Mason v. City of Warren Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 21 October 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10-CV-14182,10-CV-14182
• Parties: ANTHONY LAMART MASON and KRYSTAL LEE MASON, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF WARREN POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE CHIEF OF POLICE, individually and in his official capacity, DETECTIVE WILLIAM ASHCROFT, individually and in his official capacity, DETECTIVE SEAN JOHNSTON, individually and in his official capacity, OFFICER SHAWN JOHNSON, individually and in his official capacity, OFFICER BANKOWSKI, individually and in his official capacity, and OFFICER MASSERANG, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

ANTHONY LAMART MASON and KRYSTAL LEE MASON, Plaintiffs,

v. THE CITY OF WARREN POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE CHIEF OF POLICE,individually and in his official capacity, DETECTIVE WILLIAM ASHCROFT,individually and in his official capacity, DETECTIVE SEAN JOHNSTON,individually and in his official capacity, OFFICER SHAWN JOHNSON,individually and in his official capacity, OFFICER BANKOWSKI,individually and in his official capacity, and OFFICER MASSERANG,individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.

No. 10-CV-14182

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Date: October 21, 2011

Hon. Gerald E. Rosen

OPINION AND ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Anthony Mason and Krystal Mason ("Plaintiffs") commenced this action in Macomb County Circuit Court on August 17, 2010, alleging a series of constitutional violations against Defendants--including unlawful arrest (Count I), unreasonable search (Count II), unjust taking (Count III), and negligent failure to train (Count IV)--arising out of a confrontation between Mr. Mason and Defendants on January 16, 2010. Counts I-III are alleged against Defendants collectively; Count IV is against the City of Warren Police Department and its Chief of Police alone. Plaintiffs assert their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for dismissal or summary judgment as to each of Plaintiffs' claims. Having reviewed the parties' briefs, their supporting documents, and the record as a whole, the Court finds that the pertinent facts and legal contentions are sufficiently presented in these materials and that oral argument would not assist in the resolution of this matter. Accordingly, the Court will decide the motion "on the briefs." See Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2). The Court's opinion and order is set forth below.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On January 16, 2010, Anthony Mason, a former cab driver, agreed to two personal transport requests from women he knew. Mr. Mason provided transportation using a car belonging to his wife, Krystal Mason, and did so with her consent. The first passenger, Tammy Goforth, requested a ride from her sister's house to her own home. That trip ended without incident. The second fare, Malvina Johnson, asked for a ride to "work" at a motel located in Warren, Michigan. Unbeknownst to Mr. Mason or Ms. Johnson, the Warren Police Department was in the midst of a prostitution sting at that motel.¹

Detective Johnston and Officer Johnson, who were conducting surveillance on the target motel, observed Mr. Mason arriving at the motel, dropping off Ms. Johnson, and subsequently leaving. They followed him in an unmarked police car and requested by radio that a marked patrol car conduct a traffic stop. Mr. Mason, having already stopped at a nearby store, was on his phone in the parking lot when Detective Johnston and Officer Johnson, joined by Officers Bankowski and Masserang, approached the car and asked Mr. Mason to step out of the vehicle. Mr. Mason complied and told the officers that he had just dropped a friend off at the motel.

Soon thereafter, the police arrested Mr. Mason for possession of a controlled substance on the basis of a prescription pill bottle that was located in the car Mr. Mason was driving. Theprescription was in Ms. Goforth's name, and the bottle contained seventeen morphine pills, a controlled substance. Defendants claim to have observed the pill bottle, along with a pink purse and multiple cell phones, from outside the vehicle. Plaintiffs argue that the pill bottle was only found after a warrantless search of the car's interior. The police took Mr. Mason into custody and seized the automobile. The charge against Mr. Mason was eventually dropped when Ms. Goforth testified to accidentally leaving her pills in the car Mr. Mason was driving.

Plaintiffs filed this complaint in Macomb County Circuit Court on August 17, 2010, alleging a series of constitutional violations against a number of parties. Every count alleged against an individual Defendant is pled against that person in both individual and official capacities. Defendants removed the case to federal court on October 19, 2010. Plaintiffs stipulated to the dismissal of four defendants on April 11, 2011.² The remaining Defendants filed this motion on April 29, 2011, requesting either dismissal or summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs' claims against them.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants' motion requires a degree of clarification at the outset because it uses "dismissal" and "summary judgment" almost interchangeably, despite acknowledging that the two dispositive vehicles rely on markedly different standards. For instance, the heading to Part I of Defendants' brief states "The City of Warren Police Department, the Chief of Police and Detective William Ashcroft are entitled to summary judgment." (Brief in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 7.) That section then begins by arguing that "Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a claim upon which relief may be granted," an invocation of the standard governing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), rather than a motion for summary judgment. (Brief in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 7.) The Court, then, must sort through the arguments raised in Defendants' brief, determining whichsections should be treated as seeking dismissal and which should be treated as seeking summary judgment.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 when the motion relies upon materials outside of the pleadings. Himes v. United States, 645 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the Court will treat those portions of Defendants' motion that rely on the pleadings alone as seeking dismissal and those sections that rely on collateral material as seeking summary judgment.

A. Applicable Legal Standards

1. Dismissal for failure to state a claim

Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the Court to dismiss a complaint if it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and accept all well-pled factual allegations as true. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). To withstand a motion to dismiss, however, a complaint "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The factual allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

2. Summary judgment

Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.56(a).³ The Court also has the authority to grant summary judgment on grounds not raised by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(2). "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the [Court] of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

In deciding a motion brought under Rule 56, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 2006). Yet, "[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact" then the Court may "consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

B. Plaintiffs' Claims Against the Warren Police Department

Plaintiffs have included the Warren Police Department among the parties alleged to have committed constitutional violations under § 1983. However, under Michigan law, municipal police departments are considered agents of the municipality rather than independent entities capable of being sued. Haverstick Enterprises, Inc. v. Fin. Fed. Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 992 n.1 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming judgment in favor of Romulus Police Department on all counts because policedepartment is "a creature of the municipality") (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 92.1). As such, the Warren Police Department cannot be a Defendant in this case. Since they cannot be a party to this case, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the Warren Police Department. Therefore, dismissal of all claims against the Warren Police Department is appropriate. See id.; McCree v. City of Detroit, No. 10-14478, 2011 WL 3897957, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 10, 2011); Jeffrey v. Royal Oak Police Dept., No. 10-10463, 2011 WL 3849417, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 27, 2011); Laise v. City of Utica, 970 F. Supp. 605, 608 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Pierzynowski v. Detroit Police Dept., 941 F. Supp. 633, 637 n.4 ...