Mascarenas v. State

Citation315 P.3d 656
Decision Date31 December 2013
Docket NumberNo. S–13–0027.,S–13–0027.
PartiesAndrew MASCARENAS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant Attorney General; Prosecution Assistance Program: Darrell D. Jackson, Faculty Director, David E. Singleton, Student Director, Sophie Dornbach, Student Intern. Argument by Ms. Dornbach.

Before KITE, C.J., and HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, and DAVIS, JJ.

VOIGT, Justice.

[¶ 1] The appellant, Andrew Mascarenas, was convicted of felony driving while under the influence of alcohol, reckless driving, driving with a suspended license, and driving without an interlock device. He appeals these convictions, arguing that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated and the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the reckless driving conviction.1 We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] 1. Did the appellant receive his constitutional right to a speedy trial?

2. Did the State present sufficient evidence to support the appellant's reckless driving conviction?

FACTS

[¶ 3] In the early morning hours of October 15, 2011, Lieutenant Hooper of the Rawlins Police Department was standing outside of his patrol vehicle in the parking lot of a gas station in Rawlins, Wyoming. The sound of squealing tires caught his attention, and when he turned to the direction of the sound, he saw a vehicle go over a curb and into a yard. Lieutenant Hooper immediately drove the one city block to the location of the vehicle and found that the vehicle had crashed into a tree and its axle was broken. He observed a man wearing a dark-colored shirt, later identified as the appellant, exit the driver's side of the vehicle. Lieutenant Hooper also saw a man wearing a white t-shirt, identified as the appellant's brother, outside of the vehicle. When Lieutenant Hooper spoke with the men, he immediately suspected that alcohol had been a factor in the crash because both men smelled of alcohol, had poor balance while standing, and slurred their speech. Although the appellant denied being the driver, his brother stated that, [the appellant] struck a tree.” The appellant was placed under arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol, but refused to consent to a breath test. Thereafter, Lieutenant Hooper obtained a warrant from the circuit court judge to obtain a sample of the appellant's blood for chemical testing.

[¶ 4] The appellant was charged with felony driving while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle, reckless driving, driving while under suspension, and driving without an interlock device. Once the State received the results of the appellant's blood test, which showed a blood alcohol concentration of .23%, the State filed a new Information, which contained the same charges as in the original Information, but also charged the appellant with driving a vehicle while having a blood alcohol content that exceeded .08%.2

DISCUSSION

Did the appellant receive his constitutional right to a speedy trial?

[¶ 5] The appellant claims his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated because he spent 332 days incarcerated between the time of his arrest and the date his trial began. We review the constitutional question of whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution de novo.Potter v. State, 2007 WY 83, ¶ 14, 158 P.3d 656, 660 (Wyo.2007).

[¶ 6] Before we begin our analysis, a brief review of the procedural history in the district court is helpful. The appellant was arrested on October 15, 2011, and on October 17, 2011, the State filed an Information, charging him with felony driving while under the influence, reckless driving, driving with a suspended license, and driving without an interlock device. The appellant waived his preliminary hearing on October 26, 2011, was arraigned in the district court on November 14, 2011, and a trial date was set for April 24, 2012. On December 12, 2011, the appellant filed a pro se motion to dismiss his court-appointed attorney and, thereafter, continued to file various pro se motions seeking discovery and to have his case dismissed. On January 23, 2012, the district court held a hearing to hear the appellant's reasons for wanting to terminate the services of his counsel. The appellant's primary grievance with his trial counsel was that he felt counsel was unprepared to defend him during the preliminary hearing, thus convincing the appellant to waive the hearing, and that he was unprepared to defend him at his arraignment. After a lengthy discussion, which included multiple warnings from the district court regarding the dangers associated with pro se representation, the district court granted the appellant's request to proceed pro se. Thereafter, the appellant continued to file motions to dismiss the Information on various grounds.

[¶ 7] On February 6, 2012, the State filed a new Information and moved to dismiss the original Information against the appellant. Originally, the State charged the appellant with driving while under the influence of alcohol pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31–5–233(b)(iii)(A). However, after receiving the results of the appellant's blood test, the State also charged the appellant with driving while under the influence of alcohol pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31–5–233(b)(i). A preliminary hearing for the new Information was held on February 14, 2012, and the appellant was bound over to the district court. An arraignment was held on March 19, 2012, where the appellant, again, stated his desire to proceed pro se. The district court asked the appellant if he believed his “rights have been prejudiced by the filing of this second complaint,” to which the appellant responded he did not. However, the appellant then expressed concern about his “speedy trial.” The district court told the appellant to put his motion in writing and it would be considered at the appropriate time. A trial was then set for September 11, 2012.

[¶ 8] Between the time the new charges were filed and the time of trial, the appellant filed twenty motions. Thirteen were requests to dismiss the charges, three of which were based upon speedy trial. On June 13, 2012, the district court held a hearing regarding eleven of those motions, but the majority of the hearing was spent discussing the speedy trial issue. The State explained that the alternative charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol was based upon new evidence, and the State chose to file a new Information instead of amending the original so that the appellant could have a preliminary hearing on the new charges. The district court concluded that, under Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 48 and prevailing federal guidance, the appellant's right to a speedy trial had not been violated.

[¶ 9] First, it is important to note that the appellant is raising a speedy trial issue only under the mandates of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. While Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 48 also dictates speedy trial requirements, the appellant does not allege, and we do not find, that rule was violated. Thus, our discussion will focus solely on the constitutional requirements.

[¶ 10] When reviewing a constitutional speedy trial claim, we adhere to the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). See Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 31, 93 P.3d 222, 230 (Wyo.2004). That test requires us to consider four factors in determining whether a speedy trial violation occurred: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant. Id. at ¶ 31, 93 P.3d at 230–31. “These factors must be considered together and balanced in relation to all relevant circumstances. The burden of proving prejudicial delay from a speedy trial violation lies with [the appellant].” Id. at ¶ 31, 93 P.3d at 231 (citations omitted). However, “the burden is on the State to prove that delays in bringing a defendant to trial are reasonable and necessary.” Id.

[¶ 11] When calculating the delay, the period we consider begins upon the filing of the criminal complaint or the defendant's arrest-whichever occurs first. Strandlien v. State, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 8, 156 P.3d 986, 990 (Wyo.2007). Further,

[w]e have recognized that when one charge is dismissed and supplanted by another, the constitutional speedy trial clock is not affected. Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Wyo.1985)[.] Under such circumstances, “the periods of formal charge by a single sovereign for the same criminal act are tacked [together] even if the charges are different.” Id.

Id. at ¶ 8, 156 P.3d at 990. Here, the appellant was arrested on October 15, 2011, and he was incarcerated continuously until his trial began on September 11, 2012, for a total of a 332 day delay.

[¶ 12] This Court has never held that a certain length of delay automatically amounts to a speedy trial violation. Berry, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 32, 93 P.3d at 231. Some delays are so protracted that they must be considered presumptively prejudicial and weighed heavily in favor of the defendant in the balancing inquiry with the other factors. Id. at ¶¶ 32–33, 93 P.3d at 231–32. However, other delays are not so long as to be presumptively prejudicial, but still require further analysis of the remaining speedy trial factors. Id. at ¶ 34, 93 P.3d at 232. While we do not find a delay of 332 days presumptively prejudicial, we do believe, consistent with prior case law,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • Griggs v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • February 2, 2016
    ...right to a speedy trial." Berry, ¶ 32, 93 P.3d at 231. If the delay is sufficiently long, analysis of the other three factors is required. Mascarenas, ¶ 12, 315 P.3d at 661, citing Berry, ¶¶ 32–34, 93 P.3d at 231–32.[¶ 61] Four hundred eleven days passed between the State's filing of charge......
  • Webb v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • September 15, 2017
    ...of formal charge by a single sovereign for the same criminal act are tacked [together] even if the charges are different." Mascarenas v. State , 2013 WY 163, ¶ 11, 315 P.3d 656, 661 (Wyo. 2013) (quoting Strandlien v. State , 2007 WY 66, ¶ 8, 156 P.3d 986, 990 (Wyo. 2007) ). [¶16] Turning to......
  • Crebs v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • October 28, 2020
    ...specific length of delay is sufficient to constitute an automatic speedy trial violation." Webb , ¶ 16, 401 P.3d at 922 (citing Mascarenas v. State , 2013 WY 163, ¶ 12, 315 P.3d 656, 661 (Wyo. 2013) ). However, the length of the delay is a threshold consideration that determines whether ana......
  • Tate v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • October 24, 2016
    ...a year from arrest or charge to trial. See, e.g., Rhodes v. State , 2015 WY 60, ¶ 18, 348 P.3d 404, 411 (Wyo. 2015) (351 days); Mascarenas v. State , 2013 WY 163, ¶ 12, 315 P.3d 656, 661 (Wyo. 2013) (332 days); Potter v. State , 2007 WY 83, ¶ 35, 158 P.3d 656, 665 (Wyo. 2007) (362 days); La......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT