Masimo Corp. v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp.
Decision Date | 31 March 2014 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 09–80–LPS–MPT, Civil Action No. 11–742–LPS–MPT |
Citation | 62 F.Supp.3d 368 |
Parties | Masimo Corporation, Plaintiff. v. Philips Electronic North America Corporation and Philips Medizin Systeme Böblingen GMBH, Defendants. Masimo Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Philips Electronic North America Corporation and Philips Medizin Systeme Böblingen GMBH, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Julia Heaney, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL, LLP, Wilmington, DE, Joseph R. Re, Jon W. Gurka, Karen Weil, Perry D. Oldham, and Steve Jensen, KNOBBE, MARTENS, OLSON & BEAR, LLP, Irvine, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
David E. Moore, POTTER, ANDERSON & CORROON, LLP, Wilmington, DE, Brian A. Rosenthal, Alan M. Grimaldi, Brian K. Andrea, MAYER BROWN, LLP, Washington, D.C., Steven Yovits, MAYER BROWN, LLP, Chicago, IL, Attorneys for Defendants.
PUBLIC VERSION RELEASED ON APRIL 7, 2014
I. INTRODUCTION
In this patent infringement action, Plaintiff. Masimo Corporation (“Masimo” or “Plaintiff”), asserts that Defendants, Philips Electronic North American Corporation and Philips Medizin Systeme Böblingen GMBH (collectively “Philips” or “Defendants”), infringe four patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 6.263,222 (the “ '222 patent”) ; 5,632,272 (the “ '272 patent”) ; 7,215,984 (the “ '984 patent”) ; and 6,699,194 (the “ '194 patent”). Philips contends, among other things, that it does not infringe Masimo's patents and, further, that these patents are invalid. In addition, Philips asserts that Masimo infringes three of Philips' patents: 5,448,991 (the “ '991 patent”) ; U.S. Patent Nos. 6,122.535 (the “ '535 patent”) ; and 6.725,074 (the “ '074 patent”). In turn, Masimo asserts both non-infringement and invalidity of the Philips patents.1
When this case was assigned to the now-retired Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr., it was referred to the Honorable Mary Pat Thynge, Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge. (D.I. 61) After the case was later reassigned to the undersigned District Judge, the referral was maintained. (See also C.A. No. 11–742–LPS–MPT D.I. 22 (referring 11–742 matter to MPT))2 Judge Thynge has done a tremendous amount of work in these matters, including conducting two Markman hearings (D.I. 210, 750) and handling numerous discovery disputes (see, e.g., D.I. 63, 326).
More particularly. Judge Thynge issued three Reports and Recommendations (“Reports”) addressing the now-pending nineteen (19) motions filed by the parties. Specifically, Judge Thynge:
Both parties filed objections to various aspects of the Reports. (See D.I. 672, 674, 696, 697, 716, 717, 726, 727, 733, 734, 744, 745, 751, 752, 755, 756) The Court heard oral argument on the objections on December 2, 2013. (D.I. 774) (“Tr.”)
II. OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Before turning to the objections filed by the parties, the Court takes the opportunity to make some comments about how it views objections to Reports and Recommendations filed by Magistrate Judges.
The parties appear to dispute whether there is a requirement that they must first object to every issue decided by the Magistrate Judge in order to preserve their right to appeal issues to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Philips, citing Third Circuit law, contends that a failure to object to a Magistrate Judge's recommendation does not result in a waiver of the right to appeal that recommendation in the Court of Appeals. (See D.I. 672 at 1 n.2) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878–79 (3d Cir.1987) )4 Masimo, however, takes the position that “Philips has not preserved any rights for appeal as to objections not specifically discussed.” (D.I. 726 at 1 n.1)
The circumstances in which this question arises in the instant case are complicated by the fact that any appeal would be to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”), raising the threshold issue of whether the Federal Circuit would apply its own law or Third Circuit law to assess waiver.5 However, for present purposes, it seems that the correct conclusion is that appellate rights in the Court of Appeals are not waived by a failure to object to a Magistrate Judge's decision, because either Third Circuit law applies—in which case Henderson governs—or Federal Circuit law applies, and the Court has been pointed to no authority indicating that the Federal Circuit has adopted a requirement of such objection.6
The failure to object may result in waiver of the right to further review of the recommendation or determination in the District Court by a District Judge. See Henderson, 812 F.2d at 878–79 (3d Cir.1987) () (emphasis added). But nothing in the caselaw, statutes, or Rules of Civil Procedure that this Court has reviewed supports the proposition that appellate rights in the Court of Appeals are waived absent a timely objection to a Magistrate Judge's decision being filed in the District Court. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has refrained from deciding whether 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) of the Federal Magistrates Act “mandates a waiver of appellate review absent objections.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). The Court added that “a court of appeals may adopt a rule conditioning appeal, when taken from a district court judgment that adopts a magistrate's recommendation, upon the filing of objections with the district court identifying those issues on which further review is desired.” Id. at 155, 106 S.Ct. 466. The Court is unaware of either the Third Circuit or the Federal Circuit adopting such a requirement.
In the Court's view, while the only issues on appeal in the District Court are those that are specifically and adequately addressed in the objections, all issues that were litigated before the Magistrate Judge remain potentially available to raise on appeal in the Federal Circuit.
Philips has objected to every issue Magistrate Judge Thynge decided against Philips in the course of addressing the nineteen pending motions. (See D.I. 672 at 1–2; D.I. 716 at 1–2; D.I. 733 at 1–2) However, Philips has studiously avoided actually briefing all such objections. Indeed, in many cases Philips has failed even to identify the issue on which it is objecting, and has failed entirely to explain on what basis it is objecting.
This type of generalized objection is entirely unhelpful to a District Judge attempting to determine where further judicial attention is required to enable a case to progress, especially given that “[t]he district judge in the case must consider timely objections.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (emphasis added). Philips' approach is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provisions relating to objections, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) ( )(emphasis added), as well as the Federal Magistrates Act. see § 636(b)(1)(C) () (emphasis added). Finally, Philips' tactic overlooks the clear requirements of this Court's Standing Order for Objections Filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (“Standing Order”) (October 9, 2013), which states in relevant part that written objections to findings of fact and recommendations by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to § 636(b)(1)(B) “shall specify the portions of the findings and recommendations to which objection is made and the basis for each objection, and shall be supported by legal authority.” Standing Order ¶ 4 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶ 3 () (emphasis added).7
Accordingly, Philips' generalized objections are insufficient to preserve Philips' right to further review by the District Court of the Magistrate Judge's recommendations and decisions. See Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6 (3d Cir.1984) () (emphasis added); Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1998) ().8 “[P]roviding a complete de novo determination where only a general objection to the report is offered would undermine the efficiency the magistrate system was meant to contribute to the judicial process.” Goney, 749 F.2d at 7 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d...
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