Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Washington Nat. Arena

• Decision Date: 30 March 1976
• Docket Number: MARYLAND-NATIONAL,No. 683,683
• Citation: 354 A.2d 459,30 Md.App. 712
• Parties: CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION et al. v. WASHINGTON NATIONAL ARENA.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 712

30 Md.App. 712

354 A.2d 459

MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION et al. v. WASHINGTON NATIONAL ARENA.

No. 683.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 30, 1976.

David S. Bliden, Associate County Atty. and Ellis J. Koch, Deputy County Atty., Upper Marlboro, with whom was James C. Chapin, County Atty., Riverdale, on the brief for appellant, Prince George's County, Maryland.

Sanford E. Woll, Riverdale, for appellant Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission.

Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Ward B. Coe, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant State of Maryland.

Robert A. Manzi, with whom were Peter F. O'Malley and Shipley, O'Malley & Miles, Upper Marlboro, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before ORTH, C. J., and GILBERT and MELVIN, JJ.

GILBERT, Judge.

Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (MNCPPC), Prince George's County, Maryland, (County) and the State of Maryland (State) have appealed from an order denying them a declaratory judgment entered in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. The circuit court denied the MNCPPC petition for an injunction and, thereby, permitted the Washington National Arena (WNA), a limited partnership, to pursue a tax assessment appeal.

MNCPPC and the County seek a reversal of the order. The State of Maryland, invokes a two-pronged attack. First, the State asserts that it was error for the trial court to deny the State the right to intervene in the proceeding and, second, that the trial court was incorrect in its decision on the merits. The State suggested on oral argument that we decide both issues in their favor. Such in arrangement would place the State in the position of having the merits of the appeal adjudicated without the necessity of ever having had their case heard on the merits in the trial court. Were we to follow the State's suggestion, we would, in effect, have to close our eyes to Md.Rule 1085.

That the State has a right to appeal from a denial of a motion of intervene is no longer open to doubt. Citizens Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights, Inc. v. TKU Associates, Md., 351 A.2d 133 (filed February 4, 1976); See also Nat'l 4-H Club Found. of America v. Thorpe, 22 Md.App. 1, 9, 321 A.2d 321, 326 (1974); ¹ Md.Rule 208. If the State was a necessary party to the declaratory judgment action between MNCPPC and WNA, but was wrongfully denied intervention in the case, the decision on the merits of the matter before us is rendered nugatory, and we shall be required to reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The threshold question then is, was the State erroneously denied the right to intervene in the declaratory judgment action?

In the case sub judice, the 'Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction' was brought by MNCPPC to secure a ruling on a contractual obligation of WNA arising from a lease. The answer of WNA manifests that, in the view of the respondent, a clause of the lease, which is the actual 'bone of contention,' is violative of WNA's '. . . constitutional rights of equal protection and due process of law.'

The lease clause sought to be enforced by MNCPPC, and vigorously opposed by WNA, provides:

'Lessee (WNA by assignment) further agrees that it will not contest or challenge any determination by the State Assessor that the real estate improvements are subject to real estate taxes.'

When the State Assessor made his determination, WNA appealed to the Property Tax Assessment Appeal Board for Prince George's County. MNCPPC alleged in its petition for declaratory judgment that WNA's appeal to the Appeal Board constituted a breach of the above quoted clause of the lease.

Because the government of Prince George's County believed, among other reasons, that it had '. . . a pecuniary interest in the . . . matter and an adverse decision . . . would cause substantial loss of tax revenue to . . . (the) County,' it petitioned to intervene. The State of Maryland also petitioned to intervene alleging 'That the State of Maryland has a substantial interest in the subject matter of this suit by virtue of the effect the Court's decision may have on the State's right to certain real estate taxes.' Both petitions were heard immediately prior to the argument of the case on its merits. The County's petition to intervene was granted. The State's petition was denied.

Md.Ann.Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 3-405(a)(1) mandates that, 'If declaratory relief is sought, a person who has or claims any interest which would be affected by the declaration, shall be made a party.'

The Court of Appeals, in Williams v. Moore, 215 Md. 181, 137 A.2d 193 (1957), said the above quoted portion of what is now Courts Art. § 3-405(a)(2) ² had been interpreted many times, and that, 'It may be stated as a general rule that ordinarily, in an action for a declaratory judgment, all persons interested in the declaration are necessary parties.' 215 Md. at 185, 137 A.2d at 196.

Inasmuch as real estate taxes, payable not only to a political subdivision, but also to the State were involved in the instant litigation, it goes without saying that the State and a financial interest in the case.

Md. Rule 208, governs intervention. It provides in pertinent part:

'a. Of Right.

Upon timely application a person shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (a) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action . . ..'

Judge Levine, writing for the Court of Appeals in Citizens Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights, Inc. v. TKU Associates, supra, discussed Rule 208 and the applicable law with respect to the right to intervene in an action pending in a trial court. The Citizens opinion was grounded on federal appellate decisions, largely because there is a dearth of Maryland case law on the subject. ³ Citizens quotes from C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 1909 (1972), that the ". . . most important factor in determining adequacy of representation is how the interest of the absentee compares with the interests of the present parties." (Citizens, 351 A.2d at 139). Judge Levine, in Citizens, went on to state, 'Where the applicant's interest is similar to, but not identical with, that of an existing party, he ordinarily should be allowed to intervene 'unless it is clear that the (existing) party will provide adequate representation for the absentee.' (Wright & Miller § 1909).' (Citizens, 351 A.2d at 139). The Court said that, '(t)he burden of showing that existing representation may be inadequate is a minimal one.' (Citizens, 351 A.2d at 139). The question then arises as to whether the State met the burden of showing that the representation by the MNCPPC and the County was inadequate as to the State.

On the face of the Attorney General's petition, brought on behalf of the State, it is plain that the State's interest in the real estate taxes would be affected by any decision of the trial court. Hence, unless the representation of the State's interest by the County or MNCPPC was adequate, the State should have been allowed to intervene. Why the judge declined to allow the State to intervene is not revealed by the record. We are presented with the bare result, but not the reason for that...