Maryland v. Pringle, No. 02-809.
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | Rehnquist |
| Citation | 540 U.S. 366 |
| Parties | MARYLAND <I>v.</I> PRINGLE |
| Docket Number | No. 02-809. |
| Decision Date | 15 December 2003 |
v.
PRINGLE
A police officer stopped a car for speeding at 3:16 a.m.; searched the car, seizing $763 from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest; and arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. Respondent Pringle, the front-seat passenger, was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine, and was sentenced to 10 years' incarceration without the possibility of parole. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but the State Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, absent specific facts tending to show Pringle's knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was a front-seat passenger in a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest for possession.
Held: Because the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle, the arrest did not contravene the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Maryland law authorizes police officers to execute warrantless arrests, inter alia, where the officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed or is being committed in the officer's presence. Here, it is uncontested that the officer, upon recovering the suspected cocaine, had probable cause to believe a felony had been committed; the question is whether he had probable cause to believe Pringle committed that crime. The "substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt," Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175, and that belief must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 91. To determine whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest, a court must examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide "whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to" probable cause. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 696. As it is an entirely reasonable inference from the facts here that any or all of the car's occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine, a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly. Pringle's attempt to characterize this as a guilt-by-association case is
[540 U.S. 367]
unavailing. Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, and United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, distinguished. Pp. 369-374.
370 Md. 525, 805 A. 2d 1016, reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
Gary E. Bair, Solicitor General of Maryland, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, and Kathryn Grill Graeff and Shannon E. Avery, Assistant Attorneys General.
Sri Srinivasan argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Deborah Watson.
Nancy S. Forster argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Stephen E. Harris and Sherrie Glasser.*
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the early morning hours a passenger car occupied by three men was stopped for speeding by a police officer. The
officer, upon searching the car, seized $763 of rolled-up cash from the glove compartment and five glassine baggies of cocaine from between the back-seat armrest and the back seat. After all three men denied ownership of the cocaine and money, the officer arrested each of them. We hold that the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle — one of the three men.
At 3:16 a.m. on August 7, 1999, a Baltimore County Police officer stopped a Nissan Maxima for speeding. There were three occupants in the car: Donte Partlow, the driver and owner, respondent Pringle, the front-seat passenger, and Otis Smith, the back-seat passenger. The officer asked Partlow for his license and registration. When Partlow opened the glove compartment to retrieve the vehicle registration, the officer observed a large amount of rolled-up money in the glove compartment. The officer returned to his patrol car with Partlow's license and registration to check the computer system for outstanding violations. The computer check did not reveal any violations. The officer returned to the stopped car, had Partlow get out, and issued him an oral warning.
After a second patrol car arrived, the officer asked Partlow if he had any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle. Partlow indicated that he did not. Partlow then consented to a search of the vehicle. The search yielded $763 from the glove compartment and five plastic glassine baggies containing cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. When the officer began the search the armrest was in the upright position flat against the rear seat. The officer pulled down the armrest and found the drugs, which had been placed between the armrest and the back seat of the car.
The officer questioned all three men about the ownership of the drugs and money, and told them that if no one admitted to ownership of the drugs he was going to arrest them all. The men offered no information regarding the ownership
of the drugs or money. All three were placed under arrest and transported to the police station.
Later that morning, Pringle waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and gave an oral and written confession in which he acknowledged that the cocaine belonged to him, that he and his friends were going to a party, and that he intended to sell the cocaine or "[u]se it for sex." App. 26. Pringle maintained that the other occupants of the car did not know about the drugs, and they were released.
The trial court denied Pringle's motion to suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest, holding that the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle. A jury convicted Pringle of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine. He was sentenced to 10 years' incarceration without the possibility of parole. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. 141 Md. App. 292, 785 A. 2d 790 (2001).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, by divided vote, reversed, holding that, absent specific facts tending to show Pringle's knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, "the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when [Pringle] was a front seat passenger in a car being driven by its owner is insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest for possession." 370 Md. 525, 545, 805 A. 2d 1016, 1027 (2002). We granted certiorari, 538 U. S. 921 (2003), and now reverse.
Under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), the people are "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and...
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...was present). A warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by probable cause. Maryland v. Pringle , 540 U.S. 366, 370, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). Therefore, a warrantless arrest without probable cause is a "clearly established" constitutional v......
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