Mason v. Arctic Cat, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-11390 |
| Parties | ROBERT MASON, Plaintiff, v. ARCTIC CAT, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington
This dispute arises out of the termination of Plaintiff Robert Mason's employment relationship with Defendant Arctic Cat. About a month before Plaintiff turned forty, Defendant terminated the relationship. Defendant asserts that it did so because Plaintiff repeatedly used a company credit card for personal expenses while reporting them as business expenses. Plaintiff disagrees, and so brought suit in state court alleging that: (1) Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment because of his age, violating Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 37.2101-.2804; and (2) Defendant breached its agreement to pay Plaintiff's commissions for sales completed before his employment was terminated, entitling him to treble damages, attorney fees, and court costs pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2961. Based on diversity of citizenship, Defendant removed the case to this Court.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment. ECF No. 8. First, Defendant asserts that it is entitled to judgment on the age discrimination claim because Plaintiff does not establish that he is a member of a protected class or that Defendant's proffered reason for ending the employment relationship was mere pretext for intentional discrimination. Next, Defendantasserts that it is entitled to judgment on the breach of the contract claim because, pursuant to a restrictive covenant Defendant promulgated, Plaintiff forfeited his right to the commissions by working for a competitor.
Defendant is entitled to judgment on the age discrimination claim. Plaintiff offers no evidence that Defendant's proffered reason for ending the employment relationship was pretextual. In contrast, genuine issues of fact exist as to whether Defendant's proffered restrictive covenant formed part of Plaintiff's employment contract. Neither of the two versions that Defendant proffers were unequivocally approved by Defendant itself — the "approved by" line is blank. Moreover, Defendant offers no direct evidence that it provided Plaintiff notice of the policy. And Plaintiff denies that he was notified of the policy. Additionally, even if the restrictive covenant formed part of Plaintiff's employment contract, an issue of fact exists as to whether the company that Plaintiff went to work for is a competitor of Defendant.
Accordingly, Defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Under the brand name "Arctic Cat," Defendant produces and markets snowmobiles and all-terrain vehicles, as well as related parts, garments, and accessories. Based in Thief River Falls, Minnesota, Defendant sells its products to a network of independent dealers in the United States and Canada, as well as to international distributors.
Plaintiff, a Michigan resident, was a part of Defendant's sales force for twenty years. Plaintiff began working for Defendant as a sales representative in 1988. He was nineteen. Ten years later, Defendant transformed its sales force of independent contractors to employees, whowere given the title of "district sales managers." Plaintiff's territory included twenty-six independent Arctic Cat dealerships in Michigan.
Formerly, sales representatives had reported to the national sales manager. As employees, district sales managers reported to new "regional sales managers." They also received employee handbooks, signing acknowledgements that provided "I understand and agree that my employment with Arctic Cat Inc. is 'at will,' meaning that it is not for any definite period of time and that either I or Arctic Cat Inc. may terminate our employment relationship at any time for any legal reason." Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 4, ECF No. 8 ("Def.'s Mot."). Plaintiff signed this acknowledgement in 1998. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 4.
Sometime later (the record is unclear on precisely when1 ), Defendant gave Plaintiff a company credit card issued by Wells Fargo Bank. Plaintiff signed a "Cardholder User Agreement" that provided in pertinent part:
Def.'s Mot. Ex. 10. Defendant also announced a "corporate expense" policy that provided in pertinent part:
In 2006, Plaintiff fell behind in submitting his monthly expense report reviews. On October 8, 2006, Ms. Olson emailed him about the issue. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. 13. Following up four days later, she wrote:
On 9/8/06 I emailed you reminding you that the last report I have from you is June 24 and asked that you get your expenses current. As of this date I have not received any reports. At this time you have over $7000 in outstanding credit card charges . . . . As in the past, if your reports are not current and received at my desk by October 27, your card will be put on hold . . . . If this pattern continues you will loose [sic] the privilege of having a corporate card.
Id. Although Plaintiff appears to have then brought his reports current, a short time later he again fell behind. In February 2007, Ms. Olson wrote to Plaintiff and his supervisor, Michael Killian:
FYI - I have not received [Plaintiff's] expenses from 9/9[06] thru current, and have not received any correspondence from [Plaintiff] regarding the status of his reports. I will be shutting off the card at noon tomorrow (Friday, February 23) if the reports are not on my desk by that time. I have given him sufficient warnings.
Def.'s Mot. Ex. 14.
In October 2007, Ms. Olson again took issue with Plaintiff's expense report reviews, this time because he was not including credit card receipts for his purchases. When Ms. Olsonrequested the receipts directly from the merchants, she found "questionable charges." Olson Aff. ¶ 10, attached as Def.'s Mot. Ex. 11. Documenting inconsistencies between Plaintiff's charges and his reports, she later created a spreadsheet of the questionable transactions. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. 22.
In October 2007, for example, Plaintiff used his company credit card to purchase $113 in goods from the Tractor Supply Company. The purchase included $54 in shoes for his son and daughter. Plaintiff recorded it simply as a business expense for "bales for halloween ride w club." Def.'s Mot. Ex. 18; see also Pl.'s Dep. 99:6-25, June 20, 2011 ( ), attached as Def.'s Mot. Ex. 3.
In November 2007, Plaintiff used the company card to purchase $425 goods from New Century Signs, including decals for his son's snowmobile, again recording the charge simply as a business expense (as "signage for open house and Christmas mini promo"). Def.'s Mot. Ex. 20; see also Pl.'s Dep. 102:6-104:12 ( ).
The following month, Plaintiff used the company card to make a $210 purchase from St. Helen Power Sports. The purchase included $125 in snowmobile trail permits, $85 in boots for his son and daughter. He recorded it simply as a business expense for "trail permits for demos." Def.'s Mot. Ex. 21; see also Pl.'s Dep. 100:20-101:25 ( ).
In the fall of 2007, Mr. Killian left Defendant's employment. Derek Jordahl became Plaintiff's new supervisor. Unlike Mr. Killian, who had been a district sales manager before being promoted to regional sales manager, Mr. Jordahl was new to the company when he was hired as regional sales manager.
In early 2008, Mr. Jordahl accompanied Plaintiff on a series of customer visits. The trip did not go well. See Pl.'s Dep. 54:24-25, 55:8-9 ( ). The ride home did not go well either. Driving back, Plaintiff recalls, Mr. Jordahl remarked "you've been around a long time and maybe you should move on." Pl.'s Dep. 53:6-7. A few months later, Plaintiff would be forced to do just that. In the interval, Defendant alleges, it promulgated its restrictive covenant.
In February 2008, Defe...
To continue reading
Request your trial