Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, Civ. No. S-92-510

• Decision Date: 15 June 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. No. S-92-510,S-92-1409.
• Citation: Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 795 F. Supp. 747 (D. Md. 1992)
• Parties: MARYLANDERS FOR FAIR REPRESENTATION, INC., et al. v. William Donald SCHAEFER, et al. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR the ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, INC., et al. v. William Donald SCHAEFER, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

795 F. Supp. 747

MARYLANDERS FOR FAIR REPRESENTATION, INC., et al. v.William Donald SCHAEFER, et al.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR the ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, INC., et al. v.William Donald SCHAEFER, et al.

Civ. Nos. S-92-510, S-92-1409.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

June 15, 1992.

Samuel L. Walters, Asst. Gen. Counsel, NAACP Sp. Contribution Fund, Deborah A. Jeon, American Civ. Liberties Union Foundation of Maryland, Baltimore, Md., and Perter C. Forbes, Morrison & Foerster, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.

Evelyn O. Cannon, Lucy A. Cardwell, Asst. Attys.Gen., Baltimore, Md., and Robert A. Zarnoch and Kathryn M. Rowe, Asst. Attys.Gen., Annapolis, Md., for defendants.

Before MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge and MOTZ and SMALKIN, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

These two actions challenge the 1992 State legislative redistricting plan enacted by the Maryland General Assembly on the grounds that it violates the Voting Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq., and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.¹Civil No. S-92-510 is brought by Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc.(alleged to be "a not-for-profit, non-partisan corporation") and two individual Republicans (one of whom is an African American registered voter of Prince George's County and the other of whom is a white registered voter of Baltimore County).Civil No. S-92-1409 is brought by the NAACP, its local and State affiliates in Maryland and several individual registered voters who are African American.Defendants are the Governor, the State administrative board of election laws and various other public officials.

A three-judge district court has been convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284.Presently pending before us is a motion filed by defendants requesting us to dismiss or to stay the actions on abstention grounds pending review of the validity of the redistricting plan by the Maryland Court of Appeals.²

We are mindful, as defendants urge, that the Maryland Constitution confers original jurisdiction upon the Maryland Court of Appeals to consider constitutional challenges to a redistricting plan asserted by any dissatisfied registered voter in the State.Md. Const. art. III, § 5.³Acting with commendable speed, the Court of Appeals has already issued an order requiring that any such challenges to the 1992 plan be filed on or before July 1, 1992, and that the Maryland Attorney General respond to those challenges on or before August 31, 1992.See19 Md.Reg. 793(1992).If we were free to follow our own inclinations, we would defer our consideration of the issues presented in these cases until the Court of Appeals has had an opportunity to act upon any challenges asserted before it.It is self-evident that the task of apportionment and legislative redistricting, "dealing as it must with fundamental `choices about the nature of representation,' is primarily a political and legislative process,"Gaffney v. Cummings,412 U.S. 735, 749, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 2329, 37 L.Ed.2d 298(1973)(quotingBurns v. Richardson,384 U.S. 73, 92, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 1296-97, 16 L.Ed.2d 376(1966)), and that a federal court must take care not to "intrude upon state policy any more than necessary,"Whitcomb v. Chavis,403 U.S. 124, 160, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1878, 29 L.Ed.2d 363(1971).See alsoScott v. Germano,381 U.S. 407, 85 S.Ct. 1525, 14 L.Ed.2d 477(1965);cf.Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes,377 U.S. 656, 674, 84 S.Ct. 1429, 1439, 12 L.Ed.2d 595(1964)(encouraging state courts to hear challenges to apportionment plans).

Plaintiffs in these actions have, however, invoked federal jurisdiction to raise federal constitutional and statutory claims.We have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given us."SeeColorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483(1976)."Abdication of ... our obligation to decide cases can be justified ... only in the exceptional circumstances where ... an order to the parties to repair to the State court clearly would serve an important countervailing interest."Id. at 813, 96 S.Ct. at 1244.We cannot conclude that such circumstances exist here.To the contrary, we believe that the interests of comity, the efficient and economic use of judicial resources and the timely ordering of the electoral process all dictate that, instead of staying our hand, we seek to act in tandem with the Maryland Court of Appeals to the end that federal and state review of the legislative redistricting plan proceed simultaneously rather than sequentially.

Defendants argue that if the Court of Appeals were to invalidate the plan, either on federal or state grounds, its decision would nullify or at least modify the rulings which we are called upon to make.However, the reverse is likewise true.If we were ultimately to overturn the redistricting plan on federal grounds, decisions which the Court of Appeals had made in the interim might be nullified or substantially altered.This would prove to be particularly unfortunate if, before we acted, a revised plan had been established, pursuant to a directive of the Court of Appeals, based upon premises concerning federal law which we subsequently invalidated.⁴Were that to occur, the valuable time and resources of the Court of Appeals would be wasted, and unnecessary friction between the State and Federal courts might ensue.⁵

Under these circumstanceswe will not abstain from deciding the federal claims which plaintiffs have asserted here.However, we have conferred informally with the Maryland Court of Appeals to consider the feasibility of coordinating its proceedings with ours, including (potentially) establishing a joint schedule, cross-designating a single special master and holding joint hearings.Of course, as representatives of different sovereigns, we and the Court of Appeals must each ultimately make independent decisions on the questions falling within our respective constitutional spheres.⁶However, at least at this stage of the proceedings neither we nor the Court of Appeals perceive any institutional impediments to our working closely with one another on matters relating to the management and administration of this litigation.

For these reasons defendants' motion to dismiss or stay on abstention grounds is denied.We will, however informally stay these actions until July 15, 1992, to give us an opportunity to discuss further with the Maryland Court of Appeals the question of coordinated proceedings against the background of all challenges to the redistricting plan which are filed before it.

SMALKIN, District Judge, concurring in result:

I concur in the result of the majority's opinion denying the defendants' motion to dismiss this case.I believe, however, that this Court should refrain from exercising any adjudicative function in this case until after the Maryland Court of Appeals will have completed the review of the Governor's redistricting plan it is mandated to conduct under the Maryland Constitution.

The primacy of state judiciaries, with respect to redistricting issues, was recognized by the Supreme Court in Scott v. Germano,381 U.S. 407, 85 S.Ct. 1525, 14 L.Ed.2d 477(1965).There, the Court observed that "the power of the judiciary of a state to require valid reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but appropriate action by the states in such cases has been specifically encouraged."Scott,381 U.S. at 409, 85 S.Ct. at 1527.Thus, the clearest of messages was conveyed by the Supreme Court in Scott that, in redistricting cases, the appropriate state court should have the first opportunity to review the legislature's plan.The Supreme Court has never retrenched from the position it took in Scott.It therefore follows that a federal court should decline to hear challenges to a state redistricting plan until the state court has acted.Whether, in the procedural posture of the case before this Court, abstention is the appropriate vehicle for expressing the federal court's deference to the state judiciary, is primary among the issues we have been asked to consider by the parties.

The issue of abstention, although the primary focus of the written submissions and the oral proceedings in this case, was not clearly addressed by any of the parties presently before the Court.Furthermore, during oral argument, the defendants argued that this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case under the doctrine of ripeness.The failure of the parties to unravel the tangled doctrinal skeins of abstention and ripeness, particularly at the point where these two doctrines meet, has tended somewhat to cloud the case to date.

The defendants' position on ripeness was not fully developed during oral argument.Their contention was, however, essentially that, because the Maryland Court of Appeals has not yet acted upon the plan, the plan is not yet "final," and thus any challenge to it at this point is premature.All plaintiffs vehemently oppose the argument that their suit is not yet legally ripe for consideration, just as they oppose this Court deferring action under any variant of abstention.The point of the discussion at oral argument was to determine whether the plaintiffs' challenge to the plan should be considered by this Court before, after, or simultaneous with the Court of Appeals' determination.Unfortunately, the questions were not fully explored at oral argument.I believe that a brief analysis of ripeness and abstention, two doctrines that intersect and overlap, will show that this Court would be ill-advised to exercise its adjudicative powers prematurely.

The ripeness doctrine has its roots in both Article III"case or controversy" concepts and in discretionary policy concerns for refusing to exercise judicial power ("prudence").In its most elemental form, the doctrine of ripeness is...