Mason v. State

• Decision Date: 07 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 14-02-00456-CR.,No. 14-02-00455-CR.,14-02-00455-CR.,14-02-00456-CR.
• Citation: 116 S.W.3d 248
• Parties: Shawn Thomas MASON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

116 S.W.3d 248

Shawn Thomas MASON, Appellant, v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 14-02-00455-CR.

No. 14-02-00456-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

August 7, 2003.

Emily Munoz-DeToTo, Mark Russell Yanis, Houston, for appellant.

William J. Delmore, III, Houston, for appellee.

Panel consists of Justices ANDERSON, SEYMORE and GUZMAN.

OPINION

JOHN S. ANDERSON, Justice.

Following a jury trial, appellantShawn Thomas Mason was convicted of two felonies: aggravated sexual assault of a child¹ and indecency with a child.²Asserting four points of error, appellant contends his convictions should be reversed.We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant, a 28-year-old male, and his wife lived together with complainant K.R., the wife's five-year-old daughter.In February, 2001, K.R. approached her mother and disclosed that appellant had made K.R. take baths with him, had touched K.R.'s "private areas," had shown K.R pornography on a computer, and had attempted to put his "private area" into K.R.

When appellant's wife confronted appellant, he denied everything and claimed K.R. was lying.Nevertheless, appellant's wife went to the police and reported the alleged abuse.As a result of the report, Captain Gay Dickerson of the Katy Police Department set up an interview and medical examination of K.R. Complainant's physical exam neither corroborated nor refuted K.R.'s story.

During her investigation, Dickerson took a written statement from K.R.'s mother and asked appellant to appear at the police station to give "his side of the story."Appellant agreed to do so, arriving the next morning with his father.

While appellant's father waited in a hallway, Dickerson and a fellow police officer, Detective Julius Belton, interviewed appellant in Dickerson's office.They read appellant his rights, asked appellant for a written statement, and tried to obtain a confession.Although appellant initially said K.R. was lying and denied complainant's claims, he later signed a written statement admitting he had exposed himself to K.R. and had sexual contact with her.

Appellant now denies his statement was voluntary.In his brief, he claims his confession was obtained through deception and physical force.First, appellant asserts Belton told him that he(Belton) was a pedophile and so understood how "being placed in that situation" could lead to improper sexual behavior.Next, appellant asserts Dickerson lied to him when she(1) told appellant his father could not be present during the interview, and (2) told appellant that complainant's physical examination showed "penetration" when in fact she knew this to be untrue.Finally, appellant asserts Dickerson and Belton told appellant that if he failed to cooperate with police, appellant would go to prison "for a long, long time," but if he cooperated with police, things would "go better" for him.Appellant also claims Belton pushed him against a wall.

The entire interview between police and appellant took approximately two hours and no attorney was present.Appellant's father claims that when Dickerson first approached him about interviewing his son, the father asked if appellant needed an attorney and Dickerson said "no."The father also claims that when he attempted to accompany his son into Dickerson's office for his meeting with police, Dickerson told him to wait outside because the case involved a juvenile and she could not disclose certain details in his presence.

Upon receipt of appellant's confession, the State charged appellant with two offenses: aggravated sexual assault with a child (cause number 872,251) and indecency with a child (cause number 872,252).Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress his written statement.The trial court held a suppression hearing outside the presence of the jury, at which only Dickerson and a notary public testified.The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress.

In a consolidated trial, a jury found appellant guilty of both offenses.It assessed punishment at thirty-five years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division(TDCJ-ID) in cause number 872,251, and at twenty years in the TDCJ-ID in cause number 872,252, with the sentences to run cumulatively.

This combined appeal arises from those convictions.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Asserting four points of error, appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error during voir dire by allowing the State to commit the jury panel to (1) convict appellant in the absence of DNA or medical evidence, (2) convict appellant in the absence of testimony by the child complainant, and (3) consider probation instead of acquittal by invoking hypothetical fact patterns.Additionally, he claims the trial court committed reversible error by (4) failing to suppress appellant's written confession because the statement was involuntary and obtained through trickery.

I. VOIR DIRE

In his first through third points of error, appellant asserts the trial court allowed the State to ask the venire three improper commitment questions.We disagree.

A.Standard of review

The trial judge may impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of voir dire examination.Boyd v. State,811 S.W.2d 105, 115(Tex.Crim.App.1991).Indeed, the trial court may limit voir dire when a question commits a venire member to a specific set of facts.Ford v. State,14 S.W.3d 382, 390(Tex.App.-Houston[14th Dist.]2000, no pet.).A trial judge may not, however, restrict proper questions that seek to discover a juror's views on relevant issues.McCarter v. State,837 S.W.2d 117, 121-22(Tex.Crim.App.1992).

Although voir dire examination is largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, a trial court"abuses its discretion when its denial of the right to ask a proper question prevents determination of whether grounds exist to challenge for cause or denies intelligent use of peremptory challenges."Babcock v. Northwest Mem'l Hosp.,767 S.W.2d 705, 709(Tex.1989);see alsoTex.R. Civ. P. 228(defining challenge for cause).

To obtain a reversal, the complaining party must show that the trial court abused its discretion and the error affected appellant's substantial rights.SeeTex.R.App. P. 44.2(b).A substantial right is affected where the error causes a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict.Morales v. State,32 S.W.3d 862, 867(Tex.Crim.App.2000).

B.Discussion

Appellant claims the trial court allowed the State to ask three improper commitment questions during voir dire.A commitment question is one that "commits a prospective juror to resolve, or to refrain from resolving, an issue a certain way after learning a particular fact."Standefer v. State,59 S.W.3d 177, 179(Tex.Crim.App.2001).For a commitment question to be proper, one of the possible answers to the question must give rise to a valid challenge for cause.Id. at 182.

The inquiry for determining an improper commitment question, therefore, involves two steps: (1) a determination of whether the question is indeed a commitment question; and (2) a determination of whether the question includes facts—and only those facts—that lead to a valid challenge for cause.Id. at 182.If the answer to the first determination is "yes" and the answer to the second is "no," the proposed question is an improper commitment question and the trial court should not allow it.Id. at 182-183.

Here, appellant complains of three questions.First, he asserts the State improperly committed venire members to convict under facts presented by asking:

(1)"[T]he law does not require me to present DNA or medical evidence... before you can convict ... As long as you have other evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the law authorizes a conviction ...[W]ho still needs [DNA or medical evidence], who cannot follow the law?"³

(2)"[W]hat if I'm able to prove my case to you beyond a reasonable doubt through other ... types of evidence, but the child [herself] cannot [testify or articulate the offense?]... Is there anyone here who, even if they felt I proved my case through other means or evidence, cannot convict unless they hear it out of the mouth of the child complainant in court?"

Appellant also complains the State improperly committed venire members to facts analogous to his case by asking a question built on a "hypothetical" posed earlier by the trial court:

(3)"What if you're on a jury and, after seeing the evidence, you conclude that the 13-year-old [complainant described earlier by the trial court] was the instigator ... [t]hat they in essence took advantage of a 17-year-old...Did everyone raise their hand earlier [who said they] can't even consider probation in the appropriate case, in a case where it makes sense?"

The State asserts the three questions were not commitment questions or, alternatively, that they were not improper, because they could logically lead to valid challenges for cause.We agree with the State's second argument.

1.Were the State's questions "commitment questions"?

A commitment question is one that commits a prospective juror to resolve, or to refrain from resolving, an issue a certain way after learning a particular fact.SeeStandefer,59 S.W.3d at 179, 183(determining a question was a commitment question when defense counsel sought to ask venire members if they"[w]ould ... presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?").

Here, the State's questions required prospective jurors to:

(1) resolve the issue of whether they could convict appellant where there was no DNA and medical evidence presented;

(2) resolve the issue of whether they could convict appellant where the child complainant did not testify; and

(3) resolve the issue of whether they could give someone probation where the child complainant was the one who initiated the improper sexual encounter.

Because all three questions required venire members to commit to convicting or...