Maryland v. Macon, 84-778

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtO'CONNOR
Citation86 L.Ed.2d 370,472 U.S. 463,105 S.Ct. 2778
PartiesMARYLAND, Petitioner v. Baxter MACON
Docket NumberNo. 84-778,84-778
Decision Date17 June 1985

472 U.S. 463
105 S.Ct. 2778
86 L.Ed.2d 370
MARYLAND, Petitioner

v.

Baxter MACON.

No. 84-778.
Argued April 17, 1985.
Decided June 17, 1985.
Syllabus

A county detective, who was not in uniform, entered an adult bookstore, browsed for several minutes, and purchased two magazines from respondent salesclerk with a marked $50 bill. The detective then left the store and showed the magazines to fellow officers who were waiting nearby. Upon concluding that the magazines were obscene, the detectives returned to the store, arrested respondent, and retrieved the marked $50 bill from the cash register, neglecting to return the change received at the time of the purchase. Prior to trial on a charge of distributing obscene materials in violation of a Maryland statute, the trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress the magazines and the $50 bill, holding that the purchase was not a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that the warrantless arrest was lawful. The magazines, but not the $50 bill, were introduced in evidence, and the jury found respondent guilty. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that a warrant was required both to seize allegedly obscene materials and to arrest the distributor in order to provide a procedural safeguard for the First Amendment freedom of expression.

Held: The detectives did not obtain possession of the allegedly obscene magazines by means of an unreasonable search or seizure, and the magazines were not the fruit of an arrest, lawful or otherwise. Thus the magazines were properly admitted in evidence. Pp. 467-471.

(a) Absent some action taken by government agents that can properly be classified as a "search" or a "seizure," the Fourth Amendment rules designed to safeguard First Amendment freedoms do not apply. The officer's action in entering the bookstore and examining the wares that were intentionally exposed to all who frequented the place of business did not infringe a legitimate expectation of privacy and hence did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And the subsequent purchase was not a Fourth Amendment seizure, since a seizure occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in the property seized, and here respondent voluntarily transferred any possessory interest he may have had in the magazines to the purchaser upon the receipt of the funds. The risk of prior restraint, which is the underlying basis for the special Fourth Amendment protections accorded searches for and seizures of First Amendment materials, does not come into play in cases where an under-

Page 464

cover officer, by purchasing a few magazines, merely accepts an offer to do business that is freely made to the public. Nor was the bona fide nature of the purchase changed, so as to become tantamount to a warrantless seizure, when the officers later seized the marked $50 bill and failed to return the change. Objectively viewed, the transaction was a sale in the ordinary course of business, and the sale was not retrospectively transformed into a warrantless seizure by virtue of the officers' subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money to use as evidence. Pp. 468-471.

(b) Even assuming, arguendo, that respondent's warrantless arrest after the purchase of the magazines was an unreasonable seizure, it would not require exclusion of the magazines at trial. The exclusionary rule does not reach backward to taint information that was in official hands prior to any illegality. Here, the magazines were in police possession before the arrest, and the $50 bill, the only fruit of the arrest, was not introduced in evidence. P. 471.

57 Md.App. 705, 471 A.2d 1090, reversed.

Deborah K. Chasanow, Baltimore, Md., for petitioner.

Burton W. Sandler, Towson, Md., for respondent.

Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide whether allegedly obscene magazines purchased by undercover officers shortly before

Page 465

the warrantless arrest of a salesclerk must be excluded from evidence at the clerk's subsequent trial for distribution of obscene materials. Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Prince George's County, Maryland, respondent was convicted of distribution of obscene materials in violation of Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, § 418 (1982). The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered the charges dismissed on the ground that the magazines were improperly admitted in evidence. 57 Md.App. 705, 471 A.2d 1090 (1984). The Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari. 300 Md. 795, 481 A.2d 240 (1984). We granted certiorari, 469 U.S. 1156, 105 S.Ct. 900, 83 L.Ed.2d 916 (1985), to resolve a conflict among the state courts on the question whether a purchase of allegedly obscene matter by an undercover police officer constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Finding that it does not, we reverse.

I

On May 6, 1981, three Prince George's County police detectives went to the Silver News, Inc., an adult bookstore in Hyattsville, Maryland, as part of a police investigation of adult bookstores in the area. One of the detectives, who was not in uniform, entered the store, browsed for several minutes, and purchased two magazines from a clerk, Baxter Macon, with a marked $50 bill. The detective left the store and showed the two magazines to his fellow officers who were waiting nearby. Together they concluded that the magazines were obscene under the criteria previously used by them in warrant applications. The detectives returned to the store, arrested respondent Macon, who was the only attendant in the store, and retrieved from the cash register the $50 bill that had been used to make the purchase. The officers neglected to return the change received at the time of the purchase. Respondent escorted the remaining customers out and closed the bookstore before leaving with the detectives.

Page 466

Prior to trial, Macon moved to suppress the magazines purchased by the officers and the $50 bill used to make the purchase. App. 21. The trial judge denied the motion on the grounds that the purchase was not a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that the warrantless arrest was lawful. Id., at 52. The magazines, but not the $50 bill, were subsequently introduced in evidence at trial. The jury found respondent guilty of distributing obscene materials. Respondent appealed, contending that a prior judicial determination of probable cause to believe the matter distributed was obscene was required to sustain a seizure and an arrest on charges related to obscenity. Absent such a determination, respondent argued, the allegedly obscene materials must be suppressed and the charges must be dismissed. Respondent did not challenge the jury's finding that the magazines were obscene.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals agreed that a warrant is required both to seize allegedly obscene materials and to arrest the distributor in order to provide a procedural safeguard for the First Amendment freedom of expression. 57 Md.App., at 710, 471 A.2d, at 1092. In cases involving First Amendment rights, the court reasoned, Fourth Amendment safeguards, including suppression of material acquired in connection with a warrantless arrest, must be applied more stringently. Ibid. The court determined that the purchase of the magazines was a "constructive" seizure and that the proper remedy was to exclude the magazines from evidence at the subsequent trial. Id., at 716, 471 A.2d, at 1096. Alternatively, the court held that the warrantless arrest of respondent on obscenity charges required the exclusion of the publications from evidence. Id., at 719, 471 A.2d, at 1097. The court accordingly reversed the conviction and ordered that the charges be dismissed because without the magazines the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. Ibid.

Page 467

By holding that the purchase constituted a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals rejected the position taken by the majority of state courts that have considered the issue. In evaluating the undercover purchase of allegedly obscene materials, most state courts have treated as self-evident the proposition that a purchase by an undercover officer is not a seizure, regardless of whether the funds used to make the purchase are later retrieved as evidence. See, e.g., Baird v. State, 12 Ark.App. 71, 671 S.W.2d 191 (1984) (en banc); Wood v. State, 144 Ga.App. 236, 240 S.E.2d 743 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 899, 99 S.Ct. 265, 58 L.Ed.2d 247 (1978); People v. Ridens, 51 Ill.2d 410, 282 N.E.2d 691 (1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 413 U.S. 912, 93 S.Ct. 3046, 37 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1973); State v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 216 N.W.2d 641 (1974); State v. Perry, 567 S.W.2d 380 (Mo.App.1978); State v. Dornblaser, 26 Ohio Misc. 29, 267 N.E.2d 434 (1971); Cherokee News & Arcade, Inc. v. State, 533 P.2d 624 (Okla.Crim.App.1974). But see State v. Furuyama, 64 Haw. 109, 637 P.2d 1095 (1981) (reaching the contrary conclusion).

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the officer's entry into the bookstore and later examination of materials offered for sale there did not constitute a search and that the purchase of two magazines did not effect a seizure. We do not decide whether a warrant is required to arrest a suspect on obscenity-related charges, because the magazines at issue were not the product of the warrantless arrest. Because we hold that the magazines were properly admitted in evidence at trial, we also do not address respondent's contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.

II

The central issue presented is whether the magazines purchased by the undercover detectives before respondent's arrest must be suppressed. If the publications were ob-

Page 468

tained by means of an unreasonable search or seizure, or were...

To continue reading

Request your trial
568 practice notes
  • Soldal v. County of Cook, No. 89-3631
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • August 27, 1991
    ...n. 5, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3386, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1152, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Horton v.......
  • Rudolph v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0240-07-1 (Va. App. 2/26/2008), Record No. 0240-07-1.
    • United States
    • Virginia Court of Appeals of Virginia
    • February 26, 2008
    ...action was taken.'" Welshman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 20, 30, 502 S.E.2d 122, 137 (1998) (en banc) (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985)). "The fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justificat......
  • State v. Mooney, No. 13737
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • March 19, 1991
    ...to the issue of whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy that protected him from such surveillance. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) (existence of fourth amendment seizure does not turn on subjective intent of police); cf.......
  • State v. Eady, (SC 15858)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • July 6, 1999
    ...cause based upon evaluation of "facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer"); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 86 L. Ed.2d 370 (1985) ("[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred `turns on an objective assessment of the of......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
564 cases
  • Soldal v. County of Cook, No. 89-3631
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • August 27, 1991
    ...n. 5, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3386, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1152, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Horton v.......
  • Rudolph v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0240-07-1 (Va. App. 2/26/2008), Record No. 0240-07-1.
    • United States
    • Virginia Court of Appeals of Virginia
    • February 26, 2008
    ...action was taken.'" Welshman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 20, 30, 502 S.E.2d 122, 137 (1998) (en banc) (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985)). "The fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justificat......
  • State v. Mooney, No. 13737
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • March 19, 1991
    ...to the issue of whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy that protected him from such surveillance. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) (existence of fourth amendment seizure does not turn on subjective intent of police); cf.......
  • State v. Eady, (SC 15858)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • July 6, 1999
    ...cause based upon evaluation of "facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer"); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 86 L. Ed.2d 370 (1985) ("[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred `turns on an objective assessment of the of......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • AN ARGUMENT AGAINST UNBOUNDED ARREST POWER: THE EXPRESSIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND PROTESTING WHILE BLACK.
    • United States
    • Michigan Law Review Vol. 120 Nbr. 8, June 2022
    • June 1, 2022
    ...Section III.A.1. (22.) See id. at Section III.A.2 (discussing New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 873 (1986); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468 (1985); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 511 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 71......
  • An Empirical Assessment of Pretextual Stops and Racial Profiling.
    • United States
    • Stanford Law Review Vol. 73 Nbr. 3, March 2021
    • March 1, 2021
    ...an "objective assessment" of the actions of an officer and maintaining that the stop in this case was lawful (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (46.) Id. at 39. (47.) Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. As the Court explained, the petitioners argued that "in the unique context of civil tr......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT