Mason v. Royal Dequindre, Inc.

Decision Date29 July 1997
Docket NumberNos. 16-17,103786,Docket Nos. 102755,s. 16-17
Citation455 Mich. 391,566 N.W.2d 199
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesSteven Craig MASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROYAL DEQUINDRE, INC., doing business as Royal Lanes, doing business as Dazzles, Defendant-Appellee, and Thomas Wayne Geoffrey, Defendant. Kenneth L. GOODMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony FORTNER, Defendant, and Driftwood, Inc., doing business as Bootleggers, Lansing, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar

Ferriby & Houston by Robert L. Ferriby, Jr., and Susan J. Zbikowski, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant Mason.

D. Dennis Dudley, P.C., Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee Goodman.

Kallas & Henk, P.C. by Ted M. Kozerski and Scott L. Feuer, Bloomfield Hills, for defendants.

Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. by Jeffrey C. Gerish, Detroit, amicus curiae, for Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc.

Opinion

MARILYN J. KELLY, Justice.

We granted leave to appeal in these consolidated premises liability cases to determine whether merchants have a common-law duty to protect their patrons from the criminal acts of third parties. We affirm the Court of Appeals decisions in both cases. Our holding is that merchants can be liable in tort for failing to take reasonable measures to protect their invitees from harm caused by the criminal acts of third parties. The harm must be foreseeable to an identifiable invitee and preventable by the exercise of reasonable care.

I

Mason v. Royal Dequindre, Inc.

Dan Kanka, Jim Fitzgerald, Brian Domier, and plaintiff went to a tractor pull at the Pontiac Silverdome on March 3, 1990. After leaving the Silverdome and stopping briefly at a bar, the men arrived at another bar, Dazzles. The bar is attached to a bowling lane. Both are owned by defendant Royal Dequindre, Inc.

After entering, the four men separated. While Kanka was having a drink, defendant Thomas Geoffrey and his cousin approached him and renewed an old argument. Kanka testified that Geoffrey threatened to kill him. Geoffrey grasped Kanka by the hair, wrenched his jacket over his head, and began beating him. Dazzles' employees pulled Geoffrey from Kanka and ejected him from the bar. They took Kanka to a locker room at the rear of the bar and instructed him to wait until Geoffrey left the premises so as to avoid more conflict.

When the fight between Kanka and Geoffrey began, plaintiff was in a different area of the bar and saw only the fight's end. Plaintiff testified that, after the passage of some time, he and the other three men decided to leave.

Plaintiff and Domier went to plaintiff's car. Plaintiff drove through the parking lot to the bar's back door. Kanka and Fitzgerald had told him that they would meet him shortly. They had agreed that plaintiff would wait by the car. When Kanka did not emerge from the bar, plaintiff went in to find him.

When plaintiff again left the bar, Geoffrey confronted him, demanding to know the whereabouts of Kanka. The two exchanged words. Geoffrey struck plaintiff, breaking his nose and jaw.

Plaintiff brought a dram shop and premises liability action against defendant Royal Dequindre. At the close of proofs, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict with respect to the dram shop claim. It denied the motion regarding the premises liability claim. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor for over $90,000. 1

The Court of Appeals reversed the verdict, holding that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the premises liability claim. It found two cases of this Court controlling: Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 429 Mich. 495, 418 N.W.2d 381 (1988), and Scott v. Harper Recreation, Inc., 444 Mich. 441, 506 N.W.2d 857 (1993).

Goodman v. Fortner

Plaintiff, his girlfriend, Theresa Woods, and their friends, Otis Glover, Rodney Tittle, Charles Woods, and Carlton Woods, went to defendant Bootleggers for "Soul Night." While they were at the bar, Joslynn Lewis came in. She was plaintiff's former girlfriend and mother of his child. A scuffle erupted between Theresa Woods and Lewis. According to plaintiff, Lewis threw her drink and then her glass in Woods' face. Plaintiff then escorted Lewis from the bar. The fight continued in the parking lot.

Plaintiff and Woods reentered the bar and took refuge in the coat room from Lewis and her friends. While there, plaintiff testified, he repeatedly asked the bouncers to help him or to call the police. Glover also asked the bouncers to call the police. Plaintiff then requested an escort to the fence at the rear of the bar. The bouncers refused all the requests. Plaintiff was told merely to "sit tight" and everything would be "all right in a minute."

While plaintiff and Theresa Woods were waiting, Shawna Lewis and Duquanna Lewis, Joslynn's relatives, went back into the bar and again attacked Woods. Shawna was escorted outside once more. Duquanna remained inside and was able to attack Woods yet again when plaintiff went to the restroom. Glover testified that the bouncers saw the fight, did nothing, and that plaintiff finally interceded when he returned from the restroom.

Tittle went outside to talk to Joslynn Lewis who was in the parking lot. Lewis threatened plaintiff, saying that he was going to die. Shawna announced that she would get help and reentered the bar. Tittle saw her approach defendant Fortner. He asked the bouncers why they did not call the police or end the fighting.

Plaintiff decided to walk with Theresa Woods to her home. A bouncer opened the door to let them outside. Plaintiff saw Joslynn Lewis and her friends in the parking lot. They began yelling at him. Glover testified that, though no bouncers were in the lot, bouncers standing at the door could undoubtedly hear the threats. As plaintiff turned to speak with Lewis and her friends, Fortner approached him and shot him in the chest. He was taken to the hospital and treated for the gunshot wound.

Plaintiff brought a premises liability action against defendant Bootleggers. At the close of plaintiff's proofs, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The jury awarded $50,000 in damages.

In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. The majority agreed that business invitors are not normally required to protect customers from the criminal acts of others. However, it ruled that merchants may have a duty to eject unruly patrons or summon the police when they know or should know of the presence of unruly patrons.

II

This Court is asked to review the trial courts' denials of defendants' motions for directed verdicts. When reviewing such a motion, this Court looks at the evidence and legitimate inferences drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 429 Mich. 540, 549, 418 N.W.2d 650 (1988).

III

As we have noted in the past, questions regarding duty are for the court to decide as a matter of law. Scott, supra at 448, 506 N.W.2d 857. The general rule is that a person does not have a duty to aid or protect another person endangered by a third person's conduct. Williams, supra at 498-499, 418 N.W.2d 381. An exception to the rule arises where there is a special relationship between a plaintiff and a defendant. Id. at 499, 418 N.W.2d 381. 2

The rationale behind imposing a duty to protect in these special relationships is based on control. In each situation one person entrusts himself to the control and protection of another, with a consequent loss of control to protect himself. The duty to protect is imposed upon the person in control because he is best able to provide a place of safety. [id.] Owners and occupiers of land have a special relationship to their invitees. Id. At the same time, merchants are not insurers of their safety. Consequently, merchants do not have a duty to protect their invitees from unreasonable risks that are unforeseeable. Id. at 500, 418 N.W.2d 381. This Court has imposed a requirement that, in order for a special-relationship duty to be imposed on a defendant, the invitee must be "readily identifiable as [being] foreseeably endangered." Murdock v. Higgins, 454 Mich. 46, 58, 559 N.W.2d 639 (1997); Marcelletti v. Bathani, 198 Mich.App. 655, 665, 500 N.W.2d 124 (1993). "Readily" is defined as "promptly; quickly; easily." The Random House College Dictionary (rev. ed.).

These principles are embodied in § 344 of 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, which provides the following:

A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to

(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or

(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it. [Id., pp. 223-224 (emphasis added).]

Comment f to § 344 states:

Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur. He may, however, know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual. If the place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a...

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