Masi v. Mestice
Decision Date | 20 February 1951 |
Docket Number | No. A--4,A--4 |
Citation | 79 A.2d 82,12 N.J.Super. 140 |
Parties | MASI v. MESTICE. |
Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Leslie S. Kohn, Newark, argued the cause for the appellant (Frank G. Masini, Newark, attorney).
William R. Mestice argued pro se.
Before Judges McGEEHAN, JAYNE, and WM. J. BRENNAN, Jr.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JAYNE, J.A.D.
To trace in detail the many evolutions of this case from the Essex County Court of Common Pleas in which a final judgment was entered on November 20, 1947, in favor of the plaintiff, to the Appellate Division, where the judgment was affirmed (4 N.J.Super. 452, 67 A.2d 692), to the Supreme Court, 3 N.J. 380, 70 A.2d 539, and to the threshold of the Supreme Court of the United States, 339 U.S. 946, 70 S.Ct. 794; 339 U.S. 921, 70 S.Ct. 620, and return, would be informational but of little relevancy to the subject matter of the present appeal.
Now comes before us for review an order of the Essex County Court annulling a sale of the defendant's real estate on October 25, 1949, by the sheriff of Essex County made under the authority of a writ of execution which was issued on November 26, 1947, in pursuance of the final judgment.
In approaching the consideration of the present appeal, there are three recognizable postulates of major legal significance. They are that the process of execution issued out of a court of law, the property sold was real estate, and the summary proceeding in the County Court in which the order setting aside the sale was made, was conducted after the delivery of the deed by the sheriff.
There is abundant authority to sustain the general rule that courts of law possess the power of control over their own processes and doubtless the power to annul and set aside a sale of personal property made under the process of execution where the process has been so used as to accomplish fraud, injustice, or oppression. Voorhis v. Terhune, 50 N.J.L. 147, 13 A. 391 (E. & A.1887). The reason for the general rule is that a law court possesses a summary jurisdiction of an equitable nature for the purpose of preventing its own judgments and processes from being the means of working injustice, but this jurisdiction, certainly in case of the sale of real estate, expires when the process has been finally executed by the delivery of a deed to the purchaser.
In Marr v. Marr, 73 N.J.Eq. 643 on page 654, 70 A. 375 on page 379 (E. & A. 1908), Chancellor Pitney speaking for our former Court of Errors and Appeals explained:
In Ludlam v. Pennsylvania Realty Co., 83 N.J.Eq. 130, 89 A. 998, 999 (Ch. 1914), Vice-Chancellor Leaming remarked: See, also, the decision of the same learned vice-chancellor in Margate Co. v. Hand, 86 N.J.Eq. 314, 98 A. 313 (Ch. 1916).
This limitation of the power of the court of law received more recent confirmation in the decision of Sapinsky v. Stout, 101 N.J.Eq. 813 on page 815, 138 A. 899, on page 900 (E. & A. 1927), in which it was stated: 'Appellant was without any relief that could be accorded by the circuit court, because the deed from the sheriff, in execution of his writ, had been delivered before appellant discovered the situation, if the allegations of the bill are true.'
The inadequacy of the remedy at law after the process had been finally executed was recognized in Century Transit Co. v. Public Service, etc., Inc., 117 N.J.Eq. 520, 524, 176 A. 719 (Ch. 1935).
In Karel v. Davis, 122 N.J.Eq. 526, 194 A. 545, 546 (E. & A. 1937), Justice Heher was cautious to say, 'And courts of law likewise possess inherit equitable powers to so control their Executory process as to prevent injustice.'
The observance of this qualification of the jurisdiction at law is not confined to New Jersey. For example, the following quotation is taken from Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Edwards, 329 Pa. 529, 198 A. 123, 124 (Sup.Ct.Penna. 1938):
Another from Beckman v. Altoona Trust Co., 332 Pa. 545, 2 A.2d 826, 827 (Sup.Ct.Penna. 1938): ...
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...at page 25, 85 A.2d at page 307.) See In re Young's Estate, 18 N.J.Super. 527, 87 A.2d 460 (Cty.Ct.1952). In Masi v. Mestice, 12 N.J.Super. 140, 79 A.2d 82 (App.Div.1951), the plaintiff had recovered a judgment in 1947 in the Essex County Court of Common Pleas for personal injuries. A writ ......
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...the County Court was devoid of jurisdiction to set aside the sale once the sheriff delivered the deed, citing Masi v. Mestice, 12 N.J.Super. 140, 79 A.2d 82 (App.Div.1951). That decision, however, rested on the lack of jurisdiction in a county court to vacate a deed on purely equitable grou......
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...jurisdiction of an equitable nature for preventing its own judgments from being means of working injustice. Masi v. Mestice, 12 N.J.Super. 140, 79 A.2d 82 (App.Div.1951). The court finds that plaintiff failed to satisfy the 'good faith' (N.J.S.A. 12A:1--203) and 'commercially reasonable' st......
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