Mason v. Apfel, Civil Action No. 97-30134-MAP.
| Decision Date | 10 April 1998 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 97-30134-MAP. |
| Citation | 2 F.Supp.2d 142 |
| Parties | Norma MASON, Plaintiff, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Terrence A. Low, Rosen, Greenhut, Catugno & Low, Springfield, MA, for Plaintiff.
Ariane D. Vuono, U.S. Attorney's Office, Springfield, MA, for Defendant.
Upon de novo review this Report and Recommendation is hereby adopted and the case is remanded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(9), sentence four. So ordered.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER (Docket No. 7) AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER (Docket No. 6)
March 9, 1998.
This matter is before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), which provides for judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") regarding an individual's entitlement to disability benefits. Norma Mason ("Plaintiff") is seeking Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that the Commissioner's decision denying her benefits is not supported by substantial evidence and has moved to reverse the decision. The Commissioner has moved for an order affirming the decision. The parties' motions have been referred to the court for a report and recommendation pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules for United States Magistrates in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, the court recommends that the case be remanded for further review by the Commissioner.
Plaintiff was born on April 4, 1956. She is a high school graduate and a licensed cosmetologist. (Administrative Record ("A.R.") at 47.) After acquiring her cosmetology license, Plaintiff worked mainly as an institutional cook and cook supervisor. (A.R. at 17, 47.)
On August 26, 1991, while employed as a cook, Plaintiff suffered a back injury and was treated at the emergency room of Mercy Hospital. (A.R. at 46, 262-66.) Following that treatment, Plaintiff received physical therapy from September to December of 1991. (A.R. at 267-84.) Although the therapy provided some relief, Plaintiff still complained of having severe pain in her back and foot. As a result, she began treatment with Dr. Jay Krompinger, an orthopedic surgeon, on November 9, 1992. (A.R. at 267-97.) Dr. Krompinger prescribed a back brace to relieve Plaintiff's pain. When Plaintiff continued to complain of severe pain, Dr. Krompinger recommended surgery to correct what he diagnosed as lumbar degenerative disc disease. (A.R. at 287, 290-91, 302.)
On March 8, 1993, Plaintiff underwent surgery, resulting in a spinal fusion. (A.R. at 302.) In his post-operative report of May 21, 1993, Dr. Krompinger found that Plaintiff was no longer experiencing pain in her back and leg but complained of pain in her foot. Overall, however, Dr. Krompinger was pleased with Plaintiff's progress and scheduled her for physical therapy. (A.R. at 292.) During several follow-up visits, Dr. Krompinger noted that the pain in Plaintiff's back and leg had not reappeared. The only pain Plaintiff complained of was in her foot. (A.R. at 292-97.) Pleased with Plaintiff's success, Dr. Krompinger scheduled surgery for the removal of the hardware he installed during the spinal fusion. (A.R. at 296.)
The hardware was surgically removed on May 9, 1994. In his post-operative report, Dr. Krompinger noted his pleasure with Plaintiff's progress, but was unable to determine the source of the continued pain in her foot. (A.R. at 297.) Accordingly, Dr. Krompinger referred Plaintiff to Dr. Steven Schutzer, an orthopedic surgeon. (A.R. at 297.) Dr. Schutzer examined Plaintiff on October 18, 1994, and diagnosed her as suffering from piriformis syndrome. He reported that Plaintiff was experiencing pain in her left buttocks that radiated down to her foot and recommended another surgery. (A.R. at 298.) Refusing to undergo further surgery, Plaintiff commenced acupuncture treatments for her pain. (A.R. at 76, 334.)
Plaintiff also began counseling with Gerald Moreau, a counselor at Longview Associates. Her counseling sessions ran from February 1, to April 14, 1995. Moreau noted that Plaintiff complained of both pain and depression and concluded that she was in need of more intensive counseling. In April of 1995, Moreau referred Plaintiff to Shanti Shapiro, a licensed social worker, (A.R. at 360), who treated her on a weekly basis from April of 1995 to March of 1996. In a later report, Shapiro noted that Plaintiff had no prior history of psychiatric treatment, but that she often cried during sessions and voiced suicidal thoughts. (A.R. at 361-374.)
In January of 1996, Shapiro referred Plaintiff to Dr. Kenneth Jaffe for a psychiatric evaluation. Dr. Jaffe examined Plaintiff on behalf of the Massachusetts Department of Industrial Accidents as an impartial medical examiner. (AR.97.) After describing Plaintiff's tragic family history, Dr. Jaffe diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from major depressive and generalized anxiety disorders and opined that she was disabled. (A.R. at 325-328.) He also reported that Plaintiff's depression was related to the pain she was experiencing, the triggering event being her back injury in August of 1991. (A.R. at 327.) Dr. Jaffe concluded that Plaintiff had not reached a medical end result with respect to her emotional impairment and advised that she undergo anti-depressant and anxiety therapy. (A.R. at 328.)
On November 5, 1992, Plaintiff filed the first of three applications for SSDI. (A.R. at 146.) Plaintiff alleged that she became disabled and unable to work as of August 26, 1991, due to the back injury suffered at work. On December 11, 1992, the Commissioner denied Plaintiff's first application, finding that she could perform sedentary work with restrictions on lifting. The Commissioner concluded that, although Plaintiff could not return to her previous job as a cook, there was other work in the national economy she could perform. (A.R. at 133-37.) Plaintiff did not appeal that determination.
On October 22, 1993, Plaintiff again applied for SSDI, making the same claim as in her previous application. (A.R. at 169-80.) The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's application on January 12, 1994, setting forth the same reasons as in his previous denial. (A.R. at 164-68.) Plaintiff's February 15, 1994 request for reconsideration was denied on March 23, 1994. (A.R. at 150-63.) On June 7, 1994, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge, but the request was dismissed as untimely on June 22, 1994. (A.R. at 181-184.)1
On August 19, 1994, Plaintiff filed her third application for SSDI. (A.R. at 186-89.) As with her previous applications, Plaintiff alleged that she became disabled due to degenerative disc disease and unable to work since her accident on August 26, 1991. (A.R. at 186-188.) This application was denied on October 20, 1994, for the same reasons as the two previous denials. (A.R. at 190-205.) On November 29, 1994, Plaintiff retained counsel and on December 15, 1994, filed an application for reconsideration. (A.R. at 206.) Again the Commissioner concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled and, on February 3, 1995, denied her request for reconsideration. (A.R.208-219.)
On February 17, 1995, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. (A.R. at 220, 223-252.) A hearing was conducted before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") John F. Aronson on March 6 and June 4, 1995, and included testimony from the Plaintiff, a vocational expert, David Soja, and Dr. Jaffe. (A.R. at 26-132.)
On June 7, 1995, the ALJ issued his findings. He first determined that Plaintiff had not presented good cause to reopen any of her prior applications. The practical effect of that determination was to limit the ALJ's period of review from March 23, 1994, when Plaintiff's request for reconsideration of her second application was denied, to December 31, 1994, the date that Plaintiff's insured status for purposes of SSDI eligibility expired. (A.R. at 13.) After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled during this period and denied her claim. (A.R. at 13-21.)
Plaintiff requested a review of the ALJ's decision by the Commissioner's Appeals Council. (A.R. at 5.) On May 22, 1996, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request, thereby making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff then filed her complaint in this court.
A court may not disturb the Commissioner's decision if it is grounded in substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir.1981). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as "more than a mere scintilla." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). Thus, even if the administrative record could support multiple conclusions, a court must uphold the decision of the Commissioner if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support his conclusion. Irlanda Ortiz v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Rodriguez, 647 F.2d at 222). Accordingly, a court must affirm the decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the record could arguably justify a different result....
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