Mason v. Lax

Decision Date22 April 2020
Docket Number3:20-CV-00039 (KAD)
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesALLEN KENNETH MASON, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER LAX, NORWICH POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant.

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER

Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge

On January 9, 2020, the pro se plaintiff, Allen Kenneth Mason, (the "Plaintiff") a pretrial detainee currently held at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center, filed this civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Lax of the Norwich Police Department and the Norwich Police Department. Compl. [ECF No. 1]. Mason alleges that Officer Lax violated rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution during his arrest on October 12, 2019.1 The Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Officer Lax and the Norwich Police Department. For the following reasons, the Court permits only the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Lax based on the search of his truck to proceed.

Standard of Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the court must review prisoner civil complaints against governmental actors and "dismiss . . . any portion of [a] complaint . . . [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . or [that] seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Although detailed allegations are not required, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint that includes only "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" or "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement," does not meet the facial plausibility standard. Id. (alterations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). Although courts still have an obligation to interpret "a pro se complaint liberally," the complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to meet the standard of facial plausibility. Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).

Factual Allegations

On October 12, 2019, the Plaintiff pulled into a parking lot with his truck after picking up his personal belongings from his boat. Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1. As he exited the truck, Officer Lax pulled up to him and asked whether he had been in downtown Norwich, Connecticut. Id. The Plaintiff, who had been moving belongings from his boat prior to this, indicated that he had notand was simply parking his truck. Id. Officer Lax responded, "You are the one who took my supervisor on a chase." Id. Plaintiff denied that but Officer Lax asked him for his registration and his license. Id. The Plaintiff provided him with his paperwork. Id. After Officer Lax noted that the paperwork was for an Audi Avant, the Plaintiff responded that he would be transferring his license plates and insurance to his new truck as soon as possible. Id. The Plaintiff then asked to use the bathroom, and Officer Lax responded, "No." Id. The Plaintiff tried to explain to Officer Lax that he had thirty days to transfer his license plates to the new vehicle. Id. at 4. He also explained that he had an "ILD," which the Court assumes is an ignition locking device, in his prior vehicle and that was planning to have one installed in his new truck. Id. at 4. The Plaintiff then asked to use the bathroom again, but Officer Lax refused his request. Id.

Officer Lax then started to look through the truck without the Plaintiff's consent. Id. The Plaintiff was then frisked before being placed under arrest. Id. When the Plaintiff asked why he was being arrested, Officer Lax responded, "Don't worry about it." Id. The Plaintiff stated that he had not done anything wrong, Officer Lax responded that the court would figure that out. Id. Before he was put into the cruiser, Plaintiff again asked for the opportunity to urinate. Id. Officer Lax again refused his request. Id. The Plaintiff was put into the cruiser and transported to the Norwich Police Department. Id.

Upon arrival at the police station, the Plaintiff asked again to use the bathroom, explaining that he had kidney cancer and bladder problems. Id. As they entered the station, the Plaintiff was holding his penis to prevent himself from urinating and he continued to ask to use the bathroom. Id. Officer Lax would not allow him to use the bathroom and, instead, saying that he wanted to fingerprint him. Id. When Officer Lax grabbed the Plaintiff's arm and he let go of his penis, thePlaintiff began to urinate on himself and on the floor. Id. Officer Lax noted this incident in his police report. Id.

Discussion

The Plaintiff claims that the search and seizure of his truck and license plate violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Plaintiff also alleges that Office Lax violated his rights under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment when he refused to allow him access to a bathroom to relieve himself.

The Search of the Plaintiff's Truck

Mason contends that the search of his truck violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment claim is based on a lack of probable cause to search the truck, while the Fourteenth Amendment claim is based on the fact that Mason did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the search.

As an initial matter, the Plaintiff cannot assert a claim based on the illegal search of his truck pursuant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment covers constitutional claims of search and seizure in connection with an arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (holding that all excessive force and illegal seizure claims "aris[ing] in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop" fall under the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures of the person, not the due process clause). "The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and public interests always has been thought to define the 'process that is due' for seizures of person or property in criminal cases." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975). Moreover, a plaintiff's procedural due process claim is considered duplicative if it is basedupon the same factual basis as his Fourth Amendment claim. Levantino v. Skala, 56 F. Supp. 3d 191, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim is dismissed as futile and duplicative of the Fourth Amendment claim.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("[W]hat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures." (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)). "As a general matter, '[t]he reasonableness of a search depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.'" United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368, 402 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310 (2015)). "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." United States v. Navas, 597 F.3d 492, 497 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357(1967)). Relevant to the Plaintiff's claim, a vehicle may be searched without a warrant in two circumstances. First, under the automobile exception, a law enforcement officer may search a vehicle without a warrant where the officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. United States v. Babilonia, 854 F.3d 163, 178 (2d Cir. 2017). Second, an arresting officer may search a vehicle incidental to a lawful arrest "when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346 (2009).

The Plaintiff alleges that his truck was searched without consent and without any cause, let alone probable cause. In addition, when the allegations in the complaint are liberally construed infavor of the Plaintiff, the Court cannot discern no basis to conclude that Officer Lax conducted the search incident to arrest. Accordingly, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient at this early stage of the proceeding to state a plausible Fourth Amendment violation based on the unlawful search of the Plaintiff's truck.2

The Seizure of the Plaintiff's Truck and License Plate

The Fourth Amendment also protects against unreasonable seizures of property. Soldal v. Cook Cty, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992). "A 'seizure' of property . . . occurs when 'there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.'" Id. at 61 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). "To determine whether a seizure is unreasonable, a court must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interest alleged...

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