Mason v. Freeman Nat. Printing Equipment Co., Ltd.

• Decision Date: 04 August 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76-1407,76-1407
• Citation: 9 Ill.Dec. 504,51 Ill.App.3d 581,366 N.E.2d 1015
• Parties: , 9 Ill.Dec. 504 Robert MASON d/b/a Ideal Printing Co., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREEMAN NATIONAL PRINTING EQUIPMENT CO., LTD., an Illinois Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1015

366 N.E.2d 1015

51 Ill.App.3d 581, 9 Ill.Dec. 504

Robert MASON d/b/a Ideal Printing Co., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREEMAN NATIONAL PRINTING EQUIPMENT CO., LTD., an Illinois Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 76-1407.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Aug. 4, 1977.

L. D. McCurrie, Oak Lawn, for defendant-appellant.

James J. Riebandt, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

ROMITI, Justice.

An ex parte judgment was entered in the trial court against the defendant although only an employee of the defendant's registered agent for service was served. The defendant appeals from a refusal by the trial court to vacate the judgment for want of jurisdiction. We find that the judgment was void, that the defendant did not waive the defect by its attempt to have the judgment vacated, and that the trial court was required to vacate the judgment.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and vacate the ex parte judgment.

The plaintiff in this action filed suit against the defendant, Freeman National Printing, on March 7, 1975. The sheriff of Cook County was thereupon directed to serve process upon Arnold Abrams, the registered agent of the defendant. Instead the return reveals that service was made upon a Mrs. Ito who, the plaintiff concedes, was only an employee of Abrams. When the defendant, who apparently had received no notice of the suit, failed to file an appearance, an ex parte judgment was entered against the defendant on July 14, 1975 in the amount of $1,154.29. An execution of judgment was filed by the plaintiff on October 15, 1975. On December 9, the defendant filed a petition praying for the vacating of the judgment on the grounds there had been no proper service and asking for leave to file a limited appearance and to answer or otherwise plead within 28 days. This last request was dropped from its amended petition filed on February 2, 1976. The court denied the amended petition to vacate because it failed to comply with the requirements of section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110, par. 72), and ordered that execution should issue.

I.

It is axiomatic that one of the essentials of a valid judgment is that the court have jurisdiction to render it, and service of process on a defendant is a necessary and imperative element and prerequisite before the court can have jurisdiction to enter a judgment against him. (Stone & Adler, Inc. v. Cooper (1974), 20 Ill.App.3d 576, 315 N.E.2d 56; Chiarelli v. Mitchell (1976), 36 Ill.App.3d 287, 343 N.E.2d 563.) The Illinois Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110), designates in section 13.3 the proper procedure regarding personal service on private corporations. Pursuant to that section, a private corporation may be served by leaving a copy of the process with the corporation's registered agent or with an officer or agent of the corporation. Nowhere does the statute provide that service can be had on an employee of the registered agent. Nor does section 13.2 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act which provides for substituted service upon individual defendants apply to service upon corporations. Van Der Molen Disposal Co. v. Western Bearings Corp. (1970), 127 Ill.App.2d 33, 261 N.E.2d 759. ¹ While the provision relating to service should be liberally construed, we must bear in mind that the enumeration of one method presumptively excludes other modes or methods not expressly mentioned in the statute. (Van Der Molen Disposal Co. v. Western Bearings Corp. (1970), 127 Ill.App.2d 33, 261 N.E.2d 759.) The statute expressly provides for service upon an officer or agent of the corporation being sued. It does not provide for service on an employee or agent of an agent; therefore, we must conclude the legislature did not intend for such service to suffice. As stated by the court in Barnard v. Springfield and Northeastern Traction Co. (1916), 274 Ill. 148 at 151, 113 N.E. 89 at 90, in holding that service upon a ticket agent of a company selling tickets for the defendant was insufficient:

"To hold Sommerlad as an agent of appellee for the purpose of obtaining service on appellee under section 8 of the Practice Act requires an interpretation of the term 'agent' different from the ordinary meaning or interpretation given that word. An agent is a person employed by another to act for him. (Anderson's Law Dict. 42.) Sommerlad was not an agent of the appellee in any ordinary sense of that term. It did not employ nor pay him. It gave him no directions. It had no authority or control over him in his work and no power to discharge him. He owed no duty to transmit a copy of the summons to appellee, and the record discloses no practice or relation between him and appellee that would lead anyone to suppose that he was an agent for such purpose or any other purpose. For the purpose of service under said section of the statute such agent must be one actually appointed by the corporation and representing the corporation in some line of employment authorized by its charter, and not one created by implication or construction and contrary to the intention of the parties. (Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Weber, 219 Ill. 372, 76 N.E. 489; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., C.C., 29 F. 17.) It is not disputed that the St. Louis, Springfield and Peoria Railroad Company was the agent of appellee in the selling of tickets to passengers traveling over their joint lines. This court has heretofore held, however, that the legislature never designed that service of process upon an agent of an agent of a corporation should be sufficient service to bring the corporation into court and subject it to the court's jurisdiction. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Miller, 87 Ill. 45."

The defendant in its affidavit swore that neither Arnold Abrams nor his partner received any summons or complaint and that Mrs. Ito was not an agent to receive service of summons. No counter-affidavits were filed rebutting these allegations. Accordingly, the trial court should have taken the defendant's affidavit as true and quashed the purported return and vacated the default judgment. Harris v. American Legion John T. Shelton Post No. 838 (1973), 12 Ill.App.3d 235, 297 N.E.2d 795.

II.

The plaintiff on appeal apparently concedes that the defendant was never served. Instead, he apparently contends (A) that the motion being made more than 30 days after the judgment was entered, it was a section 72 motion and thus was properly denied since the defendant failed to allege diligence and the existence of a meritorious defense, and, (B) that the defendant by filing the petition waived any objection it had to the defective service and submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.

A

It is well established law in Illinois that a motion to vacate for want of proper service is not a petition under section 72 after valid service. (Harris v. American Legion John T. Shelton Post No. 838 (1973), 12 Ill.App.3d 235, 297 N.E.2d 795; City of Chicago v. Bah (1968), 101 Ill.App.2d 17, 241 N.E.2d 640, leave to appeal denied (abstract opinion); Mabion v. Olds (1967), 84 Ill.App.2d 291, 228 N.E.2d 188.) A void judgment can be set aside at any time (Stone & Adler, Inc. v. Cooper (1974), 20 Ill.App.3d 576, 315 N.E.2d 56; Chiaro v. Lemberis (1960), 28 Ill.App.2d 164, 171 N.E.2d 81; Lichter v. Scher (1954), 4 Ill.App.2d 37, 123 N.E.2d 161), and the defendant's delay in challenging the purported service of summons does not in any way support and affirm the service and return. Harris v. American Legion John T. Shelton Post No. 838 (1973), 12 Ill.App.3d 235, 297 N.E.2d 795.

Likewise, since section 72 by its express terms is not applicable to a motion to vacate a void judgment, the defendant is not required to plead that he had a meritorious defense.

B

The appellee's contention that the filing of the petition to vacate waived the defective service and created jurisdiction is also without merit. A motion to vacate is a proper method of raising the issue of want of jurisdiction. (Gleiser v. Gleiser (1949), 402 Ill. 343, 83 N.E.2d 693.) The defendant's amended petition clearly raised the issue of want of jurisdiction for lack of proper service and only raised that defense; the defendant asked only for leave to file its special and limited appearance, vacation of the ex parte judgment, the quashing of the purported service of summons and for any other relief the court might find meet and just. Nothing in this amended petition could be considered to recognize the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant or to submit the defendant to its jurisdiction. Quite the contrary.

It is true that the original petition was broader in scope. In that petition the defendant likewise alleged that service had never been made, but in addition alleged that it had a meritorious defense. Furthermore, besides praying for the vacating of the judgment and leave to file its...