Marzonie v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n

Decision Date30 December 1992
Docket NumberNo. 93152,93152
Citation441 Mich. 522,495 N.W.2d 788
PartiesMichael W. MARZONIE, II, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Edwin W. Jakeway, P.C. by Edwin W. Jakeway and Michael J. Kelly, Grand Blanc, for plaintiff.

Gault, Davison, Bowers, Hill, Parker & McAra by Edward B. Davison, Flint; Gross & Nemeth (James G. Gross, of counsel), Detroit, for defendant.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff was shot while occupying a motor vehicle. The circuit court awarded personal protection insurance benefits, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 193 Mich.App. 332, 483 N.W.2d 413 (1992). Because the plaintiff's injuries did not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, we reverse the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals, and we remand this case to the circuit court for entry of a judgment in favor of the defendant.

I

As the plaintiff and a passenger were driving home from a party, they became embroiled in a dispute with three occupants of a vehicle driven by Vernon Oaks. After words were exchanged, the plaintiff began to pursue the Oaks vehicle at a high rate of speed. As the plaintiff drove, his passenger threw beer bottles at the Oaks vehicle.

Mr. Oaks drove home, where he and his friends went inside. Moments later, he emerged, alone, bearing a shotgun.

Meantime, the plaintiff and his passenger arrived in their car and stopped near the Oaks home. The passenger said that the plaintiff did not move his car forward when he saw Mr. Oaks emerge from his house with a shotgun. 1 However, Mr. Oaks said that the car was moving slowly toward him:

"It was rolling towards me, just in just like a real creep. It wasn't, it wasn't driving, but it was just like in a creep."

As the car continued "at a real slight creep," Mr. Oaks tried to fire a shot at the car. Nothing happened when he pulled the trigger, however, so he "reracked the gun," aimed toward the grill of the car, and fired again. Mr. Oaks later explained that he had intended to stop the car, not shoot the driver.

It appeared to Mr. Oaks that he had missed the plaintiff's car completely. In fact, he had shot the plaintiff in the face and neck, inflicting permanent and serious injury. 2

An instant after the shooting, the plaintiff's car began backing up. Traveling in reverse, it soon hit a curb, and the passenger noticed that the plaintiff was unconscious. Taking the wheel, the passenger drove him to the hospital.

As the plaintiff's car was driving away, Mr. Oaks attempted a third time to fire a shot, but again his gun would not discharge. He tried a fourth time, and the gun fired. The plaintiff says that this shot hit the fleeing car.

Mr. Oaks testified that he initially had fired in order to stop the plaintiff's car and because he was angry at the plaintiff's presence. Asked why he shot at the escaping car, he said that he was upset and wanted to stop the car. Mr. Oaks explained:

"Q. What was your purpose in shooting the first time?

"A. To stop the car.

"Q. To stop it from coming toward you?

"A. Stop it, period. I didn't understand why if I have a gun and you are in your car and you are in front of me and I have it up on my shoulder, I don't understand why you are still coming at me. I didn't, I didn't know what he was doing in the car. I didn't know if he was reaching for a gun or what. I didn't know what he was going to do. A lot of things was [sic] going through my mind. I didn't know what he was going to do.

"Q. So you didn't want to take any chances, so you blasted first, is that right?

"A. The car was coming at me and I shot the car.

"Q. How did you think that would stop the car?

"A. Excuse me?

"Q. How did you think that that would stop the car?

"A. Well, if you put a shot into the grill of a car it's going to blow the radiator, possibly the tank, it's going to overheat. It will stop the car.

"Q. That was your idea?

"A. Yeah.

"Q. All right. But you didn't know you hit anything?

"A. No. I thought I missed the whole car completely.

"Q. All right, and for all you knew in the second shot when you ran down, you said you missed it, too?

"A. At the, at the time, yes. At the time I thought I had missed that, too.

"Q. Okay, and what was your purpose in shooting the second time?

"A. To stop the car. That's why I aimed at the back tire and shot at the back tire.

"Q. Why did you want to stop the car the first time?

"A. Why would I want these people in my neighborhood, into my house and terrorizing my house?

"Q. That's the reason you stopped it the first time, it was going away from you the second time, why did you shoot it that time?

"A. The same intention, I wanted to stop the car.

"Q. Why did you want to stop the car if it was going away from you and not endangering your neighborhood or you?

"A. These people had followed me. I felt that my privacy had been violated.

"Q. You were angry?

"A. No, not angry, upset. I was upset, confused.

"Q. You weren't angry?

"A. Not angry, no, but I felt I was upset.

"Q. What was upset, how do you define 'Upset'?

"A. I feel that there is a difference between angry and upset because upset was, it was, angry would be wanting to get back at you, okay? I didn't want to get back at them. I just wanted, I wanted something done, you know, not to him or against--not ... [.]

"Q. Take your time.

"A. I'm trying to word this. I didn't feel that he was right in coming after me, okay?

"Q. Okay.

"A. So I felt that something should be done towards him not as, as, as ... [.] As far as, okay, if I stopped the car then the police could be called and then something could be done about it, okay?"

II

The plaintiff sought personal protection (first- insurance benefits from the insurer. 3 After the demand was refused, the plaintiff filed the present suit.

M.C.L. § 500.3105(1); M.S.A. § 24.13105(1) provides:

"Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter."

In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that his injuries arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. The defendant insurer denied the allegation, and later moved for summary disposition. In an order denying the defendant's motion, the circuit court explained:

"The court finds that the case of Jones v. Allstate Ins Co, 161 Mich App 450 (1987), is controlling and that it is necessary that a jury determine the factual issue of whether the assailant, Vernon Oaks, intended to shoot either plaintiff Marzonie or Marzonie's car."

This matter was tried before a jury. In accordance with the court's earlier ruling, the sole question submitted to the jury was whether Mr. Oaks intended to shoot the plaintiff, or only to shoot the plaintiff's vehicle. After deliberating less than half an hour, the jury returned its finding that "Vernon Oaks intended to shoot only the automobile of Michael Marzonie...."

Had the jury found that Mr. Oaks intended to shoot the plaintiff, judgment would have been entered for the defendant. When the jury instead found that Mr. Oaks intended to shoot the plaintiff's car, the circuit court was prepared to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Before entry of judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant moved unsuccessfully for entry of a judgment in its favor or, alternatively, for a new trial. The motion was denied.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. Citing Jones, and saying that because the plaintiff's injuries "stemmed from the functional character of the motor vehicle," the Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to first-party benefits. 193 Mich.App. at 337, 483 N.W.2d 413.

Writing in dissent, Judge MacKenzie said that "plaintiff was injured as a result of his dispute with Oaks, and plaintiff's automobile merely served as the target of Oaks' gunfire and the situs where plaintiff was shot." Id. at 339, 483 N.W.2d 413.

The defendant has applied for leave to appeal the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

III

Throughout the time that no-fault automobile insurance has existed in Michigan, cases have arisen involving insured persons who were shot or otherwise assaulted while occupying motor vehicles. The basic rule, correctly developed by the Court of Appeals, is stated in O'Key v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 89 Mich.App. 526, 280 N.W.2d 583 (1979). There, the plaintiff was sitting in his parked car, which was idling. An individual opened the passenger door and pointed a gun at him. The plaintiff put the car in reverse, and accelerated. The assailant fired two or three shots into the car, striking the plaintiff.

The Court of Appeals found in O'Key that the plaintiff's injury did not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of an automobile:

"[We] conclude that the injuries sustained by plaintiff did not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of the automobile. Although plaintiff was an occupant of an automobile at the time he sustained the injury, this is not a controlling consideration in resolving this issue. The automobile was not the instrumentality of the injury. Rather, its role in this matter was incidental. Plaintiff's occupancy of the car was a fortuity, in no way connected with the assault. Nor is an assault by an armed assailant upon the driver of a car the type of conduct that is 'reasonably identifiable' with the use of a car. Since the injury in this case did not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of the car, the trial judge properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment in this case." 89 Mich.App. at 530, 280 N.W.2d 583.

This Court addressed a similar situation in Thornton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 Mich. 643, 391 N.W.2d 320 (1986). The plaintiff...

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