MASINGILL v. State of Ark., LR-C-82-450.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. LR-C-82-450.,LR-C-82-450.
• Parties: Robyn MASINGILL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ARKANSAS, Steve Clark, Attorney General; Tom Tatum, Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles Eddy, Circuit Judge, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

541 F. Supp. 714

Robyn MASINGILL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ARKANSAS, Steve Clark, Attorney General; Tom Tatum, Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles Eddy, Circuit Judge, Defendants.

No. LR-C-82-450.

United States District Court, E. D. Arkansas, W. D.

June 23, 1982.

Tom Donovan, Dardanelle, Ark., for plaintiff.

ORDER

ROY, District Judge.

At a trial in the Circuit Court of Conway County, Arkansas, on December 14, 1981, the plaintiff was found guilty by a jury of a misdemeanor but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on two felony charges and a mistrial was declared by defendant, Charles Eddy, Circuit Judge. The retrial of the two felony counts is scheduled for June 28, 1982. The plaintiff has filed this action asking this Court to enjoin the defendants from re-trying him until the transcript of his first trial has been prepared and made available to him for a reasonable time and until the Arkansas appellate courts have rendered decisions on various allegations of errors committed during his first trial. He alleges potential violations of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and that he will be irreparably harmed if this Court does not issue a Temporary Restraining Order.

Because of the very short time remaining before his retrial and because the legal principles on this subject are quite clear, neither a hearing nor a written response from the defendants is necessary for a determination of this matter.

This Court is extremely reluctant to impose its authority upon a state court judge and prosecuting attorney who are attempting to perform their duties by trying a person charged with criminal violations of Arkansas law. Before this Court would ever consider such an imposition the plaintiff would have to show not only that he would suffer irreparable harm, but also that such harm would be both great and immediate.

Plaintiff's mere assertion that he is to be tried and may be convicted in a manner that would violate rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution is not sufficient to justify the extreme remedy which he requests. The United States Supreme Court has prevented federal courts from intervening in state criminal proceedings to suppress the use of evidence even when it was claimed to have been obtained in violation of the defendant's rights. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971).

The Supreme Court has also refused to invoke federal jurisdiction where a state criminal defendant sought injunctive relief alleging that he had been illegally coerced to testify before a grand jury by the prosecutor and members of the New Jersey Supreme Court and it was, therefore, impossible for him to receive a fair trial in that state's courts. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975).

The clearest exposition of the abstention doctrine which is controlling in this case was enunciated by the Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d...