Mason v. Mitchell
| Citation | 95 F.Supp.2d 744 |
| Decision Date | 09 May 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:99 CV 524.,1:99 CV 524. |
| Parties | Maurice A. MASON, Petitioner, v. Betty MITCHELL, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
David C. Stebbins, Columbus, Patricia A. Snyder, Cleveland, OH, for Maurice A. Mason, petitioners.
Stuart A. Cole, Office of Attorney General, Matthew J. Lampke, Office of Attorney General, Employment Law Section, Matthew C. Hellman, Office of Attorney General, Capital Crimes Section, Columbus, OH, for Betty Mitchell, Warden, respondents.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's motion for a writ of habeas corpus and corrected motion for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. Nos. 22 & 25); the State's motion to strike Petitioner's traverse (Doc. No. 67); and on Petitioner's motion for an evidentiary hearing (Doc. No. 70). For the following reasons, Petitioner's motion for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied. The State's motion to strike will be denied. Petitioner's motion for an evidentiary hearing will be denied.
In February, 1993, Petitioner Maurice Mason, an African-American man, was a resident of Marion, Ohio. Decedent Robin Dennis, a white woman, was a resident of Richwood, Ohio, and was acquainted with Mason. Dennis was last seen alive on February 8, 1993. On February 15, 1993, Dennis' body was found in an abandoned building in a rural area north of Marion, Ohio. The coroner determined that she had died several days earlier as a result of blunt force trauma causing multiple skull fractures. The probable weapon, a bloodstained board with protruding nails, was found twenty feet from Dennis' body.
Evidence that Dennis had been raped was also found at the scene. When Dennis' body was discovered, she was wearing only a bra; her jeans and panties were positioned around her ankles and lower leg. She had been strangled, and there were bruises on her head, face, and body. Inside and around Dennis' car, which was found near the murder site, forensic investigators discovered Nike tennis shoe impressions and type B blood, Dennis' blood type; the location of the tennis shoe marks and the blood were consistent with a struggle having taken place inside and around the car. Semen was found in Dennis' vagina and on her panties; DNA testing determined that the semen was Mason's.
Two witnesses saw a person fitting Mason's description walking in the area of the murder site between 4:10 and 4:15 p.m. on the day Dennis disappeared. Police found Mason's car keys on the front seat of Dennis' car. Type B blood was found on the side of a Nike1 tennis shoe Mason was wearing on February 12, 1993.
Petitioner Mason was charged with the rape and aggravated murder of Robin Dennis. The case was tried to a jury between May 31, and June 29, 1994. The jury convicted Mason and recommended imposition of the death penalty. On July 7, 1994, the trial court adopted the jury's recommendation that Mason be sentenced to death. The conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal.2 On July 15, 1999, Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging both his conviction and sentence. He raises the following twenty-five challenges to the proceedings in the trial court and on appeal:
1. Petitioner claims he was denied his right to investigative and expert assistance in preparing and presenting his defense because the trial court refused to authorize the expenditure of funds for experts in the areas of: soil analysis; shoe print analysis; blood analysis; DNA analysis; the reliability of eyewitness identification; homicide investigation; mass media; and mental health. He further argues that the Supreme Court of Ohio used a too-deferential standard in its review of the trial court's denial of Petitioner's requests for the aforementioned experts.
2. Petitioner raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of counsel's preparation of the motions for expert assistance; preparation of Petitioner's motions to suppress; the amount of time Petitioner's counsel spent preparing for the trial; the trial court's denial of Petitioner's request for a continuance; counsel's performance during the jury selection process; counsel's performance during the guilt/innocence phase of the case; counsel's failure to present mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of the case; lead counsel's absence from the courtroom during portions of the case; failure to object to an Allen charge; and failure properly to present a motion for a new trial. He also claims that his appellate counsel's performance was deficient because appellate counsel either (a) failed on appeal to present his complaints arising out of the trial, or (b) improperly defaulted such claims by failing to address them on appeal.
3. Petitioner claims that the State improperly failed to disclose Brady material.
4. Petitioner claims that the Ohio Supreme Court erred by deferring to the jury and trial court's determination that the death penalty was proper in this case.
5. Petitioner claims that the imposition of the death penalty was improper because the state was allowed to give the first and last arguments during the mitigation phase closing arguments.
6. Petitioner claims that the imposition of the death penalty by electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in all cases.
7. Petitioner claims that the imposition of the death penalty constitutes an unconstitutional violation of international law in all cases.
8. Petitioner claims that Ohio's statutory requirement that the defendant prove the existence of mitigating factors in the penalty phase is unconstitutional.
9. Petitioner claims that it was impossible for him to get a fair trial in the venue in which he was tried because of pretrial publicity.
10. Petitioner claims that his conviction and sentence were unconstitutional because his trial was infested with racial discrimination.
11. Petitioner claims that inculpatory statements he made to police officers were improperly introduced during trial in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
12. Petitioner claims that he was denied his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury because the trial court improperly limited counsel's investigation into jurors' attitudes about race; because the trial court inappropriately expressed his personal view on the death penalty; because the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the first phase of Petitioner's trial as the "guilt" phase; because counsel failed to question two jurors who were victims of domestic violence in detail about that issue; and because counsel failed to examine potential jurors about their feelings about the victim being pregnant at the time of her death.
13. Petitioner claims that he was denied his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury because the prosecution (a) successfully challenged for cause all potential jurors who stated that their beliefs about the death penalty would prevent them from fairly considering death as a penalty, and (b) used its peremptory challenges to remove three potential jurors who expressed scruples about the death penalty.
14. Petitioner claims that he was denied due process because of the admission into evidence of inflammatory color photographs of the murder victim. He claims that the prejudicial impact of those photographs outweighed their probative value.
15. Petitioner claims that the jury was provided with transcripts of statements Petitioner made to the police, and that those statement were transcribed in such a manner as to suggest racial stereotypes.
16. Petitioner claims that the trial court inappropriately prevented him from presenting evidence that the victim's husband had a history of violence in order to show that the murder had, in fact, been committed by the victim's husband.
17. Petitioner claims that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and that the trial court improperly failed to give a curative instruction.
18. Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it must determine that Petitioner was not guilty of the greater charge of aggravated murder before considering the lesser charge of murder brought against Petitioner.
19. Petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find all the elements of aggravated murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
20. Petitioner claims that the trial court's instructions at the penalty phase of the trial were improper.
21. Petitioner claims that he was denied his right to a trial free of racial bias because the only African-American venireperson was successfully challenged for cause after he stated that he could not vote for the death penalty, and because some of the jurors made racially derogatory remarks while they were sequestered and during deliberations.
22. Petitioner claims that the trial court gave an improper Allen charge during jury deliberations at the penalty phase of the trial.
23. Petitioner claims that imposition of the death penalty in this case is so disproportionate to the offense as to violate the Eighth Amendment.
24. Petitioner claims the trial court improperly rejected his allegations of juror misconduct—namely, racial bias by several jurors, sleeping by Juror Straub, and an improper investigation by Juror Downs.
25. Petitioner claims that Ohio's death penalty statute is facially unconstitutional.
Respondent filed her return of writ on September 2, 1999. Thereafter, Petitioner requested and was granted numerous extensions of time in which to file his traverse; the final such extension made Petitioner's traverse due on January 7, 2000.
Petitioner filed his traverse on January 18, 2000, without seeking leave for a further extension of time. Respondent has...
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