Mason County Civil Research Council v. Mason County

• Decision Date: 03 October 1955
• Docket Number: No. 18,18
• Citation: 343 Mich. 313,72 N.W.2d 292
• Parties: MASON COUNTY CIVIC RESEARCH COUNCIL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MASON and City of Scottville, Michigan, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 292

72 N.W.2d 292

343 Mich. 313

MASON COUNTY CIVIC RESEARCH COUNCIL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MASON and City of Scottville, Michigan, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 18.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 3, 1955.

Eugene Christman, Ludington, for plaintiff-appellant.

Vernon, Keiser, Ludington, and Hathaway, Latimer, Clink & Robb, Muskegon (H. Winston Hathaway, Muskegon, of counsel), for defendants and appellees.

Before the Entire Bench.

CARR, Chief Justice.

The facts in this case appear from a stipulation into which the parties have entered, exhibits that have been returned to this Court, and admitted or uncontroverted averments in the pleadings. In 1942 defendant county purchased, for use as a county infirmary, a parcel of land in the city of Ludington on which was located a residence referred to as the Gray home. The building was remodeled to adapt it for use and has since been devoted to the purposes for which it was acquired. At the same time that the Mason county site for the infirmary was purchased, land comprising the present poor farm was obtained and is now being used for that purpose.

Under date of September 20, 1952, the board of supervisors of Mason county adopted a resolution for submission to the electors of the question as to whether the sum of $165,000 should be raised by a bond issue to construct and equip a new infirmary. Said resolution referred to the building then in use as inadequate, but contained no suggestion that the site was open to objection. The resolution was silent insofar as a change in location of the infirmary was concerned. It appears from the record in the case that the electors authorized the issuance of the bonds for the purpose indicated. Thereafter the defendant City of Scottville offered to convey to the county as a site for the infirmary a parcel of land in that municipality. Said parcel was a portion of a larger tract previously conveyed to Scottville for use as a public park and for athletic purposes. The board of supervisors of the county voted to accept the offer. Thereupon the plaintiff, a voluntary association composed of electors and taxpayers, brought suit to enjoin the removal of the infirmary from Ludington to the proposed new site. A hearing before the trial court resulted in a decree adverse to the claims of plaintiff, and it has appealed to this Court.

The principal question in the case has reference to the power of the board of supervisors to take the contemplated action in view of the facts involved as disclosed by the record before us. Counsel for defendants in their brief state the question as follows:

'Does the Mason County Board of Supervisors have the authority to determine to erect a county infirmary at a new location under the facts of this case, the County already maintaining an infirmary in the former Gray Home?'

The question presented is one of statutory construction. As an administrative body the board of supervisors has no inherent powers. The present State Constitution, article 8, § 7, in providing for the establishing of said board, declares that it shall have 'such powers as shall be prescribed by law.' A like provision was contained in the Constitution of 1850, article 10, § 6.

The general law providing for the support of poor persons ¹ declares in chapter 2, § 6, C.L.1948, § 402.6, Stat.Ann.1950 Rev. § 16.147, that:

'The board of supervisors of any county in this state in which a county infirmary is not already erected, may, at any annual or special meeting thereof, determine to erect such a house for the reception of the poor of their county; and upon filing such determination with the clerk of the county, they may direct the superintendents of the poor of such county to purchase I or more tracts of land, not exceeding 320 acres, and to erect thereon 1 or more suitable buildings for the purpose aforesaid: * * *.'

It will be noted that the authority conferred on the board of supervisors by the above provision is limited to counties 'in which a county infirmary is not already erected.' It is clearly implied that the legislature had in mind that it was granting administrative authority rather than powers of local legislative character. It is consistent with the the provisions of C.L.1948, § 46.11, Stat.Ann.1953 Cum.Supp. § 5.331, which, insofar as material here, reads as follows:

'The said several boards of supervisors shall have power and they are hereby authorized at any meeting thereof lawfully held:

'First, To purchase for the use of the county any real estate necessary for the erection of buildings for the support of the poor of such county, and for a farm to be used in connection therewith;

'Second, To purchase any real estate necessary for the site of any court house, jail, clerk's office or any other county building in such county;

'Third, To fix upon and determine the site of any such building, if not previously located'.

It may be noted that this section was amended by P.A.1955, No. 108, which was given immediate effect and approved June 3, 1955, by adding thereto an eighteenth subdivision. Said amendment is not pertinent to any issue in this case.

It is urged that the limitation expressed in the third subdivision, above quoted, should be construed as applicable only to the buildings mentioned in the second subdivision to the exclusion of those referred to in the first. However, if the legislature had so intended we think express reference would have been made to indicate such intent, or the second and third subdivisions would have been combined. Applying general principles of statutory construction, it is a fair conclusion that the legislature had in mind the buildings previously mentioned in the section, and hence to grant power to the board of supervisors to fix the site of the county infirmary and of the other buildings named if not previously located. Such interpretation is consistent with the statutory provision first above quoted, C.L.1948, § 402.6, Stat.Ann.1950 Rev. § 16.147. The specific provision in the general law relating to the care of poor persons clearly indicates the legislative intent, and the statute defining the powers of the board of supervisors indicates a like purpose to restrict the administrative authority granted, as a matter of public policy, with reference not only to infirmaries but other public buildings as well.

The principle has been repeatedly recognized that an express grant of power to administrative officers, boards or commissions, is subject to a strict interpretation. Mechem, Public Offices and Officers, § 511. In accord with such principle, it is said in 67 C.J.S., Officers, § 107, p. 378, that:

'The power and authority to be exercised by boards or commissions must be conferred by clear and unmistakable language, since a doubtful power does not exist.'

Of like import is the decision of this Court in Township of Lake v. Millar, 257 Mich. 135, 241 N.W. 237, 240, in which it was held that the defendant drain commissioner had undertaken to act without jurisdiction.

In reaching such conclusion, it was said:

'The extent of the authority of the people's public agents is measured by the statute from which they derive their authority, not by their own acts and assumption of authority.'

On behalf of defendants attention is directed to the fact that the provision of the law relative to the care of indigent persons above quoted, C.L.1948, § 402.6, Stat.Ann.1950 Rev. § 16.147, limits the authority of the board of supervisors to instances 'in which a county infirmary is not already erected'. Emphasis is placed on the use of the word 'erected,' it being urged in effect that the term necessarily imports the construction of a building for use as a county infirmary. The argument carries with it the assumption that a remodeling of an existing structure may not be regarded as within the scope of the provision. In other words, it is claimed that remodeling is not the equivalent of erecting, building, or constructing. While the contrary view is not unsupported by authority, we think it unnecessary to discuss this angle of the situation.

The question before us relates to the intent of the legislature in the enactment of the statutes here involved. The word 'erected' may in a proper context be construed to mean built or constructed. Having in mind the purpose of the legislature in the enactment of the statutes above quoted, we think it obvious that such restricted meaning was not intended. A fairer construction is that the legislature deemed it proper to withhold from the board of supervisors the power to change the site of a county infirmary in an instance where such infirmary has been previously established. In the case at bar there is no question but that the County of Mason, pursuant to action of its board of supervisors, did in 1942 establish the convalescent home or infirmary at a definite location in the city of Ludington. It purchased as site and remodeled the building thereon to adapt it for the contemplated use. That use has continued to the present time. On the same date a farm was acquired to be used in connection with the infirmary, the precise location of said farm not appearing in this record or in the exhibits returned here.

If 'erected' means 'established' the situation presented here is subject to the restrictive clause of the statute. In determining the legislative intent it must be borne in mind that the mere erection or construction of a building is not sufficient to furnish a county with an infirmary. Such structure must be properly equipped for the purposes for which it is designed. Facilities must be supplied to the end that inmates in such institutions may receive proper care. In 1942 the defendant county did more than to provide a building for the infirmary. It equipped that building and established it as the type of institution authorized by statute.

That the word 'erected' may be construed as 'established' is recognized by leading...