Mason v. State
Decision Date | 24 November 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 2340, Sept. Term, 2012.,2340, Sept. Term, 2012. |
Citation | 126 A.3d 129,225 Md.App. 467 |
Parties | Sharon Marie MASON v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Brian M. Saccenti (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellant.
Robert Taylor, Jr. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellee.
Panel: DEBORAH S. EYLER, WOODWARD and RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
On December 6, 2012, Sharon Marie Mason, appellant, was convicted of perjury in a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Saint Mary's County because of her false testimony at the trial of her fiancé, Jason Winnegar, for driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). At the DUI trial, appellant testified that she had been driving a Ford Ranger that was pulled over by Trooper First Class Edward Mersman, but that she and Winnegar switched seats when they were stopped. Trooper Mersman testified that he observed a male, later identified as Winnegar, who was driving the truck when it sped past his patrol car, and was sitting in the driver's seat when the truck was stopped.
At appellant's perjury trial, Trooper Mersman again testified that Winnegar was driving the truck, and the State introduced a video of the traffic stop taken from the dashboard camera in Trooper Mersman's vehicle. A transcript of appellant's testimony from the DUI trial also was entered into evidence. Based on Trooper Mersman's testimony, the video, and the transcript, the circuit court found appellant guilty of perjury.
On appeal, appellant presents a single question for our review, which we have rephrased:1 Was there sufficient evidence to convict appellant of perjury? For the reasons set forth herein, we uphold appellant's conviction for perjury and thus affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
On May 29, 2011, appellant and Winnegar were stopped for speeding by Trooper Mersman of the Maryland State Police. After smelling an odor of an alcoholic beverage on Winnegar's breath and person, Trooper Mersman removed Winnegar from the truck and asked him to perform three field sobriety tests. Winnegar failed one test,2 and Trooper Mersman arrested him for DUI.
Winnegar's jury trial was held on February 29, 2012. At the trial, Trooper Mersman testified that he observed a speeding Ford Ranger drive past his patrol car, and that a white male, later identified as Winnegar, was driving. He also testified that there was a female in the passenger's seat, and that, when the truck drove by, both the driver and the passenger were wearing seat belts. Trooper Mersman noted that Winnegar was still in the driver's seat when he approached the truck after it had stopped.
Appellant testified at Winnegar's trial. She stated that, contrary to Trooper Mersman's testimony, she was driving the truck when it was pulled over, and Winnegar, who had been drinking, was in the passenger's seat. Appellant explained that, when they were stopped, the two switched seats, because "the [truck's] tags were dead" and Winnegar did not want to get appellant in trouble.3 According to appellant, in the process of changing seats, she did not lift her weight off the bench seat of the truck, but shifted from one side to the other while Winnegar lifted himself over her. Despite appellant's testimony, the jury found Winnegar guilty of DUI.4
On April 4, 2012, appellant was indicted for perjury based on her testimony at Winnegar's DUI trial. She entered a plea of not guilty, and a bench trial was held on December 6, 2012. Trooper Mersman was the only witness called by the State. He again testified that, when he saw the Ford Ranger drive by, a white male was driving the truck, a white female was in the passenger's seat, and both were wearing seat belts. Trooper Mersman noted that the male was still in the driver's seat wearing a seat belt when the truck came to a stop and the trooper exited his police vehicle. Trooper Mersman testified that he could "kind of see [appellant]," but could not tell if she was still wearing a seat belt until he reached the driver's side window of the truck. At that point, Trooper Mersman saw that appellant "was also still in the passenger seat buckled in." Trooper Mersman noted that he "didn't see any strange movement going on in the vehicle" when he approached. At the driver's side window, Trooper Mersman made contact with Winnegar "and began [his] traffic stop."
In addition to Trooper Mersman's testimony, the State presented a video taken by the dashboard camera in Trooper Mersman's police vehicle. The video showed the entire stop of the truck and the encounter between Trooper Mersman, Winnegar, and appellant. Appellant did not testify at her perjury trial, but a written transcript of her testimony from Winnegar's DUI trial was introduced into evidence.
Based on Trooper Mersman's testimony, the video, and the transcript, the circuit court concluded that appellant had perjured herself at Winnegar's trial. In support of its conclusion, the court offered the following explanation:
Appellant was sentenced to one year imprisonment, with all but three days time served suspended, and two years of supervised probation. Appellant then filed this timely appeal.
The standard of review for non-jury trials is governed by Maryland Rule 8–131(c), which requires this Court to accept the factual findings of the trial court unless clearly erroneous. Determinations of legal questions or conclusions of law based on the trial court's findings of facts are reviewed de novo. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Harrison, 186 Md.App. 228, 262–63, 973 A.2d 841 (2009).
Montgomery v. State, 206 Md.App. 357, 385, 47 A.3d 1140 (alterations in original) (quoting Morris v. State, 192 Md.App. 1, 30–31, 993 A.2d 716 (2010) ), cert. denied, 429 Md. 83, 54 A.3d 761 (2012).
Appellant initially argues that the trial court made improper factual inferences regarding the video showing Trooper Mersman's traffic stop of Winnegar's truck. According to appellant, the trial court was clearly erroneous in concluding that, because the truck moved when appellant got in and out of the vehicle, the truck also should have moved if appellant and Winnegar had switched seats. Appellant contends that this inference was not rational, because the truck would not move in the same way when appellant shifted her weight from one side of the truck to the other as when she added or subtracted her weight from the truck. Appellant supports this argument by stating that the video shows that when appellant shifted her weight while seated on the truck's tailgate, the truck did not visibly move.
The State responds that it was rational for the trial court to infer that the truck would have moved if appellant and Winnegar had traded seats. We agree with the State.
As noted above, we defer to the fact finder's inferences from the evidence when the evidence supports different inferences....
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