Mason v. George

• Decision Date: 03 June 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:12–CV–159 WLS.
• Parties: Harold B. MASON, Plaintiff, v. Charles GEORGE, Kathy Batson, and Flint RiverQuarium, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

24 F.Supp.3d 1254

Harold B. MASON, Plaintiff

v.Charles GEORGE, Kathy Batson, and Flint RiverQuarium, Defendants.

Case No. 1:12–CV–159 WLS.

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Albany Division.

Signed June 3, 2014.

Harold B. Mason, Albany, GA, pro se.

C. Jason Willcox, Albany, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

W. LOUIS SANDS, District Judge.

Presently pending before the Court is Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 89). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 89) is GRANTED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the above-captioned matter on October 22, 2012, purportedly under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,¹ alleging race discrimination against Charles George and Kathy Batson, employees of the Flint RiverQuarium. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff's alleged in his initial complaint that his direct supervisor, Charles George, “falsif[ied] write ups [sic] ... to the detriment of future employment of [Plaintiff] with Kathy Batson agreeing with and permitting with the threat of being terminated.” (Id. ) Plaintiff alleged that George's actions present a prima facie case of discrimination and harassment on the basis of age, gender and race. (Doc. 1–2 at 5.) Plaintiff also alleged that he was subject to retaliation. (Id. at 9.) On April 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed an amendment to his original complaint that named Flint RiverQuarium as an additional defendant. (Doc. 32.) No additional substantive allegations were included in the amendment to Plaintiff's Complaint. (See id. ).

On December 19, 2013, Defendants moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Complaint. (Doc. 89.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Flint RiverQuarium (“FRQ”) as a part-time employee from November 8, 2010 until January 22, 2013. (Doc. 89–1 at 1.) Charles George was Plaintiff's direct supervisor in the Maintenance Department, and Kathy Batson was the Human Resources Director and Operations Manager for FRQ until November 2012. (Id. ) Per Defendants, FRQ properly terminated Plaintiff's employment on January 22, 2013, for insubordination and altercations with employees, both in violation of FRQ's policy. In their Motion, Defendants first contend that Defendants Batson and George are entitled to summary judgment because individuals are not subject to suit under Title VII, only employers. Therefore, Defendants contend that Defendant FRQ is the only proper defendant but that Plaintiff's discrimination claim fails against FRQ for the following reasons: 1) Plaintiff's claim should be limited to the two write-ups he alleged in his Charge of Discrimination filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); 2) Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because write-ups do not constitute adverse employment action and Plaintiff failed to establish that he was disciplined differently than another similarly situated employee. Defendant FRQ further alleges that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of harassment because the conduct complained of was not sufficiently severe or pervasive and Plaintiff failed to report the alleged harassment. Defendant indicates that even if Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discriminatory discipline, Plaintiff's workplace violations constitute legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions taken by Defendant FRQ. Per Defendant FRQ, Plaintiff has no evidence to demonstrate that these reasons are pretextual. To the extent Plaintiff tries to improperly allege a claim for retaliation, Defendant FRQ contends that this claim fails as well because Plaintiff was terminated for insubordination and altercations with FRQ employees.

On December 23, 2013, in accordance with the Court's procedures governing notice to pro se plaintiffs, the Court issued an order directing Plaintiff to file a response in opposition to Defendants' motion. (Doc. 91.) Plaintiff was noticed that he would be required to respond in opposition to Defendants' motion “with affirmative affidavits, depositions, documents[, and] rely with specificity upon evidence that is part of the record.” (Id. at 1–2.) Plaintiff was also reminded that Local Rule 56 requires that, where a summary-judgment movant has properly filed a statement of undisputed facts, the respondent to a motion for summary judgment is required to respond to each of the movant's numbered material facts. (Id. at 2 n. 1.) Finally, Plaintiff was noticed that “[i]f a party fails or refuses to file any materials in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, a FINAL judgment may be rendered against that party if otherwise appropriate under the law. In that event, there would be no trial or any further proceedings.” (Id. at 2.)

On January 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed his response in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 95.) He did not file a Responsive Statement of Facts or his own Statement of Disputed Facts. (See generally Docket.) He did, however, supplement his opposition brief with a number of exhibits. (Doc. 95–1.) In his Response, Plaintiff contends that: 1) he is a member of a protected group (African American and over the age of 40), 2) he was subject to unwelcome harassment based on his age and gender, 3) his age, gender, and race were contributing factors to his termination, and 4) his termination affected a term, condition, and or privilege of his employment. (Doc. 95 at 4.) As to the alleged harassment, Plaintiff alleges various instances of conduct he considers to be discriminatory. Plaintiff also contends that the filing of his complaint with the EEOC “escalated” the hostile work environment and “retaliation” from the staff and supervisors of FRQ. Thus, Plaintiff contends that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment.

On January 24, 2014, Defendant submitted its Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 96.) Therein, Defendants assert that Plaintiff abandoned all his claims by failing to contest the specific arguments made in Defendants' summary judgment motion. Defendants also contend that Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence to support his allegations of harassment.

The briefing for Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment has now concluded, and the Court finds that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for review.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if the quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability under the claim is raised. Allen v. Tyson Foods, 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997). A fact is “material” if it hinges on the substantive law at issue and it might affect the outcome of the nonmoving party's claim. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; see also Allen, 121 F.3d at 646. A judgment is appropriate “as a matter of law” when the nonmoving party has failed to meet its burden of persuading the Court on an essential element of the claim. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 804, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) ; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

The movant bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact or by showing or pointing out to the district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. See id. at 322–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant has met its burden, the nonmoving party is required “to go beyond the pleadings” and identify “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must do more than summarily deny the allegations or “show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all the evidence and all factual inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether that evidence could reasonably sustain a jury verdict. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Allen, 121 F.3d at 646. However, the Court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

B. Local Rule 56

Local Rule 56 requires the following from a respondent to a motion for summary judgment:

The respondent to a motion for summary judgment shall attach to the response a separate and concise statement of material facts, numbered separately, to which the respondent contends there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Response shall be made to each of the movant's numbered material facts. All material facts contained in the moving party's statement which are not specifically controverted by the respondent in respondent's statement shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate. M.D. Ga. R. 56.

Here, Defendants properly filed a summary judgment along with a statement of undisputed facts, as is required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court. (See Docs. 89, 89–2.) Plaintiff did not, however, file the required responsive statement of facts. Therefore, because Plaintiff...