Masiello, In re

• Decision Date: 20 January 1958
• Docket Number: No. A--34,A--34
• Citation: 138 A.2d 393,25 N.J. 590
• Parties: In the Matter of Joseph J. MASIELLO, Jr., Applicant for Limited School Administrator's Certificate. Joseph J. MASIELLO, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. The STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS, Respondent-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 590

25 N.J. 590

138 A.2d 393

In the Matter of Joseph J. MASIELLO, Jr., Applicant for

Limited School Administrator's Certificate.

Joseph J. MASIELLO, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. The STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS, Respondent-Respondent.

No. A--34.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Nov. 18, 1957.

Decided Jan. 20, 1958.

Leo Yanoff, Newark, argued the cause for petitioner-appellant (H. Kermit Green, Newark, of counsel).

Thomas P. Cook, Deputy Atty. Gen., argued the cause for respondent-respondent (Grover C. Richman, Jr., Atty. Gen., attorney).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FRANCIS, J.

In November 1955 appellant Joseph J. Masiello, Jr. applied to the State Board of Examiners for a school administrator's certificate. The application was denied on the ground that he did not have the necessary qualifications. Subsequent appeals to the Commissioner of Education and the State Board of Education resulted in affirmances of the denial. Review was then sought in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court but we certified under R.R. 1:10--1(a).

N.J.S.A. 18:2--4(e) authorizes the State Board of Education to:

'Make and enforce rules and regulations for the granting of appropriate certificates or licenses to teach or to administer, direct, or supervise, the teaching, instruction or educational guidance of pupils in public schools operated by boards of education, for each of which certificates a fee of not less than $5.00 shall be charged.'

Rules and regulations adopted pursuant to this statute are administered by the State Board of Examiners, the agency to which the task of issuing the certificates is assigned. N.J.S.A. 18:13--1.

Possession of the school administrator's certificate sought by Masiello is essential for the position of supervising principal or superintendent of schools. To obtain it, certain qualifications established by the State Board of Education must be satisfied. One of them is at the heart of this controversy. It provides that the applicant must have

'Three years of experience As a vice principal, when so designated by a board of education and properly certificated as a principal, spending more than half time in the fields of administration or supervision, * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Masiello asserted compliance with this standard, but the Board of Examiners declared to the contrary, basing its decision on the undisputed facts.

In order to understand the positions of the parties, some reference to the circumstances is necessary.

Masiello was employed as a teacher in the public school system in Madison, New Jersey, on September 1, 1935. On March 25, 1942, the local board of education created three new offices designated Dean of Boys, Dean of Girls and Director of Guidance in the Madison High School, where he was then teaching. The organizational chart before us illustrates the nature and stature of these positions by paralleling them on a horizontal line immediately below the office of Principal. They were designed to relieve the principal of certain duties, some of them supervisory and administrative. The title 'Dean' was selected instead of 'Assistant Principal' because the board felt that it sounded more authoritative. Masiello was appointed Dean of Boys and was given an increase in salary. Thereafter, his teaching burden was lessened and he spent about four-sevenths of each school day in supervisory or administrative work. However, he was never specifically designated 'vice principal.'

On April 20, 1944, during his tenure as Dean of Boys, the Board of Examiners issued to him a letter of eligibility for a supervisor's certificate. The record indicates that under the then current rules, such a certificate would qualify the holder to serve as 'principal of any school.' However, Masiello never paid the requisite $5 fee or obtained the certificate. He resigned from the high school on September 11, 1946 to become field representative of the New Jersey Education Association.

On April 7, 1948 he was advised by the State Board that he was eligible for a high school principal's certificate. Some correspondence followed, apparently in furtherance of an effort on his part to demonstrate that his previous work as Dean of Boys met the test for a supervising principal's certificate. The Board declined to accept that experience as sufficient for the purpose, but did issue to him a statement of eligibility as high school principal on September 20, 1948. His status then remained at rest until he requested the school administrator's certificate in November 1955.

Masiello maintains that his service as Dean of Boys should be considered the equivalent of the required experience as vice-principal. The State Board of Education counters by pointing to the organizational chart showing three of the high school officers, Dean of Boys, Dean of Girls and Director of Guidance, on the same level of authority, with no person designated as vice-principal. And it urges that designation as such is demanded by the rule in order to avoid any question as to occupancy of the status necessary to qualify for a school administrator's post. Moreover, says the Board, appellant was never 'properly certificated' as a principal while functioning as Dean of Boys, and possession of the certificate cannot be brushed aside as a mere formality by one who has received a statement of eligibility to acquire it. Our attention is called also to the fact that under Rule 23, which was then controlling, the statement operated to extend the right to obtain the certificate on payment of the fee for a period of four years after issuance. And we note that the document sent to Masiello and dated April 20, 1944 says:

'This statement of eligibility is valid until April 20, 1948.'

However, we have concluded that it is not necessary to pass upon these two issues because in our judgment another ground exists which is clearly dispositive of the case.

If we were to adopt the view that service as Dean of Boys was the same as that of vice-principal and that failure to procure the supervisor's certificate was a mere formal irregularity, Masiello would still come face to face with the mandate that an applicant must have Three years of experience as vice-principal while 'properly certificated as a principal' in order to qualify as administrator. As has been shown, the statement of eligibility for the supervisor's certificate was issued on April 20, 1944, and he resigned as Dean of Boys on September 11, 1946, 2 years, 4 months and 23 days later.

To meet this insurmountable barrier, reference is made to the fact that Masiello commenced to function as Dean of Boys on March 25, 1942, more than two years prior to his notification of eligibility as supervisor. And it is argued that a portion of the period prior to April 20, 1944 should be tacked to his service after that date to make up the required three years. The Board of Examiners held that the time element of the rule could not be satisfied in that manner.

Masiello charges that this holding illegally discriminates against him because in previous situations similar to his the rules have been liberally interpreted in order to accomplish the end he is seeking here. In support of his position he refers to seven cases of alleged relaxation or waiver.

In the field of administrative law generally the doctrine of Stare decisis has not had the same forceful impact as it has had in the common law. Davis, Administrative Law (1951), p. 550. The attribute of flexibility which is a salutary incident of the administrative process, as well as the acute understanding that similarity of problem is not identity, have made for an unusually gradual development of a doctrine of customary administrative law. However, subject to the basic notion that experience is a teacher and not a jailer, Shawmut Ass'n v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 146 F.2d 791, 796--797 (1 Cir., 1945), a realization has grown over the years that constancy of decision is desirable. So interpretative and adjudicative determinations have been acquiring more decided precedential force both within the agencies and in the courts. Parker, Administrative Law (1952), pp. 250--253; Davis, supra, p. 561. In the important area of public education during these days of urgent need of qualified teachers, the agency charged with administration of the school laws ought to be and undoubtedly is sensitive to the significance of precedent. We assume that an awareness exists of the desirability of equal treatment of like circumstances applicants for the various qualifying certificates, and that change of, or departure from, previous rulings will not take place unless they are brought about by general policy considerations or unless the need therefor becomes manifest through experience. Consequently, when a serious, as opposed to a frivolous, allegation of discrimination is made, just disposition of the claim would seem to require some specific distinguishment of the case by an informed agent of one of the boards at some time during the operation of the 'comprehensive system of internal appeals' spoken of in Laba v. Board of Education of Newark, 23 N.J. 364, 382, 129 A.2d 273 (1957). The records of the cases being in the agency, such treatment is an important, if not an essential, aid to ultimate judicial review.

One who charges discrimination in the application of allegedly precedential decisions must bear the burden of establishing it, and on the record presented here, we cannot say that the onus has been sustained. The Commissioner of Education in his written opinion on appeal from the Board of Examiners did not discuss and distinguish each earlier instance relied upon by Masiello. However, he recorded the fact that he had reviewed the cases and had found that they did not warrant a conclusion of discrimination. Abstracts of them agreed upon by counsel have been furnished to us. Our study does not persuade us that they demonstrate the establishment...