Maske v. US, 99-CO-692.

Decision Date21 November 2001
Docket NumberNo. 99-CO-692.,99-CO-692.
Citation785 A.2d 687
PartiesJoseph Michael MASKE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Francis T. Lacey, Rockville, appointed by the court, was on the brief for appellant.

Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and John R. Fisher, Frederick W. Yette, and Christopher S. Rhee, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Before TERRY, Associate Judge, and BELSON1 and NEBEKER, Senior Judges.

TERRY, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal from an order denying a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. We find no error in either the plea proceeding itself or the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea, and accordingly we affirm the trial court's order.

I

Appellant was charged in an eighteen-count indictment with conspiracy to commit robbery, armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, first-degree felony murder while armed (two counts), first-degree premeditated murder while armed (two counts), kidnapping while armed, assault with intent to kill while armed, assault with a dangerous weapon, and related weapons offenses. A few weeks after the indictment was returned, the government filed a notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without parole ("life papers"). See D.C.Code § 22-2404(a) (1996).

A. The Plea Hearing

On the morning of the scheduled trial date, just before the trial was about to begin, the parties notified the court that they had reached a plea agreement. Defense counsel told the court that appellant had agreed to plead guilty to three counts: first-degree felony murder while armed, based on the kidnapping and fatal shooting of Arnita Turner; second-degree murder while armed, for the fatal shooting and stabbing of Carl Johnson; and assault with a dangerous weapon, based on the shooting of Juanita Turner. The government in return agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to withdraw its previously-filed life papers.

The trial judge then undertook a thorough inquiry pursuant to Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, the judge explained to appellant:

This is going to take us a fair amount of time. I am going to ask you a lot of questions. Depending on how you answer the questions, that will determine whether I accept your plea or not, but I need to be sure that you understand exactly what you are doing, you understand the consequences of what you are doing, and you are making your decision to do it freely and voluntarily, not because of pressure from [the prosecutor] or [defense counsel] or anybody, least of all me.

To this end the judge instructed appellant to tell him "if there is anything you do not understand...."

The judge began the Rule 11 inquiry by confirming that appellant was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The judge also clarified that defense counsel had explained to appellant his reasons for having filed a notice of intention to raise an insanity defense, see D.C.Code § 24-301(j) (1996), and later withdrawing the notice. The discussion continued:

THE COURT: ... Have you ever suffered from mental illness that affected your ability to think clearly?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: And are you thinking clearly today?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

The judge then explained to appellant that by pleading guilty to the three counts, he would be waiving his constitutional right to a trial and all the rights that a trial provides.

Having clarified the potential sentence for the counts covered by the plea agreement, the judge went on to ensure that appellant had not been improperly induced to plead guilty, and that he had received the assistance of competent legal counsel in making his decision:

THE COURT: ... I asked you whether anybody ... had made you any promises of any kind that had caused you to plead guilty, in other words, influenced your decision to plead guilty, other than the promises that we have already talked about, that are specifically included in the plea agreement? ...
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: ... Has anyone threatened you or forced you or put on any pressure on you to plead guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir....
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty voluntarily and of your own free will?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: What do you mean when you say that? ...
THE DEFENDANT: I am saying I am guilty of the charges I am accused of.
THE COURT: And who made the decision... to plead guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Me.
THE COURT: All right. Are you satisfied with ... your lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Completely?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Have you had enough time talk to him about your case and about your decision to plead guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You sure?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

The judge then made a final effort to establish that appellant understood the consequences of entering a guilty plea:

THE COURT: You know why I am asking you all these questions?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Why do you think?
THE DEFENDANT: In case I want to withdraw my plea.
THE COURT: That's part of it. That's right.
I can't even accept your plea in the first place unless I am satisfied that you understand everything there is to know about your decision to plead guilty, that you are entering your plea knowingly and voluntarily, with a full understanding of what the consequences are. That's the main reason.
But the second reason is ... [that] once I accept your plea, you can't have it back. If I accept your plea because I am satisfied that we have been over all of this properly, then if you don't like the sentence I give you, or if you for some other reason write me and say I want my plea back, my lawyer didn't explain something to me, or I didn't have enough time, or any reason, I am going to say, wait a minute, Mr. Maske. We talked about all that on October the [7th]. And I may even play the tape for you, or let you read it from today, and therefore I am not going to grant your motion.
So I want you to be sure as I go through it today that this is the decision you are prepared to make.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

Following this admonition, the judge directed the government to make a proffer of the evidence underlying the three counts covered by the plea agreement. The judge told appellant to "listen carefully," because he would have an opportunity to "make any additions or changes or corrections" to the government's summary of the evidence.

B. The Government's Proffer

On November 20, 1995, Carl Johnson and Arnita Turner, who were romantically involved with each other, picked up Juanita Turner, Arnita's twin sister and appellant's girl friend, and drove to meet appellant. Shortly before this meeting, appellant had been with a group of people, including his cousin, Aaron Crowder, and another man named Joseph Simms. At appellant's request, Mr. Simms gave him a gun so that he could rob Mr. Johnson.

When appellant met Johnson and the Turner sisters a short while later, appellant walked with Johnson through an apartment building to a deserted area. There he shot Mr. Johnson twice and stabbed him seven times in the neck, then returned to the car where Juanita and Arnita Turner were waiting. Arnita Turner, after asking where Johnson was, tried to run away, but appellant instructed Simms and Crowder to put her back in the car. As they did so, appellant shot Arnita in the leg.

Crowder then drove the car to a deserted playground, where appellant fatally shot Arnita Turner in the head. After Simms and Crowder got out of the car, appellant proceeded to shoot Juanita Turner, wounding her in the arm and the jaw. Appellant then removed jewelry from the bodies of the sisters while Juanita feigned death.

Appellant left the car and caught up with Simms and Crowder. Appellant placed the gun against Mr. Simms' head and pulled the trigger, but when the gun failed to fire, the men fought and then went their separate ways. Later that day appellant fled to New Jersey.

The government was prepared to present testimony from three eyewitnesses, each of whom identified appellant as the shooter: Simms, Crowder, and Juanita Turner, who had survived her injuries. The government also had ballistic test results which showed that the bullets found in Juanita Turner's jaw matched those recovered from Carl Johnson's head.

C. The Guilty Plea

Appellant's only stated concern regarding the government's proffer was that it minimized Simms' and Crowder's roles in the series of events. Nevertheless, the judge proceeded to confirm the proffer with appellant:

THE COURT: Did you on November 20, 1995, force Arnita Turner and Juanita Turner into a car at gunpoint?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: When you did that, had you already shot and killed Carl Johnson?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Did you shoot and kill Carl Johnson?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Who did?
THE DEFENDANT: (A pause) I shot him.
THE COURT: Why did you say no?
THE DEFENDANT: I shot him.
THE COURT: You will have to answer my other question. I don't want there to be any question about it.
Why did you tell me no?
THE DEFENDANT: (A pause)
THE COURT: When you told me no, was that true?
THE DEFENDANT: I shot him, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, then, let me ask you in chronological order. On November 20, 1995, did you shoot and kill Carl Johnson?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: In the manner described by the prosecutor?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

Appellant pleaded guilty to the three charges, and the judge found that there was a factual basis for the plea.

D. Appellant's Motion to Withdraw His Plea

At the sentencing hearing two months later, appellant told the court that he had not murdered Carl Johnson. The court stopped the hearing, then appointed new counsel and directed him to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. He did so, and the government filed an opposition. Appellant himself also sent the court a letter claiming...

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