Maryland Transportation Authority v. King

Decision Date10 June 2002
Docket NumberNo. 17,17
Citation799 A.2d 1246,369 Md. 274
PartiesMARYLAND TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY v. Wyatt KING.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Andrew H. Baida, Sol. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of MD and Gisele M. Mathews, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Hillary Galloway Davis (Davis & Associates Law Offices, P.A., on brief), Towson, for respondent. Laurence B. Russell, Carla N. Bailey, Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver, P.C., Baltimore, on brief of amici curiae, Public Justice Center and the Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

In this action for judicial review of an adjudicatory administrative decision, a former employee of the Maryland Transportation Authority challenges the administrative decision terminating his employment with the Authority. The former employee claims that the Authority, in discharging him instead of imposing a lesser sanction for his misconduct, failed to follow its own regulations. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City rejected the former employee's arguments and upheld the decision terminating his employment. The Court of Special Appeals, however, held that the Authority had not "complied with its own regulations," that "the penalty imposed, i.e., termination, was disproportionate to the offense," and that the misconduct was not "so serious as to warrant dismissal." The appellate court directed that the trial "court impose a sanction less severe than termination." We shall hold that the Court of Special Appeals' decision in this case went beyond the proper role of a court in reviewing the action of an administrative agency. Accordingly, we shall reverse the Court of Special Appeals' decision and direct that the Circuit Court's judgment be affirmed.

I.

The Maryland Transportation Authority is a unit of the Maryland Department of Transportation, which is a cabinet-level principal department in the executive branch of the state government and is headed by the Secretary of Transportation. In 1987, the respondent Wyatt E. King commenced employment in the Traffic Management and Police Services Division of the Maryland Transportation Authority as a Police Communications Operator I. The Authority promoted King to the position of Telecommunications Supervisor I in 1989, and he remained in that capacity until his discharge from employment. King's duties in the position included accessing confidential information from the Criminal Justice Information System and the Motor Vehicle Administration records.

In June 1997, the Executive Secretary of the Authority requested an Assistant Attorney General to conduct an investigation into various allegations of misconduct within the Traffic Management and Police Services Division. As a result of this investigation and the Assistant Attorney General's report, the respondent King on February 2, 1998, was suspended from his position as a Telecommunications Supervisor I pending charges for termination of his employment with the Authority. King appealed the suspension, and a suspension hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Office of Administrative Hearings. A final administrative decision was rendered on March 10, 1998, by the Department of Budget and Management, upholding King's suspension.

In the meantime, the administrative proceedings for termination of King's employment had commenced. The Authority, on February 17, 1998, filed charges against King and sought both termination of his employment and an order disqualifying him from future employment with the Authority. The charges were filed under COMAR 11.02.08.06, Termination of a Career Service Employee, which in pertinent part provides:

"B. Cause for Termination. One or more than one of the following causes is sufficient reason for termination, though termination may be for a cause or causes other than those enumerated:
* * *

(6) The employee has violated any statute, regulation, executive order, written policy, written directive, or written rule;

* * *

(11) The employee has been wantonly offensive toward other employees, supervisors or members of the public;

* * *

(16) The employee has willfully made a false official statement or report;

* * *

(21) The employee has engaged in conduct that has brought the Department (Authority) into public disrepute."

The specific factual allegations against King were as follows:

"(6) It is alleged that, on or about February 20, 1997, while on duty, Wyatt E. King made one or more unauthorized inquiries into the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) in order to learn the birth date of a fellow employee, Michelle Battle.
"... (11) a. The agency alleges that, on or about May or June 1997, Wyatt E. King conspired with a non-employee, Maria Medley, to make a false accusation of misconduct against a fellow employee, Grace DeShazo.
(11) b. The agency alleges that, on or about May 26, 1997, Mr. Wyatt E. King threatened to physically harm Grace DeShazo.
(11) c. The agency alleges that, on or about May or June 1997, Wyatt E. King reported to TS Michelle Nolan, Grace DeShazo's supervisor, that DeShazo was emotionally unstable and on the verge of a breakdown.
(11) e. The agency alleges that, on or about August 1997, Wyatt E. King accused a fellow employee, Aurora Bullock, of being neglectful in her duties with regard to the receipt of an official facsimile, when in fact, it was Mr. King who failed to take the appropriate action with respect to the facsimile.
(16) b. The agency alleges that, on or about September 1997, Wyatt E. King accused a fellow employee, Aurora Bullock, of being neglectful in her duties with regard to the receipt of an official facsimile, when in fact, it was Mr. King who failed to take the appropriate action with respect to the facsimile.
"... (21) a. The agency alleges that beginning in October 1996, and continuing for several months thereafter Wyatt E. King brought the Authority into public disrepute in the nature of his interactions with Detective Reiland of the Baltimore City Police Department who was conducting a criminal investigation arising from an incident in which Mr. King was shot. This conduct included, but was not limited to, the offering of conflicting statements by Mr. King and the false identification of himself as a `Supervisor of the Tunnel Police.'"

The charges against King were initially heard by an ALJ of the Office of Administrative Hearings in October 1998. After the hearing, however, it was discovered that the audiotape record of the hearing was incomplete because of a malfunction in the recording equipment. Therefore a second de novo hearing, before a different ALJ (Judge Joan C. Ross) took place in June 1999.

In September 1999, ALJ Ross filed a comprehensive opinion, containing detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which she found that the Authority had proven all of the charges except for the charge under COMAR 11.02.08.06B(21), relating to King's interactions with the Baltimore City Police Department growing out of the shooting incident. The ALJ concluded that King's employment should be terminated and that he should be disqualified from future employment with the Authority. As to King's argument that the applicable regulations provided for progressive discipline prior to termination, Judge Ross stated:

"The Appellant asserts that the MdTA [Maryland Transportation Authority] failed to follow its own policy by failing to afford the Appellant progressive discipline prior to termination. The Appellant cites as the basis of his position Transportation and Human Resources Policy 7G—Disciplinary Action, which states at § 1.1 `It is the policy of the Maryland Department of Transportation to apply progressive discipline where warranted and circumstances permit.' This argument must fail in that the same Human Resources policy cited by the Appellant, also states at § 4.4 that `[s]ome forms of misconduct, unacceptable performance or violations may result in immediate termination without application of any other form of discipline.' COMAR 11.02.08.06 specifically sets forth causes that, in and of themselves, constitute grounds for termination. As testified to by Ms. Lechowicz, known violations of CJIS had been consistently resolved by termination of the employee.
"The nature of the charges that have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, are such that reflect that the Appellant's integrity, honesty, and reliability cannot be depended upon, and support his disqualification from future employment."

Subsequently, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management adopted the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law and "concur[red] with Judge Ross's determination that such behavior [by King] is sufficient to warrant removal ... and disqualification from future employment." A final order to this effect was issued by the Department of Budget and Management.

King filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City an action for judicial review of the administrative decision, pursuant to the judicial review provisions of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222 of the State Government Article. Following oral argument, the Circuit Court (Heller, J.) issued an opinion and order which rejected King's legal arguments, held that the administrative findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, and affirmed the administrative decision.

King took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the ALJ's findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence, that the administrative decision was arbitrary and capricious, and that termination of his employment instead of a lesser sanction was inconsistent with the agency's progressive discipline regulation and, consequently, violated the so-called Accardi doctrine.1 The Court of Special Appeals, in an...

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