Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, Civ. A. No. S-92-510

Decision Date14 January 1994
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. S-92-510,S-92-1409.
PartiesMARYLANDERS FOR FAIR REPRESENTATION, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. William Donald SCHAEFER, et al., Defendants. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR The ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. William Donald SCHAEFER, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

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David D. Queen, Ober, Kaler, Grimes and Shriver, Baltimore, MD, for William Bergeron and Louis J. Tiches.

Samuel L. Walters, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dennis C. Hayes, Gen. Counsel, N.A.A.C.P. Special Contribution Fund, Baltimore, MD, for N.A.A.C.P., Inc.

Robert A. Zarnoch, Atty. General's Office, Annapolis, MD, Dawna M. Cobb, Office of Atty. Gen., Diane Krejsa, Law Office, Lucy A. Cardwell, Office of Gen. Counsel, Carmen M. Shepard, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Office of Atty. Gen., Baltimore, MD, Kathryn M. Rowe, Office of Atty. Gen., Linda H. Lamone, Annapolis, MD, Evelyn O. Cannon, Law Office, Baltimore, MD, for William Donald Schaefer, State Administrative Bd. of Election Laws, William M. Kelly, Jr., Thomas V. Miller, Jr., R. Clayton Mitchell, Jr., James W. Johnson, Jr., and Gene M. Raynor.

Before MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge, MOTZ and SMALKIN, District Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case is currently before the Court on the following motions: (1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all Counts in Civil Action No. S-92-510; (2) Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I ("one person, one vote" violations) in Civil Action No. S-92-510; and (3) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all Counts in Civil Action No. S-92-1409. A hearing on all motions was held on November 19, 1993. The Court determined that a trial was necessary to resolve factual disputes concerning a potential violation of the Voting Rights Act on the State's Eastern Shore. The trial was held on December 20 and 21, 1993; and the findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). See infra Part V.C.1 As to all other claims in the combined lawsuits, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

I. COMMON FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Pursuant to Article III, § 5 of the Maryland Constitution, Governor William Donald Schaefer, following the 1990 federal census, undertook to develop a redistricting plan for the Maryland General Assembly that reflected the population shifts throughout the State since 1980. The Governor appointed a five-member advisory committee, the Governor's Redistricting Advisory Committee ("GRAC"),2 to assist him in that task in May 1991. After acknowledging the legal criteria that would constrain its redistricting decisions3 and the non-legal factors that it would also take into account in the redistricting process,4 the GRAC held a series of public hearings during the summer of 1991 across the State to receive public comments on the process and proposals for alternative districting plans. After an enthusiastic public response,5 the GRAC worked throughout the fall of 1991 to formulate a proposed redistricting plan which was released to the public on December 2, 1991. The GRAC held a final public hearing on the proposed plan on December 106 and, after several changes made in light of testimony at that hearing, submitted the plan to the Governor on December 17. The Governor submitted a slightly modified version of the plan to the General Assembly on January 8, 1992. That plan became law on February 23, upon the General Assembly's failure to enact its own redistricting plan.7

This consolidated case involves challenges by two groups of plaintiffs to Maryland's redistricting plan. The defendants are the Governor, the State Administrative Board of Election Laws and its Administrator, and the Secretary of State. In Civil Action No. S-92-510, the plaintiffs, Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. ("MFR") and two Republican registered voters, claim that the plan violates the "one person, one vote" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, is an unconstitutional political gerrymander, and violates the Voting Rights Act. In Civil Action No. S-92-1409, the plaintiffs, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. ("NAACP"), seven of its constituent branches, and eight black registered voters, claim that the plan violates the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has already upheld the plan against attacks by other plaintiffs based on eight separate state and federal grounds. See Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 629 A.2d 646 (1993). Both federal suits have been consolidated to be heard by this three-judge Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate by a properly supported motion that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Because under Rule 56(a) and (b), both plaintiffs and defendants may move for summary judgment, courts are often confronted with cross-motions. In such situations, the court must consider each party's motion individually to determine if that party has satisfied the summary judgment standard. See 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (2d ed. 1983).

The moving party has the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the belief that summary judgment is warranted. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987). If the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion, it must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54. Once a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). It must show that there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find in its favor. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. This standard "mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. In determining the sufficiency of the nonmoving party's evidence, all inferences to be drawn from underlying facts should be resolved in the favor of the nonmoving party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356, but only such evidence as would be admissible at trial can be considered. See Wilson v. Clancy, 747 F.Supp. 1154, 1158 (D.Md.1990), aff'd, 940 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1991).

III. POPULATION EQUALITY
A. The Legal Standards

The "one person, one vote" principle was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963). That principle, which is grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the dilution of individual voting power by means of state districting plans that allocate legislative seats to districts of different populations. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1385, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), the Court held that "the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis." Requiring electoral districts to be of nearly equal population ensures that each person's vote is given the same weight. Thus, in Reynolds, the Court required States to "make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts ... as nearly of equal population as is practicable." Id. at 577, 84 S.Ct. at 1390.

Although the Supreme Court has held that absolute population equality should be the paramount objective in plans allocating congressional districts, see Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732-33, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 2659-60, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983), the Court affords more flexibility to States in formulating districting plans for state legislative seats by requiring only "substantial" population equality. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 2329, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973). This slightly relaxed requirement for state redistricting plans recognizes that minor deviations from absolute population equality may be necessary to permit the States to pursue other legitimate state policies. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577-81, 84 S.Ct. at 1389-92; Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321-22, 93 S.Ct. 979, 983-84, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973). The Court has specifically recognized a number of state policies that justify minor deviations from absolute population equality. In the Karcher decision, a congressional redistricting case, the Court stated: "Any number of consistently applied legislative policies might justify some variance, including, for instance, making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives." 462 U.S. at 740, 103 S.Ct. at 2663. Given the...

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