demonstrate that such difference in treatment was unreasonable or arbitrary.

The Upton Ordinance, as is the case with any urban renewal ordinance, was enacted for the purpose of removing slums and blight from the City. A poignant description of the effect of slums and blight may be found in an article by Greaney, Praetz and Modzelewski, entitled 'Hampden County Housing Court: A Product of Citizen Initiative, in 58 Judicature 277 (1975) wherein it is said:

'Slum neighborhoods erode the mental and physical health of the urban poor who inhabit them. Dilapidation and overcrowding cause stress and tension that in turn lead to crime and violence. Defective plumbing and heating, inadequate ventilation, broken plaster, chipping paint, faulty electrical systems threaten occupants' health and safety. Neighborhoods with failing buildings and inadequate city service go hand in hand with the related social ills of ineffective schools, alcoholism, traffic in drugs, unwanted pregnancies and high juvenile delinquency.'

From the foregoing description it can be readily seen that the City has a vital interest and public purpose in the prevention of slums and blight. See also Master Royalties Corp. v....

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  • Benik v. Hatcher
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • April 19, 2000
    ...148 A.2d 408, 414 (1959); Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 208, 107 A.2d 99, 102, (1954); Maryland Mortg. & Inv. Co. v. State, 25 Md.App. 8, 11, 332 A.2d 675, 678-79 (1975); Section 6(24) of the Baltimore City Charter. They are examples of public health and safety regulations. See......
  • Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Boise Redevelopment Agency, 12676
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    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • March 13, 1980
    ...239 Ind. 35, 154 N.E.2d 515 (1958); City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky.App.1960); Maryland Mortgage & Investment Co. v. State, 25 Md.App. 8, 332 A.2d 675 (1975); Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837 cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873, 79 S.Ct. 113, 3 L.Ed.2d 104 ......
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    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • March 21, 1977
    ...the Oldtown sign prohibition. See R. S. Constr. Co. v. City of Baltimore, 269 Md. 704, 309 A.2d 629 (1973); Maryland Mort. & Inv. Co. v. State, 25 Md.App. 8, 332 A.2d 675, cert. denied, 275 Md. 753 (1975), where housing standards in the Upton urban renewal area, higher than those applicable......
  • Brown v. Hornbeck, 1081
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    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • April 14, 1983
    ...General of Maryland v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981); Montgomery County v. Walsh, supra; Maryland Mortgage & Investment Co. v. State, 25 Md.App. 8, 332 A.2d 675 (1975). More than 20 years ago, the Court of Appeals recognized that a Maryland court could decide a federal equal pro......
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