Mason County Bd. of Educ. v. State Superintendent of Schools

Decision Date05 April 1977
Docket NumberNo. 13673,13673
Citation160 W.Va. 348,234 S.E.2d 321
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesMASON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION v. STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS, Daniel B. Taylor.

Syllabus by the Court

A county board of education does have standing to obtain judicial review in the circuit court by a writ of certiorari of an order of the State Superintendent of Schools requiring the reinstatement of an employee dismissed by the county board of education.

Davis & Nesius, K. Paul Davis, John J. Nesius, So. Charleston, Donald C. Kingery, Point Pleasant, for Mason County Bd. of Education.

Charles H. Damron, Point Pleasant, for Bright McCausland.

William A. Toussaint, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for Daniel B. Taylor.

MILLER, Justice:

This appeal, from the refusal of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County to issue a writ of certiorari, involves the question of whether a county board of education has standing in certiorari to obtain judicial review of an adverse decision of the State Superintendent of Schools. We hold that it does.

The Circuit Court was of the opinion that the Mason County Board of Education lacked standing, since it had originally acted in a quasi-judicial capacity when it dismissed a school principal under the provisions of W.Va.Code, 18A-2-8.

The facts are not in dispute. On September 1, 1972, the Board dismissed one of its school principals. The decision was not unanimous and the principal exercised his statutory right of appeal to the State Superintendent of Schools. W.Va.Code, 18A-2-8. The State Superintendent, after making the Board a party to the proceeding, reviewed the record made at the hearing before the Board, and on April 4, 1974, issued a ruling ordering the reinstatement of the principal with back pay. It is from this order that the Board petitioned the Circuit Court for a writ of certiorari.

While the facts of this case have certain indicia of the usual appeal from an adverse ruling of an administrative agency, several features make this decision sui generis. First, in enacting the Administrative Procedure Act, W.Va.Code, 29A-1-1, et seq., the Legislature expressly exempted the State Board of Education from its purview, except as to the filing of its rules with the Secretary of State. W.Va.Code, 29A-1-2. The State Superintendent of Schools, appointed by the State Board of Education and serving as its chief executive officer, W.Va.Code, 18-3-3, is not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, nor is a county board of education, not being a State agency. W.Va.Code, 29A-1-1(a). Consequently, the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are not controlling.

Second, we recognize the general rule that in the absence of statutory authority, an administrative officer or agency is not entitled to judicial review of an adverse ruling made within the administrative appellate process of the agency. 1 2 Cooper, State Administrative Law 548; Davis, Standing of a Public Official to Challenge Agency Decisions: A Unique Problem of State Administrative Law, 16 Ad.L.Rev. 163 (1964); Annot. 117 A.L.R. 216 (1938).

There is a quality of reasonableness in this general rule, since we can assume that the final decision of an administrative tribunal reflects that particular agency's policy. To permit it to be attacked in the courts by its own personnel, in the absence of an express legislative authorization, would open the door to competing and antagonistic policies. 2

Third, the Legislature has not prescribed a comprehensive administrative procedure in dismissal or suspension of school personnel. The only applicable provision, W.Va.Code, 18A-2-8, grants to a dismissed or suspended employee the right of appeal to the State Superintendent of Schools when the county board's decision is by a divided vote. There is no further statutory outline as to how this appeal will be processed, either in the Article dealing with school personnel, W.Va.Code, 18A-2, or in the Article dealing with the State Superintendent of Schools, W.Va.Code, 18-3.

Because of the absence of statutory guidelines, this Court has fashioned procedures for the review of quasi-judicial administrative actions involving school boards, through the use of the writ of certiorari. In Beverlin v. Board of Education of Lewis County, W.Va., 216 S.E.2d 554 (1975), we held that a teacher could apply directly for certiorari after dismissal by a county board of education and, upon a review, the court could determine if the board had acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 3

We have also held that where a county superintendent appeals his dismissal by a county board of education to the State Superintendent, the board is to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Smith v. Siders, 155 W.Va. 193, 183 S.E.2d 433 (1971).

Smith suggests that a board of education does have standing as an interested party on an appeal to the State Superintendent, although there is no discussion of this point in the opinion. The fact remains that a mandatory right to be heard was given to a board of education on an appeal to the State Superintendent by a dismissed employee.

We recognize that considerable authority is vested in a county board of education to operate its public schools. W.Va.Code, 18-5-1, et seq. A county board of education, an elective body, is directly answerable to the citizens. It has a mandatory duty to enter into written contracts with its teachers. W.Va.Code, 18A-2-2. These contracts constitute valuable property rights to the employees which, if severed improperly, can subject the board to monetary claims. Beverlin, supra; Robinson v. Board of Education, District of Cabin Creek, 70 W.Va. 66, 73 S.E. 337 (1911).

A county board of education, being a party to contracts of employment with its school personnel and entitled to be heard on appeal before the State Superintendent, should have the right to judicial review of an adverse ruling. This is the same right we have accorded employees of a county board. To hold otherwise is to give an unfair advantage to one party to the contract. One of the essential elements of a...

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