Mashburn v. Yamhill County
| Decision Date | 04 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 08-718-HU.,CV 08-718-HU. |
| Parties | Jefory MASHBURN, On Behalf of Minor CM, Joseph Cornelison, On Behalf of Minor RC, Nathanael Williams, Amy Hinmon, Joseph Lewis, individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,v.YAMHILL COUNTY, Tim Loewen, both individually and in his official capacity as Director, Chuck Vesper, both individually and in his official capacity as Division Manager, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
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Leonard Randolph Berman, Law Office of Leonard R. Berman, Portland, OR, for Plaintiffs.
Steven A. Kraemer, Leslie Anne Edenhofer, Hoffman Hart & Wagner, LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs are or were minors who were strip searched upon entry into the Yamhill County Juvenile Detention Center (“YCJDC”) and after “contact visits” with non-YCJDC staff members, including their own lawyers. Plaintiffs sued Yamhill County, Tim Loewen, the Yamhill County Director, and Chuck Vesper, the Yamhill County Division Manager under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the YCJDC strip search policy is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment that centered on the constitutionality of the YCJDC strip search policy.
Magistrate Judge Hubel heard oral argument on both motions and issued Findings and Recommendation (“F & R”) (# 60) on December 4, 2009. He concluded the “blanket” strip searches upon entry to the detention facility were constitutional, but the post-contact-visit strip searches during detention were not. Despite finding that post-contact-visit strip searches violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, Judge Hubel recommended that Mr. Loewen and Mr. Vesper be granted qualified immunity because plaintiffs' rights had not been clearly established. The parties filed objections to the F & R, as well as responses to the other parties' objections.
Upon review, I agree with Judge Hubel's recommendation as to qualified immunity, plaintiffs' standing to seek an injunction, and the unconstitutionality of the post-contact-visit strip searches. I further find that the scope of the admission search policy is excessive in relation to the government's interest and therefore unconstitutional.
As Judge Hubel observed, “the strip searches authorized by the [ YCJDC] policies are highly intrusive, as the juveniles are completely unclothed for inspection by a stranger, are required to manipulate either their breasts or scrotum for inspection, and to squat and cough.” (F & R(# 60) 1253.) Moreover, the entire search, including inspection of the minor's hair, mouth, hands, arm pits, and feet, is conducted while the minor is completely unclothed. ( Id. at 1247-49; Kraemer Aff. (# 29) Ex. 1; Berman Decl. (# 27) Ex. 1.)
YCJDC policy authorizes staff members to conduct strip searches after a juvenile is admitted to the detention center. The detention center has a detailed intake policy that evaluates a juvenile's charged crime, criminal history, physical and mental well-being, and the behavior giving rise to the juvenile's arrest. (Kraemer Aff. (# 29) Ex. 2-3.) A juvenile may only be admitted if the juvenile: (a) is the subject of a court order to detain; (b) is the subject of a Circuit Court statewide or nationwide warrant; (c) violated conditions of probation; (d) violated conditions of conditional release; (e) allegedly committed a felony; (f) allegedly possessed a firearm unlawfully; (g) allegedly committed the offense of Criminal Manufacture or Delivery of a Controlled Substance; (h) committed a misdemeanor resulting in physical injury; (i) is a fugitive from another jurisdiction; or (j) wilfully failed to appear at a juvenile court proceeding. (F & R(# 60) 1247; Kraemer Aff. (# 29) Ex. 2.) In addition to one of these factors, the juvenile must also be either a flight risk or engaged in behavior that endangers herself, others, or the community. ( Id.)
The detention center policy also authorizes strip searches after “contact visits” with non-YCJDC staff. Contact visits take place in an open room and are only permitted when the visitor is professional, such as an attorney or mental health counselor. Personal visitors, such as parents or guardians, are allowed only non-contact visits in which the visitor and the juvenile are physically separated by a glass partition. The YCJDC policy does not authorize strip searches after non-contact visits.
The magistrate judge makes only recommendations to the court, to which any party may file written objections. The court is not bound by the recommendations of the magistrate judge, but retains responsibility for making the final determination. The court is generally required to make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendation as to which an objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). However, the court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the F & R to which no objections are addressed. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003). While the level of scrutiny under which I am required to review the F & R depends on whether or not objections have been filed, in either case, I am free to accept, reject, or modify any of the magistrate judge's F & R. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
Plaintiffs allege that the YCJDC strip search policy violates their Fourth Amendment right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Here, the policies at issue involve a full strip search of juveniles upon their admission to YCJDC and after contact visits with non-Juvenile Department staff, without any requirement for reasonable suspicion to suspect the juvenile possesses contraband.” (F & R(# 60) 1253.) This factual scenario raises two key questions that bear on the constitutionality of the policy. The first question is whether the search is justified at its inception; that is, whether it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the government to perform a strip search without individualized suspicion. The second question is whether the scope of the search is reasonable; that is, whether the government's “need for the particular search” outweighs “the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
The Fourth Amendment generally requires searches to be conducted pursuant to probable cause, or at least “some quantum of individualized suspicion.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). But, “in certain limited circumstances, the Government's need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of individualized suspicion.” Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989). These cases, commonly referred to as “special needs” cases, ask whether a government need, “beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make[s] the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) (internal quotations omitted).
For example, special needs cases frequently arise in the context of public schools, where the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard is influenced by “the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995). These cases reflect the understanding that “[a] student's privacy interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety.” Earls, 536 U.S. at 830, 122 S.Ct. 2559.
Fourth Amendment challenges in the context of prisons and jails are not typically referred to as special needs cases, but the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have upheld prison searches predicated on less than probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion. In particular, the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have upheld suspicionless strip searches of arrestees who were confined in a prison's general population. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558-560, 99 S.Ct. 1861; Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 980-82 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). In those cases, the search policies were deemed reasonable in light of the government interest in maintaining the institutional security of a prison. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 560, 99 S.Ct. 1861; Bull, 595 F.3d at 970-72, 974-76.
A government's special need does not, in and of itself, validate a search. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830, 122 S.Ct. 2559. Rather, after finding a special need, a court will consider whether the government's “need for the particular search” outweighs “the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861. In other words, even though a special need may allow YCJDC to conduct searches without individualized reasonable suspicion, the search may still be unconstitutional if it is excessively intrusive in relation to the government's need for the search.
In schools, for example, even though a student has a reduced privacy interest and the government has a special need to conduct searches based on less than probable cause, the scope of the search must not be “excessively intrusive in light of the age and...
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