Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc.

Decision Date13 January 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-6035.,03-6035.
Citation357 F.3d 1114
PartiesDiane M. MASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AVAYA COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Kindanne C. Jones, Eddy & Jones, P.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Sandy L. Schovanec (William S. Price with her on the brief), Phillips, McFall, McCaffrey, McVay & Murrah, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

Diane Mason sued her former employer Avaya Communications, Inc. (Avaya) alleging Avaya violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. Specifically, Mason alleged Avaya failed to accommodate her post traumatic stress disorder by, among other ways, refusing to allow her to work from home. Instead, Avaya terminated Mason because she would not return to work. The district court granted Avaya's motion for summary judgment holding Mason was not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA because (1) Mason's physical attendance in the workplace was an essential function of her job, and (2) Mason's request for an at-home accommodation was unreasonable. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8). Mason appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir.2003). Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106, 1108 (10th Cir.1999). Applying this standard, we affirm.

I.

The following facts are either undisputed or portrayed in the light most favorable to Mason. In 1986, Mason worked as a mail carrier for the United States Post Office in Edmond, Oklahoma. On August 20, 1986, Mason witnessed the murder of several of her then co-employees in the "Edmond Post Office massacre." After witnessing the event, Mason sought counseling. A doctor diagnosed Mason with post traumatic stress disorder. Mason ultimately sought employment elsewhere because working for the postal service aggravated the symptoms of her disorder.

Avaya is a global corporation specializing in communications systems, applications, and services. In January 1998, Avaya hired Mason as a "service coordinator." All of Avaya's service coordinators work at field service administration centers (administration centers) located in Arizona, Colorado, New Jersey, and Oklahoma. Mason was employed as a service coordinator in Avaya's Oklahoma City administration center. Mason's job as a service coordinator required her to schedule service appointments for technicians working in the field. If an Avaya customer encountered a problem with its communications network, the customer would contact an Avaya customer care center; an Avaya employee in the customer care center would prepare a "repair ticket" and enter it into Avaya's computer system; in turn, a service coordinator, such as Mason, would monitor the current days queue of repair tickets and assign them through the computer system to a technician in the field; the field technician would then address the customer's complaint. Mason's job required her to communicate with the various technicians by computer, telephone, and fax. From January 1998 until March 2000, Mason worked for Avaya without incident. Her performance was satisfactory.

On March 21, 2000, a co-employee of Mason, Kevin Lunsford, pulled out a knife during a verbal confrontation with another Avaya employee at the Oklahoma City administration center (Lunsford incident). Mason did not witness the Lunsford incident, but learned of it through her co-employees. After the incident, Avaya suspended Lunsford for a week. While Lunsford was suspended, Mason learned from her co-employees that Lunsford had previously threatened to "go postal," retained a cache of weapons, and compiled a "hit list." The incident upset Mason, but she continued to work so long as Lunsford was not in the administration center. On March 27, 2000, however, Avaya informed its service coordinators that Lunsford would return to work the following day. Avaya explained it had conducted a fitness-for-duty examination on Lunsford and concluded that he could safely return to the workforce.

Upon learning of Lunsford's return, Mason "sickened." The next day, Mason called in sick because she was physically and emotionally unable to work with Lunsford at the administration center. Mason's doctors confirmed she was suffering from post traumatic stress disorder and was unable to work in an environment she perceived as unsafe. As a result, Avaya placed Mason on short-term disability. Mason related that she could not work in the same building as Lunsford; however, Mason felt she could return to work in Lunsford's absence.

On June 1, 2000, Mason requested Avaya accommodate her disorder by (1) relocating Lunsford, (2) allowing Mason to work at another Avaya facility in Oklahoma City, or (3) allowing her to work out of her home. As a result of Mason's request for an accommodation, Avaya conducted a further investigation into the Lunsford incident. After its second investigation, Avaya concluded that relocating Lunsford was not an option and Mason could not perform the service coordinator position from her home because physical attendance at the administration center was a function of a service coordinator's job. Avaya suggested Mason should utilize its transfer program to determine the availability of other service coordinator positions.

Mason contacted someone in Avaya's transfer program and learned the only service coordinator position available in Oklahoma City was at the administration center where she and Lunsford worked. Mason did not inquire into the availability of service coordinator positions in other states because she did not want to leave Oklahoma. Mason never returned to work for Avaya and remained on short-term disability for a year. Avaya denied Mason's application for long term disability benefits. In April 2001, Avaya administratively discharged Mason because she was unable to return to the workforce. Mason subsequently filed a charge of disability discrimination with the EEOC, which concluded that reasonable cause existed to believe Avaya violated the ADA.

In March 2002, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Avaya alleging Avaya violated the ADA by failing to accommodate her disability and terminating her on the basis of her disability. The district court properly analyzed Mason's ADA claim. The court first concluded the essential functions of Mason's job required her to be physically present at Avaya's administration center. Therefore, the court reasoned that because Mason refused to work in Avaya's administration center during Lunsford's employ, she required an accommodation to perform the essential functions of her position. In analyzing Mason's requested accommodations, the court first rejected Mason's contention that the ADA required Avaya to reassign, relocate, or terminate Lunsford in order to accommodate her disability. Next, the court concluded Mason's request to work at home was unreasonable because she failed to present any evidence she could perform the essential functions of her position from home. As a result, the district court entered judgment for Avaya because Mason failed to prove she was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA.

II.

The ADA prohibits discrimination against "a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination under the ADA includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an ... employee[.]" Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, an employee must show: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired; and (3) she was discriminated against because of her disability. Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1188. Avaya concedes Mason is disabled under the ADA. Thus, we proceed directly to the question of whether Mason is qualified within the meaning of the ADA. Under the second element of the ADA's prima facie case, we employ a two-part analysis to determine whether an individual is qualified:

First, the court determines whether the individual can perform the essential functions of the job.... Second, if (but only if) the court concludes that the individual is unable to perform the essential functions of the job, the court determines whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable h[er] to perform those functions.

Id. at 1190 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining "qualified individual with a disability").

On appeal, Mason maintains her disability precludes her from working at Avaya's Oklahoma City administration center while Lunsford is an employee at the center. Mason contends, however, she could perform all the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation. Mason has not challenged the district court's conclusion that her request to "relocate" Lunsford was unreasonable. See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (explaining an accommodation that adversely affects other employees is not required under the ADA). Additionally, Mason has not presented any evidence that Avaya currently has a vacant position in Oklahoma City to which she could transfer. Mason has not challenged the district court's conclusion that her request to transfer only within Oklahoma City was unreasonable. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174-75 (10th Cir.1999) ...

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